Mohammed Ali Jinnah

Maker of Modern Pakistan

PROBLEMS IN ASIAN CIVILIZATIONS



Sheila Mc Donough

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY

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EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

Sheila McDonough

SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY

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INTRODUCTION

HOW decisive was the role played by Mohammed Ali Jinnah—the Quaid-i-Azam—in the creation of Pakistan? A visitor to Pakistan will see pictures of Jinnah prominently displayed and will find that most Pakistanis are very proud of their "great leader." Nevertheless, debate continues about Jinnah's motivations and role as scholars attempt to gain a clearer perspective on the events that led to the partition of the subcontinent into the two nations of India and Pakistan.

Almost all those who write on the subject characterize Jinnah as somewhat remote and incalculable. He was not a man likely to reveal to anyone much about his inner thoughts and purposes. The question of his motivation is disputed vigorously, but exponents of various theories offer very little evidence by way of confessions from Jinnah himself. One theory is that jealousy and spite motivated his long fight against the policies of the Gandhi-dominated Congress. Upholders of this view think that Jinnah almost became leader of the Indian struggle for independence, and that he never forgave Gandhi and Nehru for taking control of the Congress away from himself and his friends. A second view is that he alone among the Muslims was incorruptible and intelligent enough to be trusted by the Muslims to lead them safely out of the perils of Hindu domination. From this angle, the belief is that leadership was imposed upon him by his community. A third point of view is that he was less a conscious instigator of policies than an instrument of forces of class and communal antagonism that neither he nor any of the political leaders of the time fully understood.

Opinions vary about how much personal control he exerted during the years in which he led the Muslim League. Some think he dominated his followers so much that all the main decisions made by the Muslim League were the result of his direction. Others see him as the efficient advocate of the causes that his followers had freely agreed upon. A third view is that he exerted forceful, but realistic leadership. This theory assumes that he often gave direction and was usually more far-seeing than his followers; it also implies that his leadership was always conditioned and shaped by the attitudes and interests of the many diverse Muslim individuals and groups who were united in following him.

Jinnah is said to have been born in 1875 in Karachi. His biographers in talking to the few people who remember him as a child have gathered an impression of a somewhat withdrawn, but very able boy. A capacity for single-minded, purposeful hard work seems to have been noticeable in him from his early days. His family was middle class and relatively well-to-do, but not wealthy. An Englishman living in Karachi urged Jinnah's father to send the boy to England; Jinnah went at the age of fifteen to study law. He seems to have stood out among the other Indian students in London at the time. Several of the Indian leaders cultivated his friendship, involving him in their political activities, especially in the successful campaign to get an Indian elected to the British Parliament. Jinnah's convictions about the effectiveness of the parliamentary system date from this period.

When he returned to India he began his political career as an enthusiastic supporter of the liberal leadership of the Indian National Congress from 1906 to 1919. He also worked hard to make a success of his legal career. As the only Muslim lawyer in Bombay at that time, he had no assets but ability and readiness to work. But his intelligence was recognized and responsibilities were given to him by those who trusted his capacities. Two of the leading Congress personalities of this period, Dadabhai Naoroji and G. K. Golhale, treated Jinnah as a friend and a possible candidate for a place of authority in the Congress.

In these days of Hindu-Muslim cooperation it seems to have been taken for granted that the young Jinnah would play an important role in the future struggle for Indian independence from Britain. Even as late as 1930, Muhammad Ali, Gandhi's friend and co-worker, stated that Jinnah was one of the few who might be a future prime minister of India.[1] Another Congress leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, in 1940 envisaged the possibility that Jinnah might lead India.

Commentators generally agreed that it was the success of Gandhi and his followers in taking over the direction of nationalist activities in the early 1920's that led Jinnah to abandon the Congress. For a brief period he seems to have despaired of India. In 1928 he left the country, apparently for good, and set up a law practice in England. He did not return until 1934, probably in response to an invitation from the Indian Muslims to help them organize themselves against the increasing power of the Congress.

The Muslim League had been established in 1906 by a small group of upper-class Muslims who wanted to protect Muslim interests. Membership in the League at this time did not preclude membership in the Congress as well. Jinnah, however, waited to join the League until 1913 when an agreement was reached that the Congress and the League would cooperate. This was followed by the Lucknow Pact of 1916 wherein the Congress and the Muslim League agreed to work together to make common political demands on the British. This period of cooperation lasted only two or three years, although sharp antagonism between the League and the Congress did not develop until some years later, after Gandhi and his followers became active in the Congress. It was not until 1937 that the extent of Muslim bitterness became markedly apparent.

In attempting to evaluate these developments, we are naturally led to ask why Jinnah objected to Gandhi's leadership of the Congress, and specifically to the civil disobedience movements. From one angle Jinnah's objection to Gandhi is interpreted as the distaste of a liberal, bourgeois politician for Gandhi's emphasis on religious motivation and the arousing of the masses; from another, the belief is that his dislike for Gandhi's style was founded on respect for constitutional procedure. Thus he seems to have objected just as much to the Gandhi-supported Muslim Khilafat movement as to the civil disobedience agitations. The Khilafat movement was a failure in terms of its stated objectives, since the Turkish Caliph was expelled from Turkey. Jinnah was possibly a greater realist than most of the Indian Muslims in recognizing from the beginning that the Khilafat ideals were impractical. On the other hand, the Muslims gained experience in organization during the Khilafat movement, and much of that same experience Jinnah later used to organize the Muslim League. "Distaste" is perhaps the key word here: Jinnah seems to have found just about all of Ghandi's attitudes and policies distasteful and destructive of sound political life.

The Muslim League, under Jinnah's leadership, participated in the 1937 Indian election, but did badly in comparison with the Congress. At this point Nehru and other Congress leaders argued that the League had proved itself to be an ineffective political force. That very defeat, however, combined with Muslim feeling that the new Congress provincial governments were acting against Muslim interests, acted as a catalyst on Jinnah himself and on Indian Muslims generally. It is from this period that Jinnah became known as the Quaid-i-Azam, "the great leader," and the League actively undertook to organize all classes of Muslims. Today one finds disagreement as to the reasons behind the transformations of Jinnah's personal role, and the turning of the Muslim League into an organization of the masses. Some see these developments as the fruit of Jinnah's festering resentment of Congress success. Others claim that Jinnah accepted a role that the Muslims wanted him to play as their

[1] *Selections from Muhammad Ali's Comrade*, ed. by Rais Ahmad Jafri Nadvi, Muhammad Ali Academy, Lahore, 1965, p. 141.

spokesman against forces increasingly hostile to them. All agree, however, that he succeeded to a remarkable degree in subordinating the diverse elements of the Muslim League to his control and in launching a successful mass-contact movement among the Muslims.

The Muslim League and the Congress responded differently to the outbreak of World War II. The Congress used the occasion to begin its "Quit India" movement and to try to force the British to grant Indian independence immediately. One result was the jailing of the Congress leadership during much of the war period. Jinnah kept the Muslim League out of that particular struggle, using the time to further strengthen League power among the Indian Muslims. By the end of the war the League was stronger than ever and more determined to safeguard Muslim rights. The trust and mutual respect that had formerly existed between Hindus and Muslims had greatly deteriorated in the years preceding and during the war. The victory of the Labour party in Britain added a new factor to the situation, since Jinnah and the League leadership believed that the Labour party was particularly sympathetic to the Congress. Various British delegations came to India to negotiate terms for independence, but none of them was able to come up with an acceptable formula.

The Muslim League called for "Direct Action" to be observed by Muslims on August 16th, 1946. The result was an outburst of savage rioting in Calcutta. These riots exacerbated the mood of antagonism and fear throughout the subcontinent, helping to create a situation in which riots became more frequent and dangerous.

What did the League mean by "Direct Action"? Most commentators agree that it would have been out of character for Jinnah, who had always insisted on correct constitutional procedures, to have advocated violence and disorder. Some suggest that Jinnah may have been driven to extreme measures by the fear that the British were on the verge of granting Congress all its demands for power in an independent India. Others wonder if Jinnah understood the dangers of mass upheaval and destruction latent in the situation. In the accounts of that day there is wide difference of opinion as to whether Hindus or Muslims were responsible for the violence in the beginning. One gets a distinct impression of confusion in the minds of the political leaders on both sides once the explosions of killing and looting began. All, however, agree that the situation got very much out of hand.

The partition of the subcontinent took place in 1947. Jinnah became Governor-General of Pakistan, but he died in September, 1948, after an exhausting year of directing the new nation. To get an overall picture of his life and work it is necessary to take into account not only the many years in which he led the struggle for the nation, but also the one year in which he worked for its survival. A founder, especially one as revered as Jinnah, becomes in the national consciousness a kind of model of ideal characteristics, one whose example serves to stimulate emulation among the citizens of the nation. For this reason, Jinnah's acts and speeches in that final year are of considerable importance as a guide not only to his motives and attitudes, but also to the kind of norms which he left to Pakistan. From this year's activity, we can discern Jinnah's views on such fundamental problems as theocracy, democracy, civil rights, and religous freedom.

When we attempt to evaluate Jinnah's legacy to Pakistan, it is helpful to keep several questions in mind. In what sense was the new nation to be Islamic? Was the Muslim League that had fought for, and obtained, Pakistan an adequate instrument to govern the nation? Were the Muslims left behind in India betrayed or safeguarded by the existence of Pakistan? Was the union of socialists and landlords that Jinnah had kept together a viable political force when questions of implementing social and economic policies arose? Was Jinnah's decision to become Governor-General fortunate in terms of shaping the direction of future relations with India? How deeply did Jinnah's attitudes influence his followers?

CONFLICT OF OPINION

Never was there a nature whose outer qualities provided so complete an antithesis of its inner worth. Tall and stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and luxurious of habit, Mohammed Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is the deceptive sheath of a spirit of exceptional vitality and endurance. Somewhat formal and fastidious, and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks—for those who know him—a naive and eager humanity, an intuition quick and tender as a woman's, a humour gay and winning as a child's. Preeminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate in his estimate and acceptance of life, the obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly wisdom effectually disguise a shy and splendid idealism which is the very essence of the man.

—SAROJINI NAIDU

Jinnah was the man. Incorruptible, rich and disinterested in economic benefits for himself, his furious hatred of Gandhi and Nehru, who had "worked under" him and driven him out of politics, plus his conceit and "repressed intensity" bordering on the psychotic brought him back to politics in his sixties with a zeal that knew no principle except success.

—LOUIS FISCHER

Mr. M. A. Jinnah himself was more advanced than most of his colleagues of the Muslim League. Indeed he stood head and shoulders above them. . . . He was their leader, but he could only keep them together by becoming himself a prisoner to their reactionary ideologies.

—JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah's influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day. . . . Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. . . . But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition, he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society.

—B. R. AMBEDKAR

In his efforts to build up a strong Muslim party, M. A. Jinnah attached prime importance to the consolidation of the upper Muslim bourgeosie. He had never been an advocate of mass forms in the national-liberation movement, and had never, until 1935, appealed to the Muslim working people. He spoke of the "mob" with mingled contempt and mistrust. . . .

—Y. V. GANKOVSKY and L. R. GORDON-POLONSKAYA

Jinnah himself had thundered against the exploitation of the common people by landlords and capitalists. "There are millions and millions of our people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilization? is this the aim of Pakistan? . . . If that is the idea of Pakistan I would not have it. . . . "When Jinnah reorganized the Muslim League during 1935–7, he knew that in the struggle for power that was taking place in India, Muslims would not amount to anything unless they organized themselves through a powerful political organization. . . . Thus, Jinnah's conception of a political organization was that it was like an army in which once orders were given by the High Command they should be carried out.

—KHALID BIN SAYEED

But if Pakistan was not the creation of the British, it cannot be attributed solely to Jinnah. Jinnah, having an unrivalled reputation among the Muslims for political integrity and parliamentary skill, was the obvious leader who guided rather than caused the movement towards Pakistan between 1937 and 1940. If there had been no Jinnah, it still seems probable that there would have been a Pakistan.

—RICHARD SYMONDS

A big event of this time was Mr. Jinnah's decision to become Pakistan's first Governor-General. . . . Whether Mr. Jinnah's choice proved right for Pakistan is a question uncommitted Westerners may prefer to leave open. With Pakistanis, his prestige stands so high that few would admit the possibility of his making any major error. In his lifetime, he becomes the acknowledged Father of the Nation; and his memory commands unquestioning reverence, rather like Ataturk's in Turkey or Mr. Gandhi's in India.

—IAN STEPHENS

Yes, indeed, Quaid-i-Azam had a contempt for such conservative minds which naturally dreaded democracy. It was for precisely this reason that he upheld the principles of Islamic democracy.

—JAVID IQBAL

I. JINNAH: THE MAN

Hector Bolitho

THE YOUNG JINNAH

Jinnah Creator of Pakistan is the best biography of Jinnah yet written by a Westerner. Hector Bolitho is an English journalist. In this selection he considers some of the significant influences on the young Jinnah. Most of Jinnah's observers have noted that he was strict and methodical in his habits and attitudes. Both in small matters, such as his monocle, and in larger matters, such as his belief in constitutional procedure, Jinnah remained consistent from his early teens to the end of his life. The picture Bolitho gives of the able young student and advocate, aware of his abilities and of the obstacles before him, is an important clue to Jinnah's later activities.

IN the heart of the bustling new city is old Karachi, the town of mellow houses that Jinnah knew as a boy. Some of the streets are so narrow, and the houses so low, that the camels ambling past can look in the first-floor windows. In one of these narrow streets, Newnham Road, is the house—since restored and ornamented with balconies—where Mohammed Ali Jinnah was born. The date is uncertain: in the register of his first school, in Karachi, the day is recorded as October 20, 1875; but Jinnah always said that he had been born on Christmas Day—in 1876. If the 1876 date is correct, he was seven days old when Queen Victoria was proclaimed the Kaiser-i-Hind, on the Plain of Delhi. He was born in the year that the Imperial India was created, and he lived to negotiate, with Queen Victoria's great-grandson, for its partition and deliverance from British rule.

In one of the tenement houses in old Karachi there lives Fatima Bai, a handsome old woman, aged eighty-six; one of the few persons who can remember Mohammed Ali Jinnah when he was a boy. She was a bride of sixteen, married to one of Jinnah's cousins, when she arrived in the family home in Karachi. The year was 1884. Jinnah was then seven years old.

Fatima Bai lives with her son, Mohammed Ali Ganji, in rooms at the top of a flight of bare stone stairs. I went there one evening and she received me in her own room, in which there were her bed, an immense rocking-chair, and a wardrobe where, among the bundles of clothes, the few existing documents —the family archives—were kept.

Mohammed Ali Ganji spread the papers on the bed, beside his mother, and then gave me the bones of the early story.

Although Jinnah's immediate ancestors were Muslims—followers of the Khoja sect of the Aga Khan—they came, like so many Muslim families in India, of old Hindu stock. Mohammed Ali Ganji said that the family migrated to the Kathiawar Peninsula from the Multan area, north of the Sind desert, long ago. From Kathiawar, they moved to Karachi, where they settled and prospered in a modest way.

When Jinnah was six years old, he was sent to school in Karachi. When he was ten, he went on a ship to Bombay,

From Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), pp. 3–5, 7–11, 14–15, 18–19, 21–22. Documenting footnotes in this and subsequent selections have been omitted.

where he attended the Gokul Das Tej Primary School, for one year. He was eleven when he returned to Karachi, to the Sind Madrasah High School; and he was fifteen when he went to the Christian Missionary Society High School, also in Karachi.

Mohammed Ali Ganji said, "In the same year that he was at the Mission School, he was married by his parents as was the custom of the country, to Amai Bai, a Khoja girl from Kathiawar. In 1892 he went to England to study law and, while he was there, his young wife died. Soon afterwards, his mother died, and his father became very poor. . . ."

Fatima Bai raised her hand and interrupted her son: she said, "He was a good boy; a clever boy. We lived, eight of us, in two rooms on the first floor of the house in Newnham Road. At night, when the children were sleeping, he would stand a sheet of cardboard against the oil lamp, to shield the eyes of the children from the light. Then he would read, and read. One night I went to him and said, 'You will make yourself ill from so much study,' and he answered, 'Bai, you know I cannot achieve anything in life unless I work hard.' "

As Fatima Bai finished her story, an old man appeared at the door; a smiling old Muslim with tousled, snow-white hair. His name was Nanji Jafar. He came in, sat in the rocking-chair and said that, as far as he knew, he was in his eighties. Though he had been at school with Jinnah, all he could recall was, "I played marbles with him in the street. . . ." When I asked, "Can you remember anything he said to you?" he looked from beneath his thick brows and repeated, "I played marbles in the street with him."

I asked him to close his eyes and to see, once more, the coloured glass marbles in the dust. Nanji Jafar closed his eyes and dug deeper into his memory: then he told his only anecdote of Jinnah's boyhood. One morning, when Nanji Jafar was playing in the street, Jinnah, then aged about fourteen, came up to him and said, "Don't play marbles in the dust; it spoils your clothes and dirties your hands. We must stand up and play cricket."

The boys in Newnham Road were obedient: they gave up playing marbles and allowed Jinnah to lead them from the dusty street to a bright field where he brought his bat and stumps for them to use. When he sailed for England at the age of sixteen, he gave Nanji Jafar his bat and said, "You will go on teaching the boys to play cricket while I am away."

All Jinnah's story is in the boyhood dictum—"Stand up from the dust so that your clothes are unspoiled and your hands clean for the tasks that fall to them. . . ."

At the time when Jinnah finished his schooling, there was an Englishman, Frederick Leigh Croft, working as an exchange broker in Bombay and Karachi. He was heir to a baronetcy—a thirty-two-year-old bachelor, described by a kinswoman who remembers him as "something of a dandy, with a freshly picked carnation in his buttonhole each morning, a recluse and a wit, uncomfortable in the presence of children, whom he did not like." But he liked Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and was impressed by his talents. Frederick Leigh Croft ultimately persuaded Jinnah Poonja to send his son to London, to learn the practice of law.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah was not yet sixteen when he sailed across the Arabian Sea, towards the western world . . . which was to imbue him with an Englishness of manner and behavior that endured to his death. . . .

Mrs. Naidu wrote of Jinnah some years later, "It seems a pity that so fine an intelligence should have denied itself the hall-mark of a University education." Jinnah apparently withstood the temptations of literature, and art, and even of history. His mind seldom doted on the past, and it would seem that his habits in London were narrowed down —that his way was from lectures in Lincoln's Inn, to debates in the House of Commons, without any pausing in the National Gallery on the way. He was to do two things brilliantly in his life: he

was to become a great advocate, and he was to create a nation. From the beginning, he did not dissipate his energies with hobbies, nor his strength in dalliance. His chief passions were in his mind.

In an address to the Karachi Bar Association in 1947, Jinnah recalled, "I joined Lincoln's Inn because there on the main entrance, the name of the Prophet was included in the list of the great law-givers of the world." He spoke of the Muhammad as "a great statesman, and a great sovereign." His appreciation of the Prophet was realistic: perhaps his political conscience, as a Muslim, had already begun to stir while he was in England.

Jinnah told Dr. Ashraf that, during the last two years in London, his time was "utilized for future independent studies for the political career" he already "had in mind." Jinnah also said, "Fortune smiled on me, and I happened to meet several important English Liberals with whose help I came to understand the doctrine of Liberalism. The Liberalism of Lord Morley was then in full sway. I grasped that Liberalism, which became part of my life and thrilled me very much."

This awakening in politics coincided with significant personal changes. Up to April 1894, Mohammed Ali Jinnah used his boyhood name, Jinnahbhai—*bhai* being a suffix used in the Gujrati language which was his mother tongue. On April 14, 1894, he adopted the English fashion in names and became Mr. Jinnah, the form he used for the rest of his life. He had also abandoned his "funny long yellow coat" and adopted English clothes; and—perhaps encouraged by the sight of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in the House—he had bought his first monocle.

It must have been an important moment in the development of his courage, and his personality, when he went to an optician's shop in London and bought the first of many monocles, which he wore during the next fifty years—even at the end, when he was being carried into his capital on a stretcher; a dying warrior, holding the circle of glass between his almost transparent fingers.

* * *

Jinnah had said that "the Liberalism of Lord Morley" thrilled him very much. The thrill must have been intensified on June 21, 1892, when he read of the Royal Assent to the Amendment to the Indian Councils Act, empowering the Viceroy to increase the numbers in the Legislative and Provincial Councils—an amendment that gave the people of India, for the first time, "a potential voice" in the government of their country.

The beginning of Jinnah's partiality for Liberalism was well-timed. At the end of May 1892, Mr. Gladstone spoke "with a vigour and animation most remarkable in a man of eighty-two." He was rewarded in the following August, when the Liberals came into power after six years of Tory rule under Lord Salisbury.

The early 1890's offered refreshing opportunities for any young novice in politics, newly arrived from India, anxious to learn, and naturally in love with agitation and reform. In 1893, when Jinnah must have recovered from his loneliness and "settled down," he was able to listen to some of the lively debates over Mr. Gladstone's Irish Home Rule Bill: he was able also to study English reactions to affairs in India, and Egypt; to watch the growing power of Labour, and to develop his sympathy with the political emancipation of women—a reform that became a fixed part of his political creed when he returned to India.

There was another stirring innovation, nearer his own heart. Jinnah arrived in London in time to watch—perhaps to help—the election of the first Indian, Dadabhai Naoroji, to the British Parliament, as member for the Central Finsbury.

Dadabhai Naoroji was a Parsee, aged sixty-seven at the time of his return: for many years he had been a business man in London. Photographs of him, in later life, reveal some of the reasons

why he came to be known as the "Grand Old Man of India." His humorous old eyes, long white beard, and relaxed hands, proclaim the teacher, about whom young Indians gathered to learn —rather than the furious agitator in love with change for its own sake.

When Dadabhai Naoroji announced his intention to stand as Liberal candidate for Central Finsbury, Lord Salisbury committed the clumsy folly, in a speech at Edinburgh, of saying, "I doubt if we have yet got to the point of view where a British constituency would elect a black man." The Scottish electors shouted "Shame! . . ." Victoria, attended by Indian servants and engrossed in her study of Hindustani, was much displeased.

The unhappy insult—addedly unfortunate because Dadabhai Naoroji had a paler skin than Lord Salisbury—soon made the Parsee Liberal into a hero. The chapters in his biography, describing the controversy awakened by the election in Finsbury, make an exciting story. Women's Suffrage was one of his aims, and he was therefore overwhelmed by women helpers. Among the letters sent to him was one from Florence Nightingale: "I rejoice beyond measure," she wrote, "that you are now the only Liberal candidate for Central Finsbury."

Dadabhai Naoroji was elected, with a majority of three, and the quick-tongued Cockneys who had voted for him turned his difficult name into "Mr. Narrow-Majority."

Mohammed Ali Jinnah was caught up in the excitement of the Finsbury election, and he prospered under the influence of Dadabhai Naoroji, whom he was to serve, as secretary, fourteen years later. It is reasonable to suppose that Jinnah learned much from Naoroji's speeches; that he absorbed some ideas from the Grand Old Man. . . .

Mohammed Ali Jinnah returned to India in the autumn of 1896. He was then a qualified barrister, aged almost twenty, and devoted to the Liberalism he had absorbed from Gladstone, Morley, and Dadabhai Naoroji. English had become his chief language, and it remained so, for he never mastered Urdu: even when he was leading the Muslims into freedom, he had to define the terms of their emancipation in an alien tongue. His clothes also remained English, until the last years of his life, when he adopted the *sherwani* and *shalwar* of the Muslim gentlemen. And his manner of address was English: he had already assumed the habit, which he never gave up, of shaking his finger at his listener and saying, "My dear fellow, you do not understand."

Mohammed Ali Jinnah sailed for Bombay in 1897, but he was to endure three more years of penury, and disappointment, before he began to climb. Mr. M. H. Saiyid, who was Jinnah's secretary in later years, has written of this lean time. "The first three years were of great hardship and although he attended the office regularly every day, he wandered without a single brief. The long and crowded foot-paths of Bombay may, if they could only speak, bear testimony to a young pedestrian pacing them every morning from his new abode . . . a humble locality in the city, to his office in the Fort, . . . and every evening back again to his apartments after a weary, toilsome day spent in anxious expectation."

At the turn of the century, Jinnah's fortune changed, through the kindness of the acting Advocate-General of Bombay, John Molesworth MacPherson, who invited the young lawyer to work in his chambers. Mrs. Naidu wrote of this as "a courteous concession—the first of its kind ever extended to an Indian," which Jinnah remembered as "a beacon of hope in the dark distress of his early struggles."

* * *

The second advocate resumed his story: he said: "You must realize that Jinnah was a great pleader, although not equally gifted as a lawyer. He had to be briefed with care, but, once he had grasped the facts of a case, there was no one to touch him in legal argument. He was what God made him, not what he made himself, God made him a *great* pleader. He had a sixth sense: he could see around corners. That is where his

talents lay. When you examine what he said, you realize that he was a very clear thinker, though he lacked the polish that a university education would have given him. But he drove his points home—points chosen with exquisite selection—slow delivery, word by word. It was all pure, cold logic."

The first advocate then told another story. "One of the younger men practising at that time—younger than Jinnah—was M. A. Somjee, who became a High Court Judge. They were appearing, as opposed counsel in a case which was suddenly called for on hearing. Mr. Somjee was in another court at the time and the solicitor instructing him asked Jinnah to agree to a short adjournment. Jinnah refused. The solicitor then appealed to the judge, who saw no objection, provided Jinnah would agree. But Jinnah would *not* agree: he stood up and said: 'My learned friend should have anticipated this and he should have asked me personally for an adjournment.' "

"Jinnah's arrogance would have destroyed a man of less will and talent. Some of us used to resent his insolent manner—his overbearing ways—and what seemed to be lack of kindness. But no one could deny his power of argument. When he stood up in Court, slowly looking towards the judge, placing his monocle in his eye—with the sense of timing you would expect from an actor—he became omnipotent. Yes, that is the word, *omnipotent*."

"Maybe," said the third advocate, "but, always, with Jinnah one comes back to his honesty. Once when a client was referred to him, the solicitor mentioned that the man had limited money with which to fight the suit. Nevertheless, Jinnah took it up. He lost—but he still had faith in the case and he said that it should be taken to the Appeal Court. The solicitor again mentioned that his client had no money. Jinnah pressed him to defray certain of the appeal expenses out of his own pocket and promised to fight the case without any fee for himself. This time, he won; but when the solicitor offered him a fee, Jinnah refused—arguing that he had accepted the case on the condition that there was no fee."

"I'll tell you another story along that line," said the second advocate. "There was a client who was so pleased with Jinnah's services in a case, that he sent him an additional fee. Jinnah returned it, with a note, 'This is the amount you paid me—. This was the fee. Here is the balance—.' "

When the three lawyers were asked, "Did you merely admire Jinnah, or did any of you become fond of him?" one of them answered, "Yes, I was genuinely fond of him, because of his sense of justice. And because, with all the differences and bitterness of political life, I believe he was a man without malice: hard, maybe, but without malice."

* * *

Two of the advocates who spoke of Jinnah were Hindus: one was a Parsee. Some time later, a veteran Muslim barrister gave his different, perhaps more penetrating, impression of Jinnah's work at the Bar. "One must realize," he said, "that when he began to practise, he was the solitary Muslim barrister of the time: there may have been one or two others, but they did not amount to a row of pins. This was in a profession made up mostly of Hindus and Parsees. Perhaps they were over-critical of a Muslim—who came from business stock—setting up such a standard of industry. There was no pleasure in Jinnah's life; there were no interests beyond his work. He laboured at his briefs, day and night. I can see him now; slim as a reed, always frowning, always in a hurry. There was never a whisper of gossip about his private habits. He was a hard-working, celibate, and not very gracious young man. Much too serious to attract friends. A figure like that invites criticism, especially in the lazy East, where we find it easier to forgive a man for his faults than for his virtues."

* * *

During these years of Jinnah's early success as a lawyer, he met Mrs. Saro-

jini Naidu, the first sophisticated, intelligent woman to observe his talents, to see beyond the arrogance of the young advocate. She wrote of him:

> Never was there a nature whose outer qualities provided so complete an antithesis of its inner worth. Tall and stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and luxurious of habit, Mohamed Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is the deceptive sheath of a spirit of exceptional vitality and endurance. Somewhat formal and fastidious, and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks—for those who know him—a naive and eager humanity, an intuition quick and tender as a woman's, a humour gay and winning as a child's. Preeminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate in his estimate and acceptance of life, the obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly wisdom effectually disguises a shy and splendid idealism which is the very essence of the man.

Mrs. Naidu's warm regard for Jinnah was shared by many other young women who saw, as *pride*, what his lawyer friends called *arrogance*. Among them was an old Parsee lady, still living on Malabar Hill, who remembers Jinnah at the age of twenty-eight. She has said of him, "Oh, yes, he had charm. And he was *so* good looking. Mind you, I am sure he was aware of his charm: he knew his own strength. But when he came into a room, he would bother to pay a compliment—to say, 'what a beautiful sari!' Women will forgive pride, or even arrogance, in a man like that."

Louis Fischer

GANDHI'S BIGGEST PROBLEM

Louis Fischer is an American journalist who spent some time in India, and who was sympathetic to the cause of Gandhi as he understood it. His widely-read book, *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World,* has been influential in shaping opinion about the personalities involved in the struggle that led to the establishment of India and Pakistan. His portrayal of Jinnah's character and motivation is the impression by one Western observer. It also indicates the way many of those who supported Gandhi felt about Jinnah.

MOHAMMED Ali Jinnah was a remarkable figure. Over six feet tall, he weighed 120 pounds and was a very thin man. Thick, long silver-gray hair, brushed straight back, covered his well-shaped head. The shaven face was thin, the nose long and aquiline. His temples and cheeks were deep holes which made the cheekbones stand out like high horizontal ridges. When he was not speaking, he would pull in his chin, tighten his lips, and knit his brow into an expression of forbidding earnestness. He almost never laughed. He frequently wore European clothes, but for public appearances, and some private ones too, he wore a Moslem costume: a knee-length straw-colored tunic, tight white Indian trousers that clung to his bony legs, black patent-leather pumps—and a monocle on a black cord. He was "undoubtedly," wrote George E. Jones in the *New York Times* of May 5, 1946, "one of the best dressed men in the British Empire." Mr. Jones, who interviewed Jinnah several times, described Jinnah in his book, *Tumult in India,* as "a superb political craftsman, a Machiavelli in the amoral sense of that description. . . . His personal defects are a somewhat hostile reserve, conceit, and a narrow outlook. . . . He is an extremely suspicious man, who feels that he has been wronged many times in life. His repressed intensity borders on the psychotic. Withdrawn, and isolated, Jinnah is arrogant to the point of discourtesy. . . ."

Jinnah was not a devout Moslem. He infringed the Islamic code by drinking alcohol, eating pork, and seldom going to mosque. He knew little Urdu and no Arabic. He went outside his religious community—in his forties—to marry a Parsi girl of eighteen. Yet the irreligious Jinnah wanted two religious states, while the religious Gandhi would countenance only a united secular state.

Jinnah, the first child of a rich merchant of skins, hides and gum arabic, was a Khoja Moslem. The Khojas were recent converts to Islam. Many Khojas maintain the Hindu joint family system and carry Hindu names; "Jinnah" is a Hindu name. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Khojas attempted to return to Hinduism but were repeatedly rebuffed. This may have been an unconscious factor in Jinnah's hatred of Hindus.

It was personal too. "I have been in this movement for thirty-five years," he said to me in the first of two interviews in his opulent Bombay villa in June, 1942. "Nehru worked under me in the Home Rule Society. Gandhi worked under me. I was active in the Congress party. . . . My goal was Hindu-Moslem unity. . . . So it was until 1920 when Gandhi came into the limelight. A deterioration of Hindu-Moslem relations set in. . . . I had the distinct feeling that

From Louis Fischer, *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World* (New York, 1964), pp. 150–153.

unity was hopeless, that Gandhi did not want it. I was a disappointed man. I decided to stay in England. I did not even go back to India to sell my possessions but sold them through an agent. I remained in England until 1935. I took up law practice before the Privy Council, and contrary to my expectations, I was a success."

In an article on Jinnah in the London *Economist* of September 17, 1949, an author who obviously knew his subject reported that while Jinnah was practicing law in London, somebody "repeated to him that Nehru, whom he despised and hated, had imprudently said at a private party that 'Jinnah was finished.' Outraged, Jinnah packed up and sailed back to India at once just to 'show Nehru.' . . . To Cleopatra's nose as factor in history one should perhaps add Jinnah's pride."

Hurt pride is a ferocious beast. Jealousy aroused by the bottom view of a rival mounting the ladder can become a mighty urge to achieve power in order to hurt him and others. Such motivations have made history. But history must help by offering the jealous one an opportunity, it must cup its hands under his foot to give him a boost. Historic events did form a stirrup for Jinnah's climb into the saddle. The upper- and middle-class Moslems of India were indeed fearful of Hindu rule, and as Gandhi's work in the 1920's and 1930's made independence inevitable in the foreseeable future they organized to thwart it. A free India, they believed, would be a Hindu-dominated India, "Hinduraj" they called it, and it is true that one hundred million Moslems would always be a minority among three hundred million non-Moslems (Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians, and others) if religious sentiments shaped politics. Rich Moslems and the emerging Mohammedan middle class of intellectuals and merchants assumed that in a Hindu-majority free India Hindus would get most of the government posts and enjoy other economic advantages. They were therefore reluctant to see the departure of the British who helped them obtain political jobs and adequate political representation.

The envisaged Pakistan, however, would give Moslems all the political power and jobs and control over all industry and trade. Even more important was the peasantry. With the exception of Jinnah, the founders and bosses of the Moslem League were landlords who expected a Nehru-led India to parcel out their estates among the cultivators. The Congress party of the purely-Moslem Northwest Frontier Province had actually won political power by organizing the peasants. But a theocratic Pakistan, the upper class hoped, would be poison to social radicalism; the peasant, presumably, could be persuaded to put country above land.

Pakistan was thus the answer to the rich Moslem's prayers and middle-class Moslem's dreams. A religious state offered them social safety and a political and economic monopoly.

No one motivated by sordid landlord gains or the clerk's ambitions of the educated unemployed or the obscurantism of the mullahs (preachers) could have fused all these urges into a national crusade. That required somebody who stood above them, as Hitler personally stood above the financial and business aims of the German upper bourgeoisie and East Prussian land barons. Jinnah was the man. Incorruptible, rich and disinterested in economic benefits for himself, his furious hatred of Gandhi and Nehru, who had "worked under" him and driven him out of politics, plus his conceit and "repressed intensity" bordering on the psychotic brought him back to politics in his sixties with a zeal that knew no principle except success. Interviewing Jinnah was like listening to a cracked phonograph record, no argument, merely endless repetition of slogans: Hindus and Moslems Are Separate Nations; Gandhi Wants Hindu-Raj; Pakistan Must Be. This single-minded fanaticism, unreasoning passion, and unbounded hate wrapped in a person untouched by suspicions of selfish motives had an enormous appeal to people whose hard lives and frustrations made

them an easy prey to simple goals charged with emotion: Moslems will have their own state; Moslems will rule Hindus and Sikhs instead of being ruled; the Hindu merchant, industrialist, landlord, and official will go. The victims of Jinnah were as oblivious as he to the mathematics of minorities and to practical considerations. He gave them an intoxicating banner: Pakistan. He thought only of achieving Pakistan, never of the problems of Pakistan. In fact for the first few years after he broached the idea he even refused to indicate the future borders of Pakistan. The less concrete the project the more fascinating and the less attainable by criticism. The situation was a fanatic's paradise.

Jinnah had become Gandhi's biggest problem.

S. Abid Husain

HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY

In the years immediately following his return in 1902 to practice law in Bombay, Jinnah became known for his abilities as an advocate of the rights of Indians against the British. He worked hard for Hindu-Muslim unity as a basis on which to build a nucleus of competent Indians who would provide future leadership for self-governing India. He seems always to have had the model of the British parliamentary system in his mind.

The following excerpt from *The Destiny of the Indian Muslims* by S. Abid Husain (1896–) describes the events that led to Jinnah's growing disillusionment with Gandhi's ideals and methods. Dr. Husain is a distinguished Muslim scholar who chose to remain in India. He was a professor of philosophy and literature at the Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, from 1926–1956. His other works include *National Culture of India, What is General Education*, and *The Way of Gandhi and Nehru*.

MUHAMMED Ali Jinnah . . . entered the field of Indian politics in 1906. . . . He was . . . a successful lawyer and had . . . won the respect and confidence of all the residents of Bombay, irrespective of class and confidence at the early age of 30 years. He joined the Indian National Congress under the guidance of Dadabhai Naoroji. In 1910 he was elected a member of Viceroy's Legislative Council as a representative of the Muslims of Bombay, where, along with Gokhale, he supported the Congress point of view in all legislative matters. In 1913 he had for the first and last time in his life established close relations with a fellow human being to which the term of friendship could be applied. The man was Gopal Krishna Gokhale whose charming personality cast its spell over him. In April 1913 he accompanied Gokhale on a voyage to England. . . . There he met Maulana Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan and was persuaded by them to join the Muslim League in order to "bring the policy of the League into line with the progressive and national aims of the Congress. . . ."

Mr. Jinnah had joined the Muslim League in order to bring it closer to the Congress. In December 1915 he took the initiative in holding the annual session of the Muslim League in Bombay simultaneously with that of the Congress. . . .

The special importance of the Lucknow Pact in the history of the national movement was that for the first time the National Congress formally recognized communal politics and came to an understanding with the League. Its importance in the life of Mr. Jinnah was still greater. He had succeeded in uniting the educated, middle class Hindus and Muslims and was acknowledged by both to be their respected and trusted leader. . . .

So far Mr. Jinnah was guiding the Muslim League along the path of constitutional politics which it pursued in cooperation with the Congress. In 1919, however, there were new developments which swept the Congress into a storm of popular agitation that burst with great violence. It changed from a constitutional to a revolutionary body, and to some extent dragged the League with it. Mr. Jinnah, who had so assimilated the liberalism of Lord Morley and the constitutional ways of the British that they

From S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of the Indian Muslims* (Bombay, India: 1957), pp. 67–74.

had become "a part of his life," found it difficult to get along with this stormy phase of politics.

In 1919 the British Government conceded, on the one hand, the Montague-Chelmsford reforms in response to the constitutional demand of the Congress and the League, and on the other hand, passed the Rowlatt Acts to crush the agitation of the extremists and the subversive activities of the terrorists. The latter step caused a wave of resentment not only among the educated classes but also among the common people who had, to some extent, become politically conscious during the war. Mahatma Gandhi, who had acquired valuable experience in conducting a popular movement in South Africa, tried to give the unrest among the masses the form of an organized movement. Under his guidance, people protested by closing their shops, holding public meetings, undertaking fasts and offering prayers. It was in the course of this agitation that within the walled enclosure of Jallianwala Bagh, the army opened fire on a crowd of unarmed people assembled in a protest meeting and killed hundreds of them. The firing started a series of popular risings, and to crush them the Government promulgated martial law throughout the Punjab. These deplorable happenings shook the entire population of the country, irrespective of class and creed. . . .

Thus in 1920, when the British Government and her allies decided, under the treaty of Sèvres, to dismember Turkey and thus to strike at the roots of the *Khilafat*, a special session of the Congress was held in Calcutta under the presidentship of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. It presented a joint national demand urging the repeal of the Rowlatt Acts, the granting of swaraj to India, and the revision of the clauses of the treaty relating to Turkey in such a way that the dignity of the *Khilafat* could be maintained, and warning that if the demand was not conceded the Congress would launch a movement of non-violent non-cooperation as proposed by Mahatma Gandhi. The Khilafat Conference had announced the policy of non-cooperation even earlier than the Congress, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema also passed similar resolutions, and a united national front of Hindus and Muslims was thus formed.

Only Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League kept aloof from this front. The difference between the two was not of objectives or sentiments but merely of methods. Mr. Jinnah himself bitterly resented the repressive policy of the British Government. He was utterly dissatisfied with the Reforms Act of 1919 and had protested against the Rowlatt Acts by resigning from the Imperial Legislative Council as soon as they were passed. He had also expressed his distress and resentment against "the spoliation of the *Khilafat*" and the atrocities in the Punjab.

Up to this point he was with the Congress and the semi-religious and semi-political Muslim organizations. But the "desperate" course of noncooperation was entirely against his cautious and temperate nature, and he utterly disliked it. He had sensed that, even in his Muslim League, many members had been affected by the prevailing climate in the country, and he was prudent enough not to force his views on his colleagues but to advise them to decide for themselves after full deliberation. In December 1920, when the Congress had formally accepted the policy of non-cooperation at its Nagpur session, Mr. Jinnah was the only person to oppose it. Immediately after, he resigned his membership of the Congress. He had already left the Home Rule League. He continued to be a member of the Muslim League but had lost all interest in it.

Although in the new phase of national politics that had started in 1920, Mr. Jinnah's influence over the country generally as well as over the Muslim community had become much less than before, still almost all parties had full confidence in his patriotism and political acumen. Thus in March 1927, when thirty Muslim leaders, representing different political views, met in Delhi to consider the communal problem, they made Mr. Jinnah the chairman of the meeting and the resolutions passed by it

were on the whole in accordance with his point of view; that is, they proposed joint electorates with a number of safeguards for the Muslims. . . .

A little earlier, the Central Assembly in Delhi had passed a resolution that a Round Table Conference should be convened in which representatives of the British Government and the Indian people should meet and consider the constitutional question of India. The British Government completely ignored this resolution and, on its own initiative, announced in November 1927, the appointment of a commission to look into the Indian question with Sir John Simon as its chairman and six other members, none of whom was an Indian. All political parties in India, including Mr. Jinnah's Muslim League, took the appointment of the commission as a national insult and decided to boycott it. At the same time the Madras session of the Indian National Congress, which had accepted the Delhi proposals, also met the challenge of the Simon Commission by resolving that a conference of the members of the central and provincial legislatures and the representatives of all political parties in the country should be called, to prepare a new constitution for the country. This conference appointed in its first session a committee under the presidentship of Pandit Motilal Nehru to submit a report about the proposed constitution. As the conference ignored the Delhi proposals and decided to consider the communal question afresh, the Muslim League protested by refusing to take part in the Nehru Committee. The solution of the Muslim problem suggested by the committee in its report published in August 1928, was substantially different from the Delhi proposals. The All-Parties Convention held in Calcutta for the final consideration of the report dealt a severe blow to the nationalist movement among the Muslims, from which it was never able to recover fully. In the course of the meeting, the biggest Congress Muslim leader, Maulana Muhammad Ali, was harassed to such an extent that he not only left the meeting but practically left the Congress. The treatment meted out to the biggest non-Congress Muslim leader, Mr. Jinnah, was even worse. Not only were the amendments proposed by him, known as "the 14 points of Jinnah," rejected one by one, but he was also taunted with having no right to represent the Muslims. It broke his heart and hurt his pride and he gave up all hopes of Hindu-Muslim unity which was his life's mission. A Parsee friend of his says that on this occasion he saw the proud Jinnah weeping for the first time in his life. . . .

In June 1930, he left India and settled down in London where he attended the two sessions of the Round Table Conference in 1930 and 1931 as a delegate. After the first session he had some hope that the Conference might lead to a positive result. But after the failure of the second session he withdrew entirely from political life and tried to lose himself in his profession. During the course of the second Round Table Conference Mr. Jinnah had met Dr. Iqbal and the friendship which was to have a deep influence on his ideas had begun. He was not yet prepared, however, to agree with Iqbal's idea of a separate Muslim state in North-West India which the latter had recently taken up. In the gloom of despair in which Mr. Jinnah's mind was enveloped, there was a ray of hope that it was still possible to bring about a reasonable settlement between Hindus and Muslims and to persuade them to cooperate in a constitutional endeavour for establishing an autonomous Government in India. The unconstitutional, revolutionary struggle, which millions of Hindus and Muslims had started for complete independence since 1930, was, in Mr. Jinnah's opinion, disastrous for the country, and was bound to fail. Perhaps he had a notion that after seeing the deplorable results of this movement, his countrymen whom Gandhiji had led astray would come back to the right path, and at least the Muslims would decide to work under his own leadership. At any rate, a young, able and sincere leader of the Muslim League, Liaqat Ali Khan, who, with his bride, visited London in 1933, assured him that the League-minded Muslims badly

needed his guidance. In the next two years he made several trips to India and attended the meetings of the Muslim League. In October 1934, the Muslims of Bombay once more elected him, in his absence, a member of the Central Legislative Assembly, and in October 1935, he returned to India for good and took up his residence again in Bombay.

Abdul Qayyum

JINNAH AND ISLAM

One of the criticisms sometimes made of Jinnah (by Louis Fischer, for example) is that Jinnah was not a religious man. In this selection, Abdul Qayyum demonstrates how the problem of Jinnah's alleged lack of interest in religion is handled in Pakistan. We are given a brief discussion of the characteristics of the Islamic reform movement led by Sayed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938) which helped to create some degree of consensus among "modernized" Muslims as to the significance of Islamic values for twentieth-century problems. Qayyum sees Jinnah as representative of those who followed the reforms of Sayed Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal.

IN 1875, Sayed Ahmad founded the Muhammadan Educational Conference, and remained the moving spirit behind it until his death. Even at the age of seventy-eight he would enthusiastically sit for six hours a day at the annual session of the Conference at Shahjahanpur, guiding its deliberations as secretary. The conference held its annual sessions in different parts of the country and aroused enthusiasm among the Muslim masses for western education and social reforms.

Sayed Ahmad's efforts showed promise of success when, nearly six months after his retirement from service, Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, performed the opening ceremony of the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, on 8th January 1877. The M. A. O. College, which later grew into the famous Muslim University of Aligarh, imparted, through English as the medium of instruction, knowledge of western arts and sciences, together with instructions on Islamic thought and philosophy.

* * *

Sayed Ahmad filled the big void created in the life of the Muslim community by the disappearance of the Muslim rule. But he did more. His long life, spanning almost a century, bridged the gulf between the Medieval and the Modern Islam in India. Himself, a relic of the palmy days of the Great Mughals, he ushered in a new era. He gave the Indian Muslims a new prose, a new approach to their individual and national problems, and built up an organization which could carry on his work. Before this there was all disintegration and decay. He rallied together the Indian Muslims, and became the first prophet of their new nationhood.

* * *

Born at Sialkot, Dr. Sir Mohammed Iqbal (1873–1938) received his early education under Shams-ul-Ulema Mir Hasan, whose memory has been enshrined by the poet in beautiful verse. For higher education, Iqbal moved to Lahore in 1895, and after taking his M.A. Degree, joined the local Government College as lecturer. In Lahore, he came under the influence of Sir Thomas Arnold, who had left Aligarh and had joined Government College, Lahore, as Professor of Philosophy. On Sir Thomas' advice, Iqbal proceeded to Europe for higher studies in 1905.

For the next three years, Iqbal's thought developed in the libraries of

From Abdul Qayyum, "Jinnah and Islam," in *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan,* eds. S. M. Ikram and P. Spear (Karachi, 1955), pp. 186, 188, 192–193, 201–204.

Cambridge, London and Munich. He studied philosophy at Cambridge, took his doctorate degree on the *Development of Persian Metaphysics* from Munich, and was called to the Bar in London. He studied the old masters of the East and the West, discussed philosophy and metaphysics with the renowned Dr. McTaggart, and conversed on literature and Islamics with Professors Nicholson and Browne.

* * *

It was Iqbal who was destined to play the historical role in the reconstruction of Islamic thought; he brought to bear upon Islamic institutions, which he respected no less than any Muslim of this time, a searching analysis of their fundamentals; he reinterpreted Islam as a dynamic rather than a static religion, and a liberal rather than a reactionary force. In fact, in Iqbal's view, Islam would cease to be Islam if its fundamentals were not living enough to allow a continuous process of fresh experiments and new adjustments to changes in society. It was this dynamic view of Islam that best fitted Iqbal for a happy synthesis of the East and the West in him.

The vision of a "new world" for the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was projected by Iqbal when he acclaimed that the future of Muslims, with their distinct cultural and spiritual urges, lay in a separate homeland. Presiding over the 1930 session of the Muslim League at Allahabad, he declared that he would "like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, amalgamated into a single State. . . ."

Iqbal was the first to see the vision of Pakistan. The role he played in promoting that intellectual revolution among the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, which heralded the emergence of Muslims as a separate political force, conscious of their national destiny, decidedly constituted his most valuable contribution to the Muslim cause.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohamad Ali Jinnah said about him: "To me Iqbal was friend, guide and philosopher, and during the darkest moments throughout which the Muslim League had to go, stood like a rock and never flinched for one single moment. . . . Iqbal was the bugler of Muslim thought and culture. He was the singer of the finest poetry in the world. He will live as long as Islam will live. His notable poetry represents the true aspirations of the Muslims. It will remain an inspiration for us and for generations after us."

Mohamad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) personified the liberal spirit of Islam released by Sayed Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali, as well as the dynamic philosophy of Iqbal with its emphasis on relentless action. His able leadership of their struggle for freedom, culminating in the creation of Pakistan as an independent State, brought unprecedented hope and vitality to the Muslims of the sub-continent, producing in its wake a whole cultural renaissance and youthful idealism.

Jinnah's pre-occupation with political issues left him little time to devote himself to writing; but his speeches and sayings have been compiled by his admirers into a series of volumes, and they are all permeated with a liberal outlook.

Like Iqbal, Jinnah believed in Islam as a dynamic religion. "The discipline of the Ramzan fast and prayer will culminate today in an immortal meekness of the heart before God," he said in a broadcast speech on Eid Day, "but it shall not be the meekness of a weak heart, and they who would think so are doing wrong both to God and to the Prophet, for it is the outstanding paradox of all religions that the humble shall be the strong, and it is of particular significance in the case of Islam; for Islam, as you all know, really means action. This discipline of Ramzan was designed by our Prophet to give us the necessary strength for action. . . ."

Religion for Jinnah implied not duty to God, but to Mankind. "Man has indeed been called God's caliph in the *Quran,* and if that description of man is to be of any significance, it imposes upon us a duty to follow the *Quran,* to behave towards others as God behaves towards his mankind, in the widest

sense of the word, his duty is to love and to forebear. And this, believe me, is not a negative duty but a positive one. If we have any faith and love for tolerance towards God's children, to whatever community they belong, we must act upon that faith in the daily round of our simple duties and unobtrusive pieties. It is a great ideal and it will demand effort and sacrifice. Not seldom will your minds be assailed by doubts. There will be conflicts not only material, which you perhaps will be able to resolve with courage, but spiritual also. We shall have to face them; and if today, when our hearts are humble we do not imbibe that higher courage to do so, we never shall."

Whenever Jinnah got an opportunity to speak on religion, he advocated a rational approach. "In the pursuit of truth and the cultivation of beliefs," he said, "we should be guided by our rational interpretation of the *Quran*, and if our devotion to truth is single-minded, we shall, in our own measure, achieve our goal. In the translation of this truth into practice, however, we shall be content with so much, and so much only, as we can achieve without encroaching on the rights of others, while at the same time not ceasing our efforts always to achieve more." In another context, he remarked: "The test of greatness is not the culture of stone and pillar and pomp but the culture of humanity, the culture of equality . . . and only a man who is dead to all the finer instincts of humility and civilization can call a religion based on determination and exploitation a heritage."

Jinnah was outspoken in his condemnation of reactionary elements which generated retrograde tendencies in religion. Dealing with the contribution of the Pakistan movement to our national life, he said: "We have to a great extent to free our people from the most undesirable reactionary elements. We have in no small degree removed the unwholesome influence and fear of a certain section that used to pass off as Maulana and Maulvis. We have made efforts to take our women with us in our struggle. . . ."

He championed the cause of womanhood, advocating for women an equal share with men in social and national life. "In the great task of building the nation and maintaining its solidarity, women have a most valuable part to play. They are the prime architects of the character of the youth who constitute the backbone of the State. I know that in the long struggle for the achievement of Pakistan, Muslim women have stood solidly behind their men. In the bigger struggle for the building up of Pakistan that now lies ahead let it not be said that the women of Pakistan had lagged behind or failed in their duty."

The liberalism of Jinnah freed the minds of the Indo-Pakistan Muslims, turning their intellectual activities towards tackling traditional Islamic ideas and ideals in terms of modern standards and requirements. Thus the final phase of the intellectual movement among the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent that was ushered in by Iqbal, began to be re-enforced by Muslim thinkers under the inspiring leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. With the growing strength of Pakistan that phase is gathering momentum and spreading in ever widening concentric circles, permeated with the spirit of both the Seer and the Leader.

II. JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

Subhas Chandra Bose

THE LEAGUE IS UN-SOCIALIST

Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) was one of the early leaders of the left wing of the Congress. He was the only national leader of stature to have offered an alternative to the Gandhian program. He was elected President of the Congress in 1938, but he resigned as a result of conflict with Gandhi and formed the "Forward Bloc," a radical and progressive group within the Congress. In World War II he supported Germany and Japan because they were enemies of England. He disappeared in 1945. From Bose's point of view, a socialist revolution in India was the answer to the problems of the nation. The Muslim League, therefore, inasmuch as it appeared to put communal interests before social change, was considered obstructionist. The excerpts quoted below are taken from a collection of Bose's writings published in India in 1964 by the Netaji Research Board.

BESIDES the above political parties comprising members of all communities, there are communal organisations whose avowed object is to secure the loaves and fishes for members of their own community. Among the Moslems, the All-India Moslem League is the most important organisation, having been started as early as 1906. During 1920 and 1924, the Moslem League was eclipsed by the All-India Khilafat Committee. But after the abolition of the Khalifate in 1924, the Khilafat movement in India collapsed, and the Moslem League regained its former importance. Besides the Moslem League, there are other organisations of recent growth, like the All-India Moslem Conference. The prominent communal Moslem leaders are the Aga Khan, Mr. M. A. Jinnah (who was a Congress leader up to 1920), Sir Mohammed Ikbal of Lahore, Sir Mohammed Yakub of the United Provinces and Mr. Shafi Daudi of Patna. Moulana Shaukat Ali, once a prominent Congress and Khilafat leader, has, on several occasions, identified himself with the communal Mohammedans. Sir Abdur Rahim occupies a position between the communal leaders on the one side and the Nationalist Moslem leaders on the other.

As a counterblast to the All-India Moslem League, the Hindu Mahasabha has come into existence for the avowed object of protecting the rights of the Hindus. It has influential support in some parts of India.

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In accordance with the time-worn policy of *divide et impera,* the Government greatly encouraged these parties—just to spite the Indian Nationalist Congress and try to weaken its influence. This was clearly exhibited in 1930 and later, when the Indian representatives to the Round Table Conference were not selected by a vote of the Indian peo-

From S. C. Bose, *The Indian Struggle 1920–1942* (Bombay, 1964), pp. 30–32, 44–46, 103–104, 119, 121–122, 144–145, 155–156, 214–216, 293–295, 298, 330–331, 343–344.

ple—but were nominated by the British Government and in making these nominations, the communal parties, who have no concern with the fight for political freedom, were given exaggerated importance. As a matter of fact, whenever the occasion demands, leaders are created overnight by the British Government and, thanks to the British Press, their names are made known to the whole world. When the Government of India Act, 1919, was under consideration, the late Dr. T. M. Nair of Madras, was made a leader in London, in opposition to the Congress leaders at the time. In 1930 and after, Dr. Ambedkar has had leadership thrust upon him by a benign British Government, because his services were necessary to embarrass the nationalist leaders.

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The resolution of the Special Congress at Calcutta came up for consideration at the regular annual session held at Nagpur in December, 1920, under the presidency of the veteran Congress leader from Madras, Mr. Vijayaraghavachariar. Mr. Das and his followers mustered strong at Nagpur hoping to cross swords with Mr. Gandhi once again. But through the latter's tactful handling of the situation an understanding was arrived at between him and Mr. Das. The boycott of the legislatures, to which Mr. Das was chiefly opposed, was no longer a live issue, as the elections had already taken place. It was, therefore, possible to persuade Mr. Das to come to an agreement. When this was done, the non-co-operation resolution was ratified with practical unanimity, though Pandit Malaviya, Mrs. Besant, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. B. D. Pal remained irreconcilable.

Besides ratifying the resolution on progressive non-co-operation, including the boycott of legislatures, law-courts and educational institutions, the Nagpur Congress took a very important step in altering the Constitution of the Indian National Congress. Hitherto, the goal of the Congress, as defined in the Constitution, had been "Self-Government within the British Empire." This had antagonised all those Congressmen who believed in the severance of the British connection or who refused to be tied down to the Empire. To enable the Left-Wingers to return to the Congress fold, the goal of the Congress was declared to be "Swaraj" (which means literally self-rule) and it was left to individual Congressmen, to define "Swaraj" in their own way. Mr. Gandhi, however, defined "Swaraj" to mean "Self-Government within the Empire, if possible—and outside, if necessary."

Before the Nagpur Congress the machinery of the Congress had been a loose one. There were branches only in the big cities and throughout the year, no work was done according to a systematic plan. At Nagpur, it was decided to re-organise the Congress on a country-wide basis. The smallest unit would be the Village Congress Committee. Several such Committees would combine to form a Union Congress Committee. Then there would be formed in succession—sub-divisional (also called Taluka or Tahsil), district, provincial and All-India Congress Committees. The All-India Congress Committee would be a body of about 350 members consisting of representatives from the different provinces. This Committee would elect a Working Committee of 15 members which would be the Supreme Executive of the Congress for the whole country. Further, the provinces were re-organised on a linguistic basis. For instance, the Madras Presidency was divided into Andhra, which is Telegu-speaking and Tamil-Nadu, which is Tamil-speaking. The basis of the new Congress Constitution was of a democratic and parliamentary character. Besides setting up a new Constitution, the Nagpur Congress laid down a definite plan of work for the coming year.

Regarding the means to be followed by the Congress for attaining Swaraj, a change was made in the Constitution. Hitherto the Congress had been tied down to "constitutional" means, but in future the Congress could adopt "all peaceful and legitimate" means. This change had to be made in order to enable the Congress to resort to non-co-operation, which could be regarded as

unconstitutional. Regarding both the goal and the means, the decision of the Nagpur Congress represented the golden means between the views of the Right-Wingers, like Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Jinnah and the youthful Left-Wingers who swamped the Congress for the first time in 1920. The latter desired the goal of the Congress to be complete independence to be attained by all possible means. It was Mr. Gandhi, however, who by virtue of his tremendous influence and popularity was able to keep the Left-Wingers at bay. The Constitution that was adopted at Nagpur and which holds good even today, was practically his own draft.

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After establishing peace within the Congress camp through his understanding with the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma turned to another acute problem. Since 1923, Hindu-Moslem dissensions had appeared in different parts of India and Mahatma Gandhi was farsighted enough to realise that if the evil was not nipped in the bud, it would soon grow into a national calamity. The communal storm might not break while the Swarajist campaign, supported by both Hindus and Moslems, was in full swing—but the moment there was a lull in the campaign, the evil was sure to rear its head.

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In March 1924, Mustapha Kemal Pasha took the extraordinary step of abolishing the Khalifate altogether. Those Moslems who had been drawn towards the Indian National Congress owing to the desire to secure support for the Khilafat campaign, no longer felt any urge to remain friendly towards the Congress. The Khilafat Committees themselves went out of existence in most parts of India and many of the erstwhile members of those organisations were absorbed into reactionary mushroom organisations. About this time the All-India Moslem League came back to life again. This body had been the premier organisation for Moslems in India till 1920. Since that year it had been practically replaced by the All-India Khilafat Committee which had succeeded in drawing most of the active elements among the Indian Moslems. The abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks themselves, struck at the root of the Khilafat Committees in India and indirectly helped the revival of the All-India Moslem League. In December 1924, when the All-India Moslem League met once again, the Khilafatists were defeated for the first time since 1920. The newly-revived All-India Moslem League, as we shall see later, became more sectarian and reactionary than it had been prior to 1920.

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The accentuation of Hindu-Moslem differences in 1925 and after, threw more Hindu Congressmen into the arms of the Hindu Mahasabha and the politics of the Hindu Mahasabha was, generally speaking, identical with that of the Responsivist Party. Both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Responsivist Party thought that the Moslem community by co-operating with the Government was able to strengthen its position and further its interests, to the detriment of Hindu interests—while the Indian National Congress through its policy of indiscriminate opposition was unable to do anything for the Hindus. This feeling was strengthened as a result of the conduct of Mr. (Now Sir) Mian Fazil Hussain, who by accepting the office of Minister in the Punjab, was able to promote Moslem interests in that province to the exclusion of Hindu and Sikh interests. The position of the Hindu Mahasabha and of the Responsivist Party received further support from the Hindu community through the reactionary and communal attitude adopted by the Moslem League at its sitting at Aligarh in December 1925, in which prominent leaders like Moulana Mohammed Ali, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Sir Abdul Rahim and Sir Ali Imam participated.

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The history of 1926 is largely a history of Hindu-Moslem strife. As happens ev-

erywhere, the slackening of the Nationalist movement diverted the energies of the people to internal questions and disputes. The abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks in 1924 led many of the Nationalist Moslems in India to give up the Khilafat movement and to divert their whole attention to the Nationalist cause. But some of the Nationalists as well as the more reactionary Moslems continued to keep up the Khilafat Committees, as Moulana Shaukat Ali did in Bombay, and where that was not possible, they started other organisations of a sectarian and reactionary character, under different names. This reactionary movement among the Moslems called forth a similar reactionary movement among the Hindus and branches of the Hindu Mahasabha began to grow up all over the country. The Hindu Mahasabha, like its Moslem counterpart, consisted not only of erstwhile Nationalists, but also of a large number of men who were afraid of participating in a political movement and wanted a safer platform for themselves. The growth of sectarian movements among both Hindus and Moslems accentuated intercommunal tension. The opportunity was availed of by interested third parties who wanted to see the two communities fight, so that the Nationalist forces could be weakened. The causes which generally led to intercommunal rioting were the slaughter of cows which outraged Hindu feelings and the playing of music before mosques at prayer time, which gave offence to Moslem feelings. Friction would also be caused if a Moslem mosque or a Hindu temple was defiled in any way. Once there was a mental tension between the two communities in a particular locality, such incidents could easily throw the spark to light the flame of communal passion and it was not difficult for third parties to employ agents to do this dirty work.

The worst episode in the events of 1926 was the Hindu-Moslem riots in Calcutta which broke out in May and again in July. The trouble arose through an Arya Samajist procession playing music while passing before a mosque. The Arya Samajists claimed that they had been having the procession for many years without any trouble. The Moslems declared on the contrary that the music was interfering with their worship inside the mosque. Fighting went on for many days and many were killed on both sides. Ultimately when both parties were exhausted, they made peace. Though matters did not reach a crisis elsewhere as it did in Calcutta, there was considerable tension all over the country. For the Congress Party the hour was dark. The elections to the Legislatures were due in November and they were going to be held under the shadow of Hindu-Moslem riots. The field would not be as open to Congressmen as it had been in 1923. New organisations representing reactionary Hindus and reactionary Moslems had come into existence and they would put up their own candidates. During the elections of 1926 a strong propaganda was carried on by a section of the Moslems to the effect that if the Hindus were going to carry on their non-co-operation with the Government, the Moslems should have nothing to do with them, but should endeavor to work the Constitution. On the other side the Hindu Mahasabha raised the cry that if the Hindus non-co-operated while the Moslems secured the help of the Government, they would be placing themselves at a serious disadvantage as compared with the Moslems. The Hindu Mahasabha therefore urged the modification of the Swarajist policy of non-co-operation. Nevertheless, among the Hindu electorate the influence of the Congress was much greater than that of the Hindu Mahasabha, though among the Moslem electorate, the influence of reactionary and sectarian organisations proved to be stronger than that of the Congress at the General Election of 1926.

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The announcement regarding the Statutory Commission evoked a chorus of condemnation from the Congress leaders of all parts of India as also from the public at large. The public had become so much accustomed to the idea

of self-determination for India, that they no longer regarded the British Parliament as the arbiter of India's destiny. It was therefore but natural that the Congress should, without hesitation or delay, decide to boycott the Commission (popularly known as Simon Commission). That was, of course, no surprise for the Government. But what did surprise them was the decision of the Indian Liberals to boycott the Commission. It was not the violation of the principle of self-determination which offended them but the exclusion of Indians from the All-White Commission. In the face of this non-co-operation on the part of the British government, how could the Liberals maintain their pet theory of Indo-British collaboration? The attitude of the Liberals was explained by a resolution passed at a public meeting held at Allahabad in December, which was presided over by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and which considered "the exclusion of Indians a deliberate insult to the people of India, as not only does it definitely assign to them a position of inferiority, but what is worse, it denies them the right to participate in the determination of the constitution of their own country." The tenth session of the Liberal Federation held at Bombay the same year and presided over by the same gentleman, decided to reject the Simon Commission.

Following the Unity Conference in November, the All-India Moslem League met in Calcutta in December. The League passed a resolution recommending Hindu-Moslem unity on the lines laid down by the Unity Conference. It also urged the boycott of the Simon Commission and accepted the principle of joint electorates with reservation of seats for Moslems. This decision was a triumph for the Nationalist Moslems and it was possible only because such prominent Moslems as Mr. M. A. Jinnah and the Ali brothers participated in the conference and advocated the Nationalist point of view.

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The All-Parties Convention held in Calcutta during the Congress week had unfortunate consequences. All those who did not have a hand in drafting the Nehru Report now made a dead set against it. Mr. M. A. Jinnah, who a year earlier had advocated a progressive nationalist point of view at the Moslem League Conference in Calcutta, now came forward with his famous "fourteen points" in order to amend the communal settlement embodied in the Nehru Report. He demanded, among other things, one-third of the elected seats in both Houses of the Indian Legislature for Moslems, reservation of seats for Moslems in Bengal and Punjab on a population basis, vesting of residuary powers in the provinces, etc. This attitude served to make Mr. Jinnah popular with his reactionary co-religionists but undermined the value and importance of the Nehru Report. Following the Moslems, the Sikhs also made extreme demands, while the representatives of the Hindu Mahasabha refused to make any further concessions beyond what had been already embodied in the Nehru Report, and they even criticised adversely the concessions made by the Nehru Committee to the Moslem demands. It was difficult to get the support of the Moslem League for the Nehru Report, because of the parties within that body, based largely on personal considerations. For instance, the group led by the late Sir Mohammed Shafi took up a *non-possumus* attitude on the communal question, and on the political question advocated co-operation with the Simon Commission. The Nationalist bloc stood for wholehearted acceptance of the Nehru Report and for complete boycott of the Simon Commission. A meeting of the Moslem League was summoned at Delhi in March 1929, to consider the question and there was a clash between the warring sections, so that the meeting ended in pandemonium.

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. . . The Mahatma had a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi in April. I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him the same

evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a depressed mood, because they had presented him with the fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as Jinnah's fourteen points) and he felt that an agreement would not be possible on that basis. Thereupon I remarked that the Congress should only care for an agreement between Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and that the agreed solution should be placed before the Round Table Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the absence of the third party the different communities would live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate electorates were against the fundamental principles of Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion, not worth having. While we were engaged in this discussion, Dr. Ansari and some of the Nationalist Moslem leaders including Mr. Sherwani, arrived on the scene and joined in the discussion. They said that if for any reason the Mahatma gave up the demand for a common electorate for both Hindus and Moslems and accepted the demand of the reactionaries for a separate electorate for each community, they would oppose the reactionary Moslems and also the Mahatma, because they were convinced that separate electorates were bad not only for the country as a whole, but also for the different communities. The strong attitude of the Nationalist Moslems on this occasion was largely responsible for preventing the Mahatma from agreeing to separate electorates, and forced him to wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in which he had placed himself. Soon after this, the Mahatma issued a public statement saying that he could not accept the demands made by the communalist Moslem leaders, since the Nationalist Moslems were opposed to them.

The atmosphere in Delhi was then (i.e. in April 1931) full of intrigue. Though Lord Irwin was inspired by a sincere desire for a settlement, there were many officials who were against it. These diehard elements were encouraged by the impending departure of Lord Irwin from India and the advent of Lord Willingdon, who had the reputation of being a strong man. While we were in Delhi, information reached us from a reliable source as to the tactics that the British Government would follow at the Round Table Conference. We were told that every effort would be made to drag Mahatma Gandhi at the very outset into minor issues with a view to getting the Indians to fight among themselves, so that they would not be able to combine against the British Government over the major issues. I duly conveyed to the Mahatma this information for what it was worth. He said in reply that his plan was to meet the authorities concerned soon after his arrival in London and try to obtain satisfaction from them on the major issues. If he felt satisfied, he would go into the minor issues—otherwise his work in England would end there and then. Unfortunately, when Mahatma Gandhi was in England, the minorities problem assumed the greatest importance and all the major problems were put aside. Events took place exactly as it had been prophesied in April at Delhi.

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The role which a man plays in history depends partly on his physical and mental equipment, and partly on the environment and the needs of times in which he is born. There is something in Mahatma Gandhi, which appeals to the mass of the Indian people. Born in another country he might have been a complete misfit. What, for instance, would he have done in a country like Russia or Germany or Italy? His doctrine of non-violence would have led him to the cross or to the mental hospital. In India it is different. His simple life, his vegetarian diet, his goat's milk, his

day of silence every week, his habit of squatting on the floor instead of sitting on a chair, his loin-cloth—in fact everything connected with him—has marked him out as one of the eccentric Mahatmas of old and has brought him nearer to his people. Wherever he may go, even the poorest of the poor feels that he is a product of the Indian soil—bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh. When the Mahatma speaks, he does so in a language that they comprehend not in the language of Herbert Spencer and Edmund Burke, as for instance Sir Surendra Nath Banerji would have done, but in that of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Ramayana*. When he talks to them about Swaraj, he does not dilate on the virtues of provincial autonomy or federation, he reminds them of the glories of *Ramarajya* (the kingdom of King Rama of old) and they understand. And when he talks of conquering through love and *ahimsa* (non-violence), they are reminded of Buddha and Mahavira and they accept him.

But the conformity of the Mahatma's physical and mental equipment to the traditions and temperament of the Indian people is but one factor accounting for the former's success. If he had been born in another epoch in Indian history, he might not have been able to distinguish himself so well. For instance, what would he have done at the time of the Revolution of 1857 when the people had arms, were able to fight and wanted a leader who could lead them in battle?

* * *

The Indian National Congress of today is largely his creation. The Congress Constitution is his handiwork. From a talking body he has converted the Congress into a living and fighting organisation. It has its ramification in every town and village in India, and the entire nation has been trained to listen to one voice. Nobility of character and capacity to suffer have been made the essential tests of leadership, and the Congress is today the largest and the most representative political organisation in the country.

But how could he achieve so much within this short period? By his single-hearted devotion, his relentless will and his indefatigable labour. Moreover, the time was auspicious and his policy prudent. Though he appeared as a dynamic force, he was not too revolutionary for the majority of his countrymen. If he had been so, he would have frightened them, instead of inspiring them; repelled them, instead of drawing them. His policy was one of unification. He wanted to unite the Hindu and Moslem; the high caste and the low caste; the capitalist and the labourer; the landlord and the peasant. By this humanitarian outlook and his freedom from hatred, he was able to rouse sympathy even in his enemy's camp.

But Swaraj is still a distant dream. Instead of one, the people have waited for fourteen long years. And they will have to wait many more. With such purity of character and with such an unprecedented following, why has the Mahatma failed to liberate India?

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As has been already indicated, the Mahatma has endeavoured in the past to hold together all the warring elements —landlord and peasant, capitalist and labour, rich and poor. That has been the secret of his success, as surely as it will be the ultimate cause of his failure. If all the warring elements resolve to carry on the struggle for political freedom, the internal social struggle will be postponed for a long time and men holding the position of the Mahatma will continue to dominate the public life of the country. But that will not be the case. The vested interests, the "haves," will in future fight shy of the "have-nots" in the political fight and will gradually incline towards the British Government. The logic of history will, therefore, follow its inevitable course. The political struggle and the social struggle will have to be conducted simultaneously. The Party that will win political freedom for India will be also the Party that will win social and economic free-

dom for the masses. Mahatma Gandhi has rendered and will continue to render phenomenal service to his country. But India's salvation will not be achieved under his leadership.

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The emergence of the Congress Socialist Party in 1934 was a sure indication of the resurgence of the radical or left-wing forces in the country. This was accompanied by a phenomenal awakening among the peasantry and the students, and to some extent, among the workers. For the first time, there emerged a centralised All India Peasants' Organisation, called the All India Kisan Sabha, the most prominent leader of which was Swami Sahajananda Saraswati. The students' movement also, which had gone through many ups and downs in the past, was centralised under the leadership of the All India Students' Federation. The All India Trade Union Congress, which had experienced two successive splits—in 1929 at Nagpur and again in 1931 at Calcutta—was once again unified under a joint leadership representing all shades of opinion, both Right and Left. In the literary world, too, there was an attempt to organise the progressive writers.

Pandit Nehru's Presidentship for two terms was marked by energy and initiative at the top and gave a fillip to the radical forces in the Congress, while, at his insistence a number of socialists were employed as permanent Congress officials. But Pandit Nehru could have achieved much more. The years 1936–37 represented the high-water mark of his popularity and in a certain sense, his position was then stronger than that of Mahatma Gandhi, because he had the support of the entire Left, which Gandhi had not.

But the Mahatma's position was organisationally very strong, for he had built up a party of his own, the Gandhi Wing, within the Congress Party, and with the help of the former he could dominate the latter. Nehru, on the other hand, in spite of his tremendous popularity, did not have a party of his own. There were two courses open to him, if he wanted to live in history—either to accept the tenets of Gandhism and join the Gandhi Wing within the Congress Party, or to build up his own party in opposition to the Gandhi Wing. He could not do the former, because though he was personally loyal to the Mahatma, he did not accept all the tenets of Gandhism. On the other hand, he did not build up his own party, because that would have given offence to the Gandhi Wing, and he has never in his own life had the courage to do anything in opposition to the Mahatma. Thus, Nehru began to drift along, trying to please both the Right and the Left—without joining either the Gandhi Wing or any other radical party—and thus remaining in effect, a lone figure within the Congress Party.

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A few days before he was thrown into prison, that is, in June, 1940, the writer had his last long talk with Mahatma Gandhi and his principal lieutenants. India had received the news of the final collapse of France. The German troops had made a triumphal entry into Paris. British morale, in England and in India, had sunk low. A British Minister had found it necessary to rebuke the British public for going about "with long faces as if they were at a funeral." In India, the civil disobedience campaign started by the Forward Bloc was going on and many of the Bloc leaders were already in prison. The writer, therefore, made a passionate appeal to the Mahatma to come forward and launch his campaign of passive resistance—since it was now clear that the British Empire would be overthrown and it was high time for India to play her part in the war. But the Mahatma was still non-committal and he repeated that, in his view, the country was not prepared for a fight and any attempt to precipitate it, would do more harm than good to India. However, at the end of a long and hearty talk, he told the writer that if his (the writer's) efforts to win freedom for India succeeded—then his

(Gandhi's) telegram of congratulation would be the first that the writer would receive.

On this occasion, the writer had also long talks with the leaders of some other organisations—e.g. with Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League and Mr. Savarkar, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha. Mr. Jinnah was then thinking only of how to realise his plan of Pakistan (division of India) with the help of the British. The idea of putting up a joint fight with the Congress, for Indian independence, did not appeal to him at all though the writer suggested that in the event of such a united struggle taking place, Mr. Jinnah would be the first Prime Minister of Free India. Mr. Savarkar seemed to be oblivious of the international situation and was only thinking how Hindus could secure military training by entering Britain's army in India. From these interviews, the writer was forced to the conclusion that nothing could be expected from either the Muslim League or the Hindu Mahasabha.

V. Savarkar

AWAKENED MUSLIM DESIGNS

Vinayak Savarkar (1883–1957) was the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha during the years of the struggle for independence. He had been an activist from his student days in London before World War I. The British arrested him on charges of being a terrorist in 1910, and he was sentenced to be transported for life. He was sent to the harsh penal settlement on the Andaman Islands, and remained there until he was released in 1921. On his return to India, he resumed his activist policies, and campaigned vigorously against both the Congress and the Muslim League. The excerpts quoted below are taken from a biography of Savarkar written by Khananjay Keer, published in 1950, and republished in a second edition in 1966. The attitudes of Savarkar and his followers were a significant factor in contributing to the uneasiness that was growing among Muslims in the years from 1920 to 1948. Gandhi's assassin was associated with the Mahasabha.

IN the Andamans Savarkar had ample time to philosophize his political theories and theorize his political philosophy. His thoughts, reading and experience evolved into a definite ideology. The seeds of his ideology took firm root and sprouted into a tree. The decrease in the population of the Hindus and the consequent danger to Hindustan by the rise of rival and alien proselytizing faiths absorbed his mind. In Europe people belong mostly to one religion. There the strife is between races aimed at predominance and domination. In India it is a question of rival religions, where kidnapping and conversion are ostensibly done in the name of religion to strengthen a rival faith. The danger Savarkar scented was clear, straight and real.

Though the British Government had to resort to a policy of non-interference in religious affairs, they were in a way not inclined to curb the proselytizing activities of the Muslims. Mosques, markets, dens of Muslim robbers and prison houses were free for the conversion of Hindus. Whenever news came to Savarkar about the conversion of a Hindu lad or a prisoner, he was restless and he turned his mind devotedly to the serious threat, outwardly a religious but inwardly a crucial problem of national importance and existence.

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With that aim in view he began to shake off the passivity in Hindus, change their tone and tendencies, mould them into an organism alive to every injury, and make them masters of their fate and land. To the broad-minded and wiseacres he asked why the Non-Hindus tried to win over to their fold that base, wicked, corrupt lot of dangerous drunkards and murderers. They said the Muslims were fanatic and with them reason did not weigh. Well, why did these cool and cultured Europeans use the hoe of gold for removing that mud in Indian villages, woods and valleys? Of course, to fertilize their lands of influence with the manure! Savarkar asked his colleagues why those Westerners polluted their holy religion with that vile and worthless lot of humanity? Why should the Missionaries and Maulavies render service or offer food and shelter as a price for religion and never from a hu-

From Dhananjay Keer, *Veer Savarkar* 2d ed. (Bombay, 1966), pp. 139–141, 165, 168–169, 246, 258–259, 270–271, 294, 356–357.

manitarian angle? If the ulterior motive of these Missionaries and Maulanas was to increase the strength of their religion and to dominate the world, then let the Hindus have the freedom to serve Humanity in their own way. Let the Hindus aim at increasing their numerical strength to fight their struggle for existence and material well-being. Thus went forth his chain of arguments.

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On the eve of the Lucknow session the shrewd elements in the Muslim League adopted the Congress ideal of self-government for India within the empire. For winning support of the Muslim League to its demands, the Congress made a pact with the Muslim League, conceding them separate representation and communal electorates. The Lucknow Pact, after Tilak's death, unfortunately proved to be a rift in the lute. It was one thing for a man like Tilak to say that he wanted Hindu-Muslim unity and another for a man like Gandhi to say that he wanted Hindu-Muslim unity. The former had the confidence, strength and realism of Shivaji whereas the latter had the nervous surrendering mood of the Rajputs who placated Muslim rulers of Delhi.

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On his way back to Ratnagiri, Savarkar visited Bombay in the second week of November 1924. There the Muslim leader Shaukat Ali came to meet him. The Muslim leader praised Savarkar for his patriotism and sacrifice; but he said that he disliked Savarkar's Hindu Sanghatan ideology and wished that it should be stopped. Thereupon Savarkar asked the Muslim leader to stop his Khilafat Movement first if he wanted him to stop Hindu Sanghatan Movement. Shaukat Ali replied that the Khilafat Movement was the breath of his nostrils. Savarkar told him that as long as there were separate organizations for the Muslims and the movement of conversion was carried on by them, so long the movement of Hindu Sanghatan and the propaganda for reconversion would go on unabated. At this Shaukat Ali told Savarkar that the Muslims were agitated and were against his Hindu Sanghatan. If he did not give it up and mend matters he left him to his fate. Savarkar replied with equal force that where the mighty British Raj failed to browbeat him, a handful of Muslims armed with knives would not succeed.

Then the Muslim leader told Savarkar that the Muslims had many other countries and they would leave India, if inevitable. Savarkar at once answered back, "O quite freely! Why do you wait? The Frontier Mail is daily running towards that direction!" Shaukat Ali was now quite nervous. While taking Savakar's leave, he cut a joke to make up the loss he suffered in arguments with Savarkar. With a bitter tone he said he was a giant and Savarkar was a dwarf and that he could punch Savarkar easily. "Here," said Savarkar sharply, "I am not disinclined to accept your challenge. Come on! You know Shivaji was also a dwarf before the giant Afzulkhan. They had a meeting. And everybody knows what was the history afterwards!" The Muslim leader lost his face and stepped out.

Savarkar's insight perceived the growing danger from the designs of the awakened Muslim mind. He knew that Muslim opposition to the national aspirations was not confined to a song here or a piece of music there. According to him there was a fundamental difference in their outlook on life and literature and in their aspirations for the governance of Hindustan as a nation. Therefore, the first thing Savarkar did was to strive to bring into operation the Federal part of the 1935 Act, and frustrate the Muslim designs. Though the Federal part of this Act, he said, handed over no real power especially in the matter of military and foreign policy to the representatives of the people, it offered an opportunity for the realization of national unification of the States and other parts under the British occupation into an organized and corporate whole.

But partly being not sure of the party

domination at the Centre, and partly being afraid of the opposition led in the field by youthful left-wing forged by its president Subhas Bose, the Congress High Command bypassed the issue of Federation. Not because there was no promise for immediate independence that that the Congress did not accept the Federation. The Congress could have fought here, too, to undo the unsatisfactory portion of the Federation.

Shrewd and practical politician that he was, Jinnah feared that if the Federation came into operation, it would weld India into a unified and united State under which the separatist designs of the Muslims would be totally crushed. Hence he condemned the Federation Scheme as "thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable" to the Muslims. In fact, this fear of Jinnah fully justified Savarkar.

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Despite these curses and misunderstanding, Savarkar vigorously carried on his propaganda. Independently and in honourable co-operation with the Government the Hindu Mahasabha workers and leaders gave an impetus to the Hindu militarization movement through the Hindu Mahasabha papers they had at their command, from the platform and through the Militarization Boards which they had established independently of Government recruiting machinery. The effect of this intense propaganda was seen everywhere. The Muslim plans for preponderance was effectively checkmated and brought down and the percentage of the Hindus in the army went as high up as seventy.

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To those who believed that the third party, i.e. the British Government, was the hindrance to the Hindu-Muslim unity, he asked, "Who set Muhammad Bin Quasim, Mahomed of Gazni and Aurangzeb to lay India waste with a mad fanatic fury? Were they the creations of the third party, the Britishers?" He warned the Hindu-Muslim unity-hankerers that the real question at the root of the Muslim opposition, displeasure and problem was not a word here or a song there. The Muslims cherished secret designs to disintegrate the Indian State and to create a State within a State or subvert the national State and in the end wanted to brand the Fatherland of the Hindus and other non-Muslim sections in Hindustan with the stamp of self-humiliation and Muslim domination. He, therefore, denounced this attitude and declared to the non-Hindus and especially to the Muslims: "If you come, with you; if you don't, without you and if you oppose, in spite of you, the Hindus will continue to fight for their national freedom as best as they can."

Savarkar further explained his attitude towards the minorities in general. The Parsis, he stated, amongst the other minorities were by race, religion, language and culture most akin to the Hindus. They had been loyal to India and had made her their only home. They had produced some of the best Indian patriots and revolutionaries like Dadabhai Naroroji and Madame Cama. He, therefore, said that the Parsis would be incorporated into the common Indian State with perfect equal rights and trust.

The Christian minority, Savarkar observed, was civil, had no extra-territorial political designs against India, was not linguistically and culturally averse to the Hindus and therefore could be politically assimilated with the Hindus. Only conversion, he added, should be made voluntary and on a legitimate basis.

As to the Jews in India, he said, they were too few and had given no political or cultural troubles and were not in the main a proselytizing people. They willed, he continued, to be friendly towards the Hindus who had sheltered them when homeless, and could be easily assimilated in a common Indian State.

Thus the problem of minorities was not at all the problem of all minorities, but the problem of only one minority—the Muslim minority.

So far as the Muslim community was

concerned, Savarkar said, every equitable treatment which an Indian citizen could claim on an equality of footing with others in respect of language, religion and culture, could be given to them, but they should be held as suspicious friends for at least some years to come for their extra-territorial designs.

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Jinnah denounced the Hindu Mahasabha in his presidential address at the Madras session of the Muslim League held in April 1941 as an absolutely incorrigible and hopeless body, and threatened that if the British Government failed to create an independent group of Pakistan States, others would come and do it. Savarkar accepted Jinnah's remarks about the Hindu Mahasabha as an unalloyed tribute to the unalloyed patriotism of the Hindu Mahasabha, and asked the Congress party to read with open eyes the writing on the wall —the declaration of Pakistan—and warned them not to deceive themselves and to delude the masses by misreading and misunderstanding the demands of the Muslim League.

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The talks of Gandhi with Jinnah in the palatial building of Jinnah at Mount Pleasant Road, Bombay, lasted for about three long weeks in September 1944. Jinnah was stubborn but shrewd, ruthless but realist in his own way in his demand for the vivisection of India. The underlining theme of Gandhi's arguments was that the British Government should be ousted first and then the right of self-determination would be given to the Muslims. Jinnah insisted that the settlement between the Hindus and Muslims should be first made. Gandhi clearly agreed to the principle of Partition as between brothers and promised that though he differed from Jinnah on the general basis, he would recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation as contained in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore of 1940. In a letter to Jinnah, Gandhi said: "If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that those areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two Sovereign Independent States." Lastly, Gandhi said: "The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League may not be willing to participate."

Thus the Muslim participation in the freedom struggle was nowhere guaranteed; but the partition of India was guaranteed by Gandhi to Jinnah. Gandhi paid nineteen visits to Jinnah's house without receiving a single in return, even observed his usual silence on Sundays instead of Mondays to facilitate the progress of the talks and returned with an unpleasant face from Mount Pleasant. The master diplomat in Jinnah knew that now the British Government was required to sign his nefarious plot against the Indian integrity. Thus Gandhi, who had regarded Pakistan as a sin, a patent untruth, a denial of God, and the undoing of the work of a good many ancestors agreed to lay the axe at the root of Hindustan and to cut off the holiest part of India for the mere asking of the Muslims.

Savarkar's heart was torn with anxiety; his anguish was unimaginable. A true son of India, he was grappling to save the neck of his Motherland from the knife of the butchers, fighting against the colossal betrayal by great leaders, against the long purses of the multimillionaires who sided with those leaders and the great guilty press that saw the treachery being enacted, but shed no tears, not to speak of offering any opposition to it. Savarkar shouted: "Hark countrymen, the Indian National Congress, which was ushered into existence to consolidate the Indian Nation, has itself betrayed its sole mission, the very justification of its existence and falling a victim to the pseudo-nationalistic malady, has dealt the unkindest cut of all at the Indian national integrity." The keeper turned verily a poacher.

Jawaharlal Nehru

A VICTIM OF MUSLIM REACTION

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) was never in sympathy with Jinnah although he respected his abilities. Nehru considered Jinnah's objection to the mass movements led by Gandhi to be a symptom of "old-guard" narrow-mindedness. As Nehru saw it, Jinnah failed to comprehend the need to involve the masses in a struggle for national liberation. He was convinced that Jinnah and the Muslim League represented only the reactionary landlords and the upper class bourgeois Muslims, while the Congress was the necessary instrument not only for national liberation, but for the freeing of all the poor, Hindu and Muslim, from the domination of the capitalist. From this point of view, the Hindu and Muslim masses both needed the services of a strong Congress.

The selection from *The Discovery of India* presents Nehru's opinion of Jinnah and the Muslim League in 1937, at a time when Congress was the strongest national party. Later selections present the attitudes of those who differed from Nehru's interpretation of the events that followed the 1937 elections.

THE Moslem League's communal attitude was often difficult and unreasonable in the past, but no less unreasonable was the attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha. The Hindu minorities in the Punjab and Sind, and the dominant Sikh group in the Punjab, were often obstructive and came in the way of a settlement. British policy was to encourage and emphasize these differences and to give importance to communal organizations as against the Congress.

One test of the importance of a group or party, or at any rate of its hold on the people, is an election. During the general elections in India in 1937 the Hindu Mahasabha failed completely; it was nowhere in the picture. The Moslem League did better, but on the whole its showing was poor, especially in the predominantly Moslem provinces. In the Punjab and Sind it failed completely, in Bengal it met with only partial success. In the North-West Frontier Province, Congress formed a ministry later. In the Moslem minority provinces the League met with greater success on the whole, but there were also independent Moslem groups as well as Moslems elected as Congressmen.

Then began a remarkable campaign on behalf of the Moslem League against the Congress governments in the provinces and the Congress organization itself. Day after day it was repeated that these governments were committing "atrocities" on the Moslems. Those governments contained Moslem ministers also, but they were not members of the Moslem League. What these "atrocities" were it was not usually stated; or some petty local incidents, which had nothing to do with the government, were distorted and magnified. Some minor errors of some departments, which were soon rectified, became "atrocities." Sometimes entirely false and baseless charges were made. Even a report was issued, fantastic in its contents and having little to do with any facts. Congress governments invited those who made the charges to supply particulars for investigation or to come and inquire themselves with government help. No one took advantage of these offers. But the campaign continued unchecked. Early

in 1940, soon after the resignation of the Congress ministries, the then Congress president, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, wrote to Mr. M. A. Jinnah and also made a public statement inviting the Moslem League to place any charges against the Congress governments before the federal court for inquiry and decision. Mr. Jinnah declined this offer and referred to the possibility of a royal commission being appointed for the purpose. There was no question of any such commission being appointed, and only the British government could do so. Some of the British governors who had functioned during the regime of the Congress governments declared that they had found nothing objectionable in the treatment of minorities. Under the act of 1935 they had been especially empowered to protect minorities if any such need arose.

I had made a close study of nazi methods of propaganda since Hitler's rise to power, and I was astonished to find something very similar taking place in India. A year later, in 1938, when Czechoslovakia had to face the Sudetenland crisis, the nazi methods employed there were studied and referred to with approval by Moslem League spokesmen. A comparison was drawn between the position of Sudetenland Germans and Indian Moslems. Violence and incitements in speeches and in some newspapers became marked. A Congress Moslem minister was stabbed, and there was no condemnation of this from any Moslem League leader; in fact it was condoned. Other exhibitions of violence frequently took place.

I was terribly depressed by these developments and by the general lowering of the standards of public life. Violence, vulgarity, and irresponsibility were on the increase, and it appeared that they were approved of by responsible leaders of the Moslem League. I wrote to some of these leaders and begged them to check this tendency, but with no success. So far as the Congress governments were concerned, it was obviously to their interest to win over every minority or other group, and they tried hard to do so. Indeed complaints arose from some quarters that they were showing undue favor to the Moslems at the expense of other groups. But it was not a question of a particular grievance which could be remedied, or a reasonable consideration of any matter. There was a regular rampage on the part of members or sympathizers of the Moslem League to make the Moslem masses believe that something terrible was happening and that the Congress was to blame. What that terrible thing was nobody seemed to know. But surely there must be something behind all this shouting and cursing, if not here then elsewhere. During by-elections the cry raised was "Islam in danger," and voters were asked to take their oaths on the holy book to vote for the Moslem League candidate.

All this had an undoubted effect on the Moslem masses. And yet it is surprising how many resisted it. The League won most by-elections, lost some; even when they won, there was a substantial minority of Moslem voters who went against them, being influenced more by the Congress agrarian program. But for the first time in its history the Moslem League got a mass backing and began to develop into a mass organization. Much as I regretted what was happening, I welcomed this development in a way, as I thought that this might lead ultimately to a change in the feudal leadership and more progressive elements would come forward. The real difficulty thus far had been the extreme political and social backwardness of the Moslems, which made them liable to exploitation by reactionary leaders.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah himself was more advanced than most of his colleagues of the Moslem League. Indeed he stood head and shoulders above them and had therefore become an indispensable leader. From public platforms he confessed his great dissatisfaction with the opportunism, and sometimes even worse failings, of his colleagues. He knew well that a great part of the advanced, selfless, and courageous element among the Moslems had joined and worked with the Congress. And yet some destiny or course of events had thrown him among the very people for whom he had no

respect. He was their leader, but he could only keep them together by becoming himself a prisoner to their reactionary ideologies. Not that he was an unwilling prisoner, so far as the ideologies were concerned, for despite his external modernism, he belonged to an older generation which was hardly aware of modern political thought or developments. Of economics, which overshadow the world today, he appeared to be entirely ignorant. The extraordinary occurrences that had taken place all over the world since World War I had apparently had no effect on him. He had left the Congress when that organization had taken a political leap forward. The gap widened as the Congress developed an economic and mass outlook. But Mr. Jinnah seemed to have remained ideologically in that identical place where he stood a generation ago, or rather he had gone further back, for now he condemned both India's unity and democracy. "They would not live," he has stated, "under any system of government that was based on the nonsensical notion of Western democracy." It took him a long time to realize that what he had stood for throughout a fairly long life was nonsensical.

The beginning of World War II brought an internal crisis which resulted in the resignation of the Congress governments in the provinces. Before this occurred, however, the Congress made another attempt to approach Mr. M. A. Jinnah and the Moslem League. Mr. Jinnah was invited to attend the first meeting of the Congress executive after the commencement of the war. He was unable to join us. We met him later and tried to evolve a common policy in view of the world crisis. Not much progress was made, but nevertheless we decided to continue our talks. Meanwhile the Congress governments resigned on the political issue which had nothing to do with the Moslem League and the communal problem. Mr. Jinnah, however, chose that moment for a fierce attack on the Congress and a call on his League for the observance of a "Day of Deliverance" from Congress rule in the provinces. He followed this up by very unbecoming remarks on nationalist Moslems in the Congress and especially on the Congress president, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was greatly respected among Hindus and Moslems alike. The "Day of Deliverance" was rather a flop, and counter demonstrations among Moslems took place in some parts of India. But it added to bitterness and confirmed the conviction that Mr. Jinnah and the Moslem League under his leadership had no intention whatever of coming to any settlement with the Congress, or of advancing the cause of Indian freedom. They preferred the existing situation.

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman

HOW WE PUT LIFE IN THE LEAGUE

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (1889–) was an active member of the Muslim League in U.P. in pre-independence India. He began his career as a pro-Congress supporter of the Khilafat movement, but gradually turned to the Muslim League and to Jinnah. The development of his attitudes as recounted in his recent memoirs, *Pathway to Pakistan,* is representative of much that happened to significant Muslim opinion in the years between the wars. Before the 1937 elections, he had been working with his own group, the Muslim Unity Board, a party that intended to cooperate with the economic policies of the Congress. His reasons for supporting Jinnah are indicated in the selection given below. After partition, he served Pakistan as Ambassador to Indonesia and as Governor of East Pakistan.

IN the evening we met Mr. Jinnah as arranged. Mr. Jinnah began by telling us that he himself was very much dissatisfied with the Muslim League leadership which consisted mostly of big landlords, title-holders and selfish people, who looked to their class and personal interests more than to communal and national interests and who had always been ready to sacrifice them to suit British policy. He said:

"I would like to see the Muslim League organization purified and revived, and with that end in view I am going to hold a Muslim League session on 10 May 1936 at Bombay where I would ask the Muslim League to give me a mandate to form a Parliamentary Board for the forthcoming election purposes. And I promise to you that in that Board I shall give people of your party a majority. If we have to fight elections on the Muslim ticket, it would not be in the interests of either of us to split our votes. Let us therefore fight from the common platform of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board."

This was exactly what I had been feeling for a long time about the League and its shortcomings. I was happy to see that Mr. Jinnah realized, though late, the weaknesses of the organization of which he had been the President since 1920. I took no time in telling him that I found the offer reasonable and accepted it. Maulana Husain Ahmad said: "We are committed to the claim of India for complete independence for the country while your organization does not approve of it. How are we to reconcile our differences?" Mr. Jinnah replied: "When I give you a majority in the Parliamentary Board you can do everything." Thereafter all of us agreed and assured him that we should defer any decision with regard to elections in our meeting of the Unity Board till after the League session of 10 May 1936.

From 1909, when Mr. Jinnah entered the Imperial Legislative Council as a member from Bombay, to March 1919 when he resigned his membership as a protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill, the Central Legislature had only an official bloc which voted according to the behest of the Government but the people's representatives were all independents with no party label. If these representatives of the people ever combined on any political issue it was from regard for public opinion outside and not under any party discipline. Things, however, had changed when Mr. Jinnah re-entered the House in 1923 and found himself pitched against the Congress-Swaraj Party consisting of Hindus and

some Muslims who voted en bloc for their point of view. In this new situation, Mr. Jinnah was obliged to have a party of his own in the Legislature consisting of Parsis, Sikhs, four or five Hindus and Muslims, numbering in all about twenty. By the very nature of the composition of the party it had to be on the look-out for a chance to intervene in the debates, supporting either the Government or the Nationalist Wing represented by the Congress-Swaraj Party. Taking of any initiative by this party was out of the question on communal issues which were few and far between in the Central Legislature and the members of the Independent Party voted according to their individual conscience. But communal issues were at times indirectly involved in many of the political matters that came before the Assembly and the difficulties of Mr. Jinnah arose on such subjects as I have already pointed out. . . .

Of the Unity Board representatives who negotiated the settlement with Mr. Jinnah, four of them, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Husain Ahmad and now also Maulana Ahmad Said, are dead and gone; I happen to be the only person alive to narrate to our progeny both in India and Pakistan the story of how through unity we put life into our old organization, the Muslim League. . . .

Mr. Jinnah was given the right by the League to nominate a Parliamentary Board, of at least thirty persons from all over India, which was to prepare its own election manifesto and to take all steps to fight the forthcoming elections. Mr. Jinnah announced the names of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in May 1936 and fixed a meeting at Lahore for the preparation of the manifesto as well as to frame rules for the conduct of the business of the Central and provincial Parliamentary Boards to be held on 8 June 1936. The personnel of the Board as announced was very good indeed and all of us were satisfied that he had done his best in excluding undesirable elements from the Board. From a perusal of the list contained in the League's proceedings it will be noticed that not only the five members of the Muslim Unity Board who had entered into a pact with Mr. Jinnah were included in this list but a large number of old Khilafatists and Ahrars had also been brought in.

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With more funds, I might have been able to secure more candidates to stand on the Muslim League ticket. However we entered into the election fight against the landlords who had formed the Agriculturist Party, which contested Congress Hindu candidates by setting Hindus and the Muslim League candidates by putting forward Muslims with the backing of the Ministers. Thus we had a very uphill task as the entire Government machinery was working against us. There was no general opposition to the Muslim League from Congress as the League manifesto had practically been modelled on the Congress economic programme, and secondly, because of the Nationalist character of the Muslim League candidates. . . .

We had the good fortune of having with us Maulana Shaukat Ali, the hero of the Khilafat agitation with all his influence on the Muslim mind. He toured the Province like a soldier to help the League cause.

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The tenantry of the biggest agriculturist province of India, U.P., for the first time in history decided to record a protest against the prevailing conditions in the villages and suppression of their rights. Since the British assumed the administration in 1859, they had passed no Rent Act until 1866 in which the tenant was treated as a mere tenant-at-will. About two decades later the Oudh Rent Act was amended to give the tenant the statutory right to remain in possession of his holding for seven years and to be ejected only for non-payment of rent. This was again replaced in 1922 by another Act which gave the tenant a right to hold his land for life and thereafter his heir to hold it for five years. In

all elections before 1937 he merely went to vote for the zamindar's candidate but on this occasion he refused to be influenced. Thus it took the tenant seventy-eight years of the British rule before revolting against the landlord and asserting his existence. The landlords were so ignorant of the impending catastrophe that to the last day they were keeping Sir Harry Haig, the Governor of U.P., well convinced that the Congress would not be able to secure more than sixty out of the one hundred and forty-four Hindu seats. The Civil Service also gave a similar estimate of Congress strength in the election. When the actual result was declared Government House became a mourning-den. In U.P. Congress secured 134 seats out of 144.

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Babu Mohan Lal Saxena was still anxious that there should be a coalition Government in U.P. and with that end in view he came to me one day and advised me to discuss the matter with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself. I went to meet Pandit Jawaharlal on 12 May 1937 and that was the last time for me to meet him at Anand Bhawan. He was ill with fever and I could talk to him only in the evening. With him it was not necessary for me to start from the beginning, because he knew all the circumstances in which the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was formed, Muslim League elections were fought and every effort had been made to make the Muslim Parliamentary Board manifesto as near to the Congress economic policy as possible. I had, thus, only to impress upon him the necessity in the Legislative Assembly of co-operation between the Congress and the Muslim League which in my opinion would once and for all put an end to British interference in Indian affairs and pave the way for the complete independence of the country. Quite contrary to my views he believed that really the Hindu-Muslim question in India was confined to a few Muslim intellectual landlords and capitalists who were cooking up a problem which did not in fact exist in the mind of the masses. He ridiculed the idea of Muslims having any separate organization carried on within the precincts of the Legislature. In support of the dangers involved in keeping party factions alive he cited the civil war in Spain and instances in other countries of Europe. I pointed out to him that the Muslim problem of India was unique, that no parallel could be found anywhere in the world and that a difference in magnitude and dimensions often makes a difference in kind. Drawing parallels from what might apply to Canada or other western countries was completely to ignore the history of India and the magnitude of the Muslim problem in the country. I further said that democracy was for the good of the country but the country should not be sacrificed at the altar of a system of government borrowed from the West, which had never had to face a problem approaching in similarity to that presented by India. We could not agree and I had to leave disappointed.

The Allahabad meeting of the Ulema was held on 17 May and the next day I read in the Press that the Ulema had decided to leave the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and to go over to the Congress unconditionally. This happened a mere five days after my meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru. It was a great success for Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as he had managed to get a contrary *fatwa* from the Ulema within twelve days of their meeting at Muradabad in which they had decided to remain with the Muslim League.

Maulana Husain Ahmad wrote a letter to me after the Allahabad meeting of the Ulema in which, so far as I remember, he said that by this means he was preparing ground for a coalition with the Congress and for securing ministerships in the Cabinet. Nothing could have hurt me more than this narrow and petty approach to a crucial problem concerning the Muslim future in India.

However, a letter from Maulana Ahmad Said, the Secretary of the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind, which he had written in reply to a letter of mine, had fallen into the hands of my brother Mushfiq

which speaks volumes about the mental disequilibrium of the Ulema in relation to the events which they had to deal with. Here is the translation of the original letter:

Dear Respected Choudhri Sahib,

Assalam Alaikum. I am thankful to you for your detailed letter. I have a complaint against my friends that those who ran from city to city and town to town (to work for the Muslim League), after the elections, were forgotten altogether. Mr. Jinnah when he decided to unite the Agriculturist Party (with the Muslim League) also did not care for them and when some of our selfish friends started negotiations with the Congress for Ministries and Speakerships, they also did not care for us. Look at my behaviour that I courted bad terms with all my friends and co-workers but I continued to repeat to them to come to terms with the Muslim League: whatever I did in the Allahabad Conference you will not be ignorant of it and what my friends there did with me will also be known to you. Nevertheless I stand by my opinion. . . . Your League will do nothing and is not capable of doing anything. If it had been capable of doing anything the Muslims would not have been facing the present deplorable condition. . . .

Ahmad Said.

I received this letter when I had already started leading the Opposition against the Congress. It speaks for itself and does not require any comment from me.

While behind the scene such a rueful display of political immorality prevailed, the Muslim mass conscience outside had begun to be pricked even without full knowledge of the situation in the country and a wave of fear of the approaching danger and a determination to face adversity was daily growing. Up to now they had never realized the real significance of elections in democracy but after the staggering success of the Congress they vaguely realized that it might mean in time a purely Hindu raj. They could never imagine that such a revolutionary change in the Government could be brought about by mere manipulation of votes, for in their past history in India the fate of dynasties followed the success of arms on a battlefield. Most of their political lethargy and their lack of activity had been due to their ignorance of the march of time and of the change in the method of struggle for power. The absence of any political organization to educate them regarding creeping changes in the political sphere, and the unfortunate lack of an Urdu Press worth the name in U.P. were other factors which held them back.

* * *

There were occasions when I had been opposed to some of the Congress policies but their nature had been different from the current one. There was danger of bitterness in personal relations however much I might try to avoid it. To alienate old friends and to form new friendships at such an age seemed a very irksome task, yet the call of duty directed that way.

All the avenues of further talks with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had been sealed by the misguided action of the Ulema on 17 May 1937 when they, under the guidance of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, left the Muslim League and unconditionally joined the Congress, for it gave the Hindu Sabha section in the Congress encouragement to remain adamant against any settlement with the Muslim League.

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One result of the revival of Muslim mass-consciousness was an increase in the number of riots. For soon after the Congress Government came into power the Hindus generally, not only in cities but in towns and villages also, started thinking in terms of a Hindu raj which created ill-will between the communities.

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There are, however, some people who have not liked the news of the proposed publication of my book, lest it might not give due credit to Mr. Jinnah's personality; as if a strong and living Pakis-

tan is not evidence enough of his solid achievement, and the title of Quaid-e-Azam conferred on him by the people is not a merited tribute to commemorate him! They would perhaps be content with stories rather than a connected, factual picture of his life, of his failures, reverses, pain and sorrows, his ultimate success and the achievement of his objective; and that written by one who, having had to follow the course of his life often in opposition, in the final analysis accepted his lead. When on 8 February 1936, after a talk with him I agreed to rejoin the League on certain terms, I was not too blind to see that ultimately it would mean the winding up of the Muslim Unity Board, an organization which I had nursed with great labour and sacrifice and which had for the first time fought elections on a party ticket and won a good number of Muslim seats, and that it also implied, as a natural consequence, acceptance of Mr. Jinnah's leadership. In spite of that I was the first amongst the five public leaders of considerable experience and reputation, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Maulana Ahmad Said, Mufti Kifayatullah and myself, all members of the Muslim Unity Board, to welcome Mr. Jinnah's proposal, which gave the Muslim League a large body of tried mass workers and public platform speakers.

Since then whatever differences I had with Mr. Jinnah had not been of a material character and I continued to follow his lead, even though sometimes I could not bring myself round to agree with him.

* * *

For people to think that in the Muslim League there were all nonentities who had no opinions of their own would show a pathetic state of affairs. And so far as history is concerned we know that even the caliphs did not remain immune from criticism by one section or the other. What the public will have to judge is how far the criticism is honest and sincere and based on logical conclusions. That Mr. Jinnah was a great man no one can doubt and when he took up the Pakistan cause he never swerved from it.

B. R. Ambedkar

ON CURING THE GHOST OF PAKISTAN

B. R. Ambedkar (1893–1956) was the leader of India's untouchables. His views have the advantage of coming from one who, though actively involved in the political struggles under discussion, was uncommitted to either party. He wrote *Pakistan or the Partition of India* in 1940 when the Independent Labour Party of Bombay asked for a study to be done on the issues related to the demand for Pakistan. By 1940 antagonism between the League and Congress had greatly increased, and the League had put forward a demand for Pakistan. In the excerpt below, Ambedkar indicates his reasons for differing from the attitude of the Congress towards Jinnah's position.

ON the pleadings the following issues seem to be necessary issues:

(1) Is Hindu-Muslim unity necessary for India's political advancement? If necessary, is it still possible of realization not withstanding the new ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims being two different nations?

(2) If Hindu-Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached by appeasement or by settlement?

(3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the new concessions that can be offered to the Muslims to obtain their willing co-operation, without prejudice to other interests?

(4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the terms of that settlement? If there are only two alternatives, (i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii) Fifty-fifty share in Legislature, Executive and the Services, which alternative is preferable?

(5) Whether India, if she remained one integral whole, can rely upon both Hindus and Musalmans to defend her independence, assuming it is won from the British?

(6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between Hindus and Musalmans and having regard to the new ideology demarcating them as two distinct nations and postulating an opposition in their ultimate destinies, whether a single constitution for these two nations can be built in the hope that they will show an intention to work it and not to stop it?

(7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come to stay, will not India as one single unit become an incoherent body without organic unity, incapable of developing into a strong united nation bound by a common faith in a common destiny and therefore likely to remain a feeble and sickly country, easy to be kept in perpetual subjection either of the British or of any other foreign power?

(8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better that Indians should help India in the peaceful dissolution of this incoherent whole into its natural parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan?

(9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of two independent and separate nations, a Muslim nation inhabiting Pakistan and a Hindu nation inhabiting Hindustan, than pursue the vain attempt to keep India as one undivided country in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will some day be one and occupy it as the members of one nation and sons of one motherland?

Nothing can come in the way of an Indian getting to grips with these issues and reaching his own conclusions with

From B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (Bombay, Thacker and Co., 1946), pp. 403–406, 412, xv–xvi, xix.

the help of the material contained in the foregoing pages except three things: (1) A false sentiment of historical patriotism, (2) a false conception of the exclusive ownership of territory, and (3) absence of willingness to think for oneself. Of these obstacles, the last is the most difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India is rare and free thought is rarer still. This is particularly true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of this book has been addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvious. The Hindus are in a majority. Being in a majority, their viewpoint must count. There is not much possibility of peaceful solution if no attempt is made to meet their objections rational or sentimental. But there are special reasons which have led me to address so large a part of the argument to them and which may not be quite so obvious to others. I feel that those Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls "the Seeing Eye" and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip of the Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr. Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge in two things. He started by saying that to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This is a strange argument. India is not the only country faced with the issue of partition or shifting of frontiers based on natural and historical factors to those based on national factors. Poland has been partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there will be no more partition of Poland. There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral or immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it.

As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah's influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. To exclude them from political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and when he was sworn in as an M. L. A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political. Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the Id congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed King Henry IV of France—the unhappy father-in-law of the English King Charles I. Henry IV was a Huguenot by faith. But he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in Paris. He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to pay for the powerful support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Null Bazaar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is strategy; it is mobilization. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading

into all the different strata of Muslim society and is becoming part and parcel of its mental makeup. This is as clear as anything could be.

* * *

After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution of the question of Pakistan. The question of Pakistan is not an academic question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How? It must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be the result of negotiations—of give and take and not of surrender by one side to the other. That is not agreement. It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties may come to an agreement. But agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before good sense prevails. How long one cannot say. The political freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be postponed and yet without a solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it dependent on agreement is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must be found. It seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out.

* * *

The Muslim League's Resolution on Pakistan has called forth different reactions. There are some who look upon it as a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of their conscious unity and power are very liable. Others have taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and not merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly perturbed.

The question is undoubtedly controversial. The issue is vital and there is no argument which has not been used in the controversy by one side to silence the other. Some argue that this demand for partitioning India into two political entities under separate national states staggers their imaginations; others are so choked with a sense of righteous indignation at this wanton attempt to break the unity of a country, which, it is claimed, has stood as one for centureis, that their rage prevents them from giving expression to their thoughts. Others think that it need not be taken seriously. They treat it as a trifle and try to destroy it by shooting into it similes and metaphors. "You don't cut your head to cure your headache," "you don't cut a baby into two because two women are engaged in fighting out a claim as to who its mother is," are some of the analogies which are used to prove the absurdity of Pakistan. In a controversy carried on the plane of pure sentiment, there is nothing surprising if a dispassionate student finds more stupefaction and less understanding, more heat and less light, more ridicule and less seriousness.

My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular. I do not think the demand for Pakistan is the result of mere political distemper, which will pass away with the efflux of time. As I read the situation, it seems to me that it is a characteristic in the biological sense of the term, which the Muslim body politic has developed in the same manner as an organism develops a characteristic. Whether it will survive or not, in the process of natural selection, must depend upon the forces that may become operative in the struggle for existence between Hindus and Musalmans. I am not staggered by Pakistan; I am not indignant about it; nor do I believe that it can be smashed by shooting into it similes and metaphors. Those who believe in shooting it by similes should remember that nonsense does not cease to be nonsense because it is put in rhyme, and that a metaphor is no argu-

ment though it be sometimes the gunpowder to drive one home and imbed it in memory. I believe that it would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its implications and to form an intelligent judgment about it.

* * *

The essence of Pakistan is the opposition to the establishment of one Central Government having supremacy over the whole of India. Pakistan contemplates two Central Governments, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. This gives rise to the second important point which Indians must take note of. That point is that the issue of Pakistan shall have to be decided upon before the plans for a new constitution are drawn and its foundations are laid. If there is to be one Central Government for India, the design of the constitutional structure would be different from what it would be if there is to be one Central Government for Hindustan and another for Pakistan. That being so, it will be most unwise to postpone the decision. Either the scheme should be abandoned and another substituted by mutual agreement or it should be decided upon. It will be the greatest folly to suppose that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will never raise its head again. I am sure, burying Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as the hostility to one Central Government for India, which is the ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of Pakistan will be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future of India. Neither will it be prudent to make some kind of a make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the permanent solution to some future day. To do so would be something like curing the symptoms without removing the disease. But, as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby making certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form.

Khalid Bin Sayeed

THE REALITIES OF MUSLIM POLITICS

Khalid Bin Sayeed (1926–) indicates in the two selections printed below that a difference in attitude towards a strong central authority between the Congress and the League was a significant factor in the collapse of negotiations at the time of the Cabinet Mission Plan. He points out that there were Socialists in both parties, and that Jinnah himself gave some measure of support to the Socialists in the League. As Sayeed sees the problem, it was difference of opinion about the necessity for a strong center, rather than difference about theories of economic and social development that divided the two parties. Both parties contained within their ranks members with widely differing views about social change. Dr. Sayeed teaches political science at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

MUSLIM leaders like Muhammad Ali, his brother, Shaukat Ali, and Abul Kalam Azad urged the Muslims to cooperate with the Congress, which, under Gandhi's leadership, had embarked on a civil disobedience movement. The Congress declaration of "progressive, nonviolent, noncooperation" involved total noncooperation with all government institutions like local bodies, the Reformed Councils announced under the Government of India Act, 1919, and courts of justice, gradual withdrawal of children from government schools and colleges, and boycott of foreign goods. Gandhi thought that this was a capital opportunity for building Hindu-Muslim unity at the grass-roots level. "I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana Mahomed Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure safety of the cow, that is my religion, from the Mussalman knife."

Gandhi, accompanied by the Ali brothers and Azad, undertook extensive tours of the country to mobilize popular support. The Khilafat movement had captured the public imagination and most of the moderate leaders had either veered round to Gandhi's point of view or had been rendered ineffective. Jinnah seemed lonely in furrowing his constitutional path. His view was that Gandhi's "extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganization and chaos."

For Muslims, Khilafat meant the honor and glory of Islam. They had been watching with mounting dismay the gradual and steady decline of Muslim political power throughout the world. They regarded this as an opportunity to pour forth all their energy and fervor for the cause of Islam. Hundreds of *ulama* (learned men in Islamic religion) issued *fatwas* (religious decrees) sanctioning the program of non-violent noncooperation. Another *fatwa* forbade Muslims from serving the government in any capacity—particularly service in the police or the army was declared an unpardonable sin. Resolutions to the effect that religious duty forbade Muslims from joining the Indian army or continuing to serve in it were passed by the All-India Khilafat Conference which met in Karachi in July, 1921. This resulted in the imprisonment of the Ali brothers. The idea that owing to the flagrant disregard of the law of Islam by the British

From Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston, 1967), pp. 23–28, 32–36, 38–40.

government, India had become a *dar-ul-harb* (zone of war) spread widely, particularly in the North West Province and Sind. The result was that thousands of Muslims—as many as 18,000 in the month of August, 1920—sold all their belongings and migrated to Afganistan. . . . Afghan authorities, alarmed by such an enormous influx, were compelled to turn the emigrants back.

* * *

Hindu-Muslim cooperation for the Khilafat movement registered a severe setback when the Moplahs (Muslim inhabitants of Malabar in South India) rioted against their Hindu landlords. In addition to destroying government property and attacking European planters, they sacked Hindu houses, deserted temples, and converted thousands of Hindus by force. They declared their objective to be the establishment of a Khilafat. The Moplah riots alienated a considerable body of Hindu opinion. These riots were followed by Hindu-Muslim clashes in several parts of India. Several Hindu communal organizations started Hindu movements to reconvert those Hindus who had recently embraced Islam. Muslims retaliated by launching similar movements. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the Khilafat movement was petering out. In February, 1922, horrified by an incident in which twenty-one policemen were murdered and for which the Congress volunteers were held mainly responsible, Gandhi called off the national movement. The final blow was struck by the Turkish government on March 3, 1924, which under its President, Kemal Pasha, exiled the Khalifa and abolished the Khilafat.

The Khilafat movement was the first and the only movement in which both Hindus and Muslims had played a joint role on a mass scale. But as suggested earlier, freedom of India was not the first and only objective of the Muslim struggle. Muslims seemed to suggest to the Hindus through the Khilafat movement that they could become passionately interested in the freedom of their country only if it ensured the safety and glory of Islam both in India and Muslim countries. No one was more acutely aware of this than Gandhi.

"We both have now an opportunity of a life-time. The Khilafat question will not recur for another hundred years. If the Hindus wish to cultivate eternal friendship with the Mussalmans, they must perish with them in the attempt to vindicate the honour of Islam."

It was apparent that after the collapse of the Khilafat movement, there was Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the air.

* * *

A convention of all parties known as the All-Parties Conference met in Calcutta in the last week of December, 1928, to consider the Nehru Report. Jinnah, who was at that time president of the Muslim League, put forward his famous Fourteen Points, which were amendments to the Report, before the open session of the Conference on December 28, 1928. His basic amendments were: (1) Representation of communal groups should continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present. (2) There should be a Federal constitution with the residuary powers vested in the provinces. (3) In the central legislature Muslims should have one-third representation. (4) No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being at least one-third Muslim Ministers. (5) The Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal, and the North-West Frontier Province should not be disturbed.

These proposals were rejected in their entirety by the Conference. Congress leaders felt that Muslims were divided, and Jinnah was representing only a faction. There were other Muslims led by Abul Kalam Azad who were in agreement with the proposals of the Nehru Report. Another reason why the Congress leaders adopted a rigid attitude was because a considerable section of Hindu opinion would have been alienated if they had made any concessions to the Muslims. But it must be emphasized that Motilal Nehru, the chairman,

stood solidly behind his Report, not merely because it was politically wise to do so. He was a lawyer who believed in a liberal, democratic and constitutional government. To him, separate electorates were not only antithetical to basic principles of responsible government; they also had accentuated the animosities that prevailed between the two communities. Jinnah himself at one time had held such views. In the author's opinion, herein lay the crux of the problem. Leaders like Motilal Nehru in their total adherence to Western modes of thinking and forms of government were not taking into account the peculiar political conditions in India; although India was a heterogeneous subcontinent, they were drawing on the practices and traditions of a unitary and homogeneous country like the United Kingdom in order to solve its problems.

During 1930 and 1931, a series of meetings of British government leaders and Indian representatives of all parties and communities, known as the Round Table Conference, were held. The Congress Party, before taking part in such a Conference, wanted a clear commitment from the government that the purpose of the Round Table Conference would be to draft a scheme for Dominion status which would be implemented by the British government. The Viceroy's refusal to give such a commitment resulted in the congress launching a campaign of civil disobedience, including nonpayment of taxes, in March–April, 1930.

It was significant that Muhammad Ali, who had so far taken an active part in the Congress movement, called upon Muslims to remain aloof from the Congress civil disobedience campaign. He declared: "Mr. Gandhi is working under the influence of the communalist Mahasabha. He is fighting for the supremacy of Hinduism and the submergence of Muslims." This was strong language, and this view regarding the role of the Congress and Gandhi, as we shall see later, became the official and accepted view of the Muslim League under Jinnah. This bitterness also cast its shadow over the Round Table Conference. Gandhi was absent in the first session, November–January, 1931. He was present in the second session of the Round Table Conference in the autumn of 1931, after having suspended the civil disobedience movement in accordance with the agreement reached between himself and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin.

In the Round Table Conference a long and bitter conflict regarding the number of seats that minorities should be given in various legislatures took place. Muslim representatives asked for one-third representation for Muslims in the central legislature of British India. Similarly, they argued strongly for Muslim majority representation in Punjab and Bengal since those provinces were to be given provincial autonomy. But no agreement could be reached on the questions of minority representation. Gandhi tried his best but "with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation" he announced "utter failure to secure an agreed solution of the communal question."

* * *

How does one spell out these conflicts in concrete terms? In the northwestern parts of the Indian subcontinent, in the Punjab and Sind, Hindus were the moneylenders and the Muslims were peasants, whereas in the east, in the province of Bengal, Hindus were often landowners with Muslims as tenants. In East Bengal, despite its greater concentration of Muslim majority, the professional classes were mostly Hindus. This conflict had caught the Congress in different provinces in contradictory positions. In the United Provinces, they were in favor of land reforms directed against big landowners, great numbers of whom were Muslim, whereas in Bengal they were opposed to land reforms where the great majority of big landowners happened to be Hindu. In the Punjab and Sind, they often opposed legislation designed against the moneylenders.

It was well known that Muslims, because of their backwardness in Western education, had lagged behind the Hindus in obtaining positions in the all-

Indian services like the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, and others. In order that Muslims might be able to make up this handicap, the British had introduced the quota system in the recruitment of the central services. This competition for jobs, particularly at the provincial level, aggravated Hindu-Muslim tension among the intelligentsia. The provincial civil servants came in close contact with the rural people in matters like land records, payment of land revenue, and maintenance of law and order. Whether a Muslim or Hindu villager felt secure or apprehensive depended upon the religious affiliation of the officer. In the United Provinces, where Muslims were in the minority, they occupied a favored position in the provincial services; whereas in Bengal, where they were in the majority, the Hindus held most of the posts in the provincial services. In the United Provinces, the Muslim League could point out that under the Congress regime, Hindus were determined to oust the Muslims from their favored positions, and in Bengal the Muslim League could point the accusing finger at the Hindus for having deprived the Muslims of their share in public services, even though the latter were in the majority.

The question that may be raised is: Were Muslims merely interested in cataloguing their grievances against the Hindus and reiterating the plea that under a perpetual Hindu majority, the Muslim minority could not be confident of fair play and justice? In other words, was Muslim nationalism a mere product of negative forces, or did it have intellectual and ideological content? According to Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938), one of the greatest poets of Indian Islam and often described as the national poet of Pakistan, Muslims of India did not have to struggle to become a nation for they were already a nation.

> We are seventy millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. . . . The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift.

There was no doubt that Muslim leaders could evoke enthusiastic support for a political cause from Muslim masses by invoking the name of Islam. The problem was whether Islam would continue to have the same appeal for the Muslim intelligentsia who were coming under the spell of Western rationalism. Sir Syed went to great lengths in showing that Islam was basically a rational system and that the superstitious beliefs and practices which had arisen among Muslims were based upon an erroneous and fanciful interpretation of the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet. Ameer Ali's *The Spirit of Islam* was perhaps even a more elaborate and painstaking effort to persuade both Muslim and Western readers that Islam in its days of glory had been ahead of other religions in its spirit of tolerance towards minorities and liberal in protecting the rights of indivduals—women, slaves, etc. The sprit of philosophical and scientific inquiry had always been prized by Muslim rulers. But Ameer Ali wrote in an apologetic vein. It was Sir Muhammad Iqbal who pointed out that there was no need for Muslims to emulate the Western example in politics or philosophy because the West itself had grown disenchanted with its thinking and philosophy which had produced the inequitable capitalist system and horrible global conflicts. Iqbal claimed that as opposed to Western nationalism, Islam preached international brotherhood, and in contrast to the Western capitalist system, Islam was vibrant with a sense of social justice and humanitarianism. However, all these values needed to be reinterpreted in the light of modern times. Iqbal thought that Indian Islam could undertake this task of reinterpretation. The most important instrument that Indian Islam needed for fulfilling this role was a separate Muslim polity.

* * *

The elections that were fought during 1936–37 were not marked by any increase in Hindu-Muslim tension. On the contrary, the Muslim League under Jinnah produced a program which was

not too dissimilar from that of the Congress. But it was clear that the Muslim League was determined to maintain its separate identity as an organization representing the Muslims of India. Jinnah had become quite convinced that the only way of resolving the Hindu-Muslim conflict was for the two representative bodies, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, to enter into negotiations with each other. This was how the Lucknow Pact was arrived at, and Jinnah, as a lawyer and political leader, regarded political settlement as essentially a compromise arrived at between two negotiating parties. The Congress, on the other hand, because of its growing strength and efficient organization, thought that there were only two parties in the country—the British government and the Congress. Jinnah, who was trying to build the Muslim League under his leadership, made his position clear.

> Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have said in Calcutta that there are only two parties in the country, namely, the Government and the Congress, and the others must line up. I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is a third party in this country and that is the Moslems. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody.

It may also be pointed out that Congress intellectuals and particularly Jawaharlal Nehru held the view that India as an historic and cultural entity had absorbed many outside forces and thereby grown richer, and, despite its apparent diversity, there had been an inner spirit in India which rolled through all ages. Thus, to them Islam could also be absorbed, and India's unity could flow in an uninterrupted fashion. Furthermore, to a socialist like Nehru, religion was a somewhat reactionary force and all communities in modern India should think primarily in economic terms.

Nehru felt that the Congress under the leadership of socialists like himself could look after the genuine interests of Muslims better than the Muslim League, which was dominated by landowning classes and therefore reactionary.

> I come into greater touch with the Moslem masses than most of the members of the Muslim League. I know more about their hunger and poverty and misery than those who talk in terms of percentages and seats in the Councils and places in the State service.

But this view of Muslim politics grossly underrated the enormous appeal that religion had for the Muslim masses. It also ignored the fact that a number of Congress leaders were not as secular-minded and generous towards Muslims as Jawaharlal Nehru. Such mistakes could have been avoided if the Congress had been able to consult representatives of Muslim majority opinion. This it could have done if it had included such representatives in the provincial governments.

* * *

It is difficult to establish the degree of truth in the charges levelled by the Muslim League against the Congress governments. The Muslim League did not respond to a Congress offer to have the charges investigated by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court (an Englishman). Moreover, the evidence offered by pro-Congress Muslim leaders was conflicting. The president of the pro-Congress *Jamiyat al Ulama-i-Hind* suggested that in view of the fact that Muslims were dissatisfied with the treatment meted out to them in certain Congress provinces, the Congress should appoint a nonofficial committee to look into the charges. He also protested at the increasing use of Sanskrit words in the Hindustani language. Abul Kalam Azad felt the Muslim League charges "were absolutely unfounded." The point that one has to bear in mind is not whether the Muslim grievances were true or exaggerated but whether a great majority of Muslims believed them. Had not the Qur'an reminded them time and again that the infidel could never be expected to bear any good will toward Muslims? When the Congress Ministers resigned their offices in October, 1939, on the plea that India had been dragged into war with Germany by the British

government without consulting Indian leaders, Jinnah seized this occasion to call upon the Muslims to celebrate what he designated the "Deliverance Day" on December 22, 1939. The resolution that was passed by Muslim League meetings in various provinces on this day said:

> The Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their duties of the administration and in the Legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights. . . .

* * *

The way Jinnah's mind was working was revealed in an article he published in *The Time and Tide* of London on January 19, 1940. He pointed out that the Muslim League was irrevocably opposed to any federal objective because it would bring about Hindu majority rule. He suggested that the British government should revise the entire problem of India's future constitution *de novo:* "To conclude, a constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland."

A day before the famous Lahore Resolution was passed on March 23, 1940, Jinnah's presidential address spelled out the two-nation theory which became the bedrock of the Muslim League ideology.

> It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. . . . They neither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often, the Hero of one is a foe of the other and likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.

* * *

IN fairness to Jinnah, it must be said that when he argued that the Muslim League was the sole, authoritative representative of the Muslim nation, he did not mean that it represented each and every Muslim. Even though Pakistan was not yet a reality, he was thinking along the lines that the Muslim League represented the Muslim nation in the same sense that a British party government represented the British nation.

* * *

As the Muslim League leaders, particularly the young intelligentsia, came increasingly in contact with the masses, they were shocked by the poverty and social inequalities that stared them in the face wherever they went in the countryside. They had also been influenced in their universities by socialistic ideas. Out of all this was born that impatient idealism which one noticed in the annual sessions of the Muslim League, in some of the manifestos that were published during the Provincial elections of 1945–46, and also in the conflicts between progressives and conservatives that smouldered in Provinces like Sind, the Punjab and Bengal. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, speaking at the Karachi session in December, 1943, declared that he was a Communist "if Communism means to efface poverty and class distinctions and to provide bread and clothing to the poor." He qualified this remark by saying that he did not draw his inspiration from Karl Marx, who denied the existence of God. He hoped that the Muslim League Planning Committee would produce an economic plan based

From *Pakistan: the Formative Phase* by Khalid Ben Sayeed, published by the Oxford University Press, pp. 141, 224, 228–229.

on Qur'anic justice. Addressing the Quaid-i-Azam, he said, "We have understood Pakistan in this light. If your Pakistan is not such we do not want it." The manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League declared that there should be nationalization of key industries and banks beginning with immediate nationalization of all public utility services, public control of private industry, a ceiling placed on land holdings, and an equalization of the burden of taxation involving the imposition of additional taxes on large landowners. The manifesto was adopted unanimously by the Working Committee of the Provincial Muslim League and published by an extreme left-wing leader, Danyal Latifi. Similarly, it was reported that Abul Hashim, the young socialist General Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, who was waging a battle royal inside the Bengal Provincial League against the group led by the Nawab of Dacca and Khwaja Nazimuddin and probably supported by Muslim merchants and industrialists. G. M. Syed, President of the Sind Provincial Muslim League during 1943–45, was also indignant that the Muslim League High Command constantly supported those whom he considered reactionaries like Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. He had also seen and been moved by the destitution and squalor in which the *haris* of Sind lived, and his bitter outburst was:

"Do not forget that Islamic society actually in existence is that in which religious head is an ignorant Mulla, spiritual leader an immoral Pir, political guide a power intoxicated feudal lord and whose helpless members are subjected to all the worldly [*sic*] forces of money and influence. If the really important question about the abolition of Jagirdari and Zamindari system crops up or the prohibition of intoxicants becomes the issue of the day, what would not a rich Jagirdar or an aristocratic member of a sophisticated club do to use his influence, as also that of the Mulla and the Pir, to resist this threat to what is essentially an immoral and un-Islamic cause?"

Jinnah himself had thundered against the exploitation of the common people by landlords and capitalists. "There are millions and millions of our people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilization? Is this the aim of Pakistan? . . . If that is the idea of Pakistan I would not have it." He had encouraged men like Abul Hashim and G. M. Syed to use their crusading spirit for organizing the Muslim masses under the League flag. He had counselled them to be patient and fight their battles inside the League with a view to transforming it. But the realities of Muslim politics forced even a domineering personality like Jinnah to work with the existing powerful social forces like the landowners and the new industrial magnates. Jinnah knew that the Muslim masses were too ignorant to be fully aware of their interests and too content to follow their pirs and landlords. The simmering of ideas that the activities and speeches of the fiery young idealists had produced was a phenomenon confined only to the top. It never went below the Provincial Working Committee or the Provincial Council. Thus Jinnah could not afford to antagonize the influential groups only to satisfy the wishes of the angry young men of the League. Referring to the charge that the League was against the Zamindars, he said in Punjab, "The League is not against any interests among the Muslims."

* * *

The Muslim League campaign before 1940 was that Islam was in danger and therefore all Muslims should join the Muslim League which was fighting for the preservation of Muslim religion and culture. After 1940, its campaign was that in Pakistan lay the future glory of Islam and therefore all Muslims should support the demand for Pakistan. In either case, opposition was ruled out as anti-national. Any Muslim who opposed the Muslim League was an enemy of Islam. Thus, the Muslim League Party was not a party in the normal sense of the term. It was a movement which represented the whole nation. And its

leader himself declared many times that anyone who acted against the interests of the Muslim League was a quisling or a traitor.

When Jinnah reorganized the Muslim League during 1935–7, he knew that in the struggle for power that was taking place in India, Muslims would not amount to anything unless they organized themselves through a powerful political organization. "If Wardha makes any decision and issues orders to-morrow, millions of Hindus will follow and obey. I ask you, suppose the Muslim League were to issue any order, what would happen to it?" Thus, Jinnah's conception of a political organization was that it was like an army in which once orders were given by the High Command, they should be carried out.

For the Muslim League, parliamentary democracy was not an ideal but only an instrument through which it was trying to achieve its major objective. The Muslim League had come into being prior to most of the Legislatures and therefore the primary focus of loyalty was not to the Parliament or a parliamentary form of government but to the Muslim League. No matter who stood on the ticket of the Muslm League, "we should support the League candidate even though he may be lamp-post."

III. THE CALL FOR DIRECT ACTION

Maulana Azad

A CONGRESS VIEW

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) was the most important Muslim member of the Congress leadership. He had worked closely with Gandhi during the Khilafat Movement, and later became an active member of the Congress Working Committee. He was President of the Congress from 1939 to 1946. In his autobiographical sketch of the nationalist struggle, *India Wins Freedom,* Maulana Azad gives his views on the failure of attempts to negotiate a settlement which would have allowed the Muslim League and the Congress to work together within one nation.

THE acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by both Congress and Moslem League was a glorious event in the history of the freedom movement in India. It meant that the difficult question of Indian freedom had been settled by negotiation and agreement and not by methods of violence and conflict. It also seemed that the communal difficulties had been finally left behind. Throughout the country there was a sense of jubilation and all the people were united in their demand for freedom. We rejoiced but we did not then know that our joy was premature and bitter disappointment awaited us.

* * *

Now happened one of those unfortunate events which changed the course of history. On 10 July, Jawaharlal held a press conference in Bombay in which he made a statement which in normal circumstances might have passed almost unnoticed, but, in the existing atmosphere of suspicion and hatred, set in train a most unfortunate series of consequences. Some press representatives asked him whether, with the passing of the resolution by the A.I.C.C., the Congress had accepted the Plan in toto, including the composition of the interim Government.

Jawaharlal stated in reply that Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly "completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise."

Press representatives further asked if this meant that the Cabinet Mission Plan could be modified.

Jawaharlal replied emphatically that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.

I must place on record that Jawaharlal's statement was wrong. It was not correct to say that Congress was free to modify the Plan as it pleased. We had in fact agreed that the Central Government would be federal. There would be the compulsory list of three Central subjects while all other subjects remained in the provincial sphere. We had further agreed that there would be the three sections, viz., A, B, and C, in which the provinces would be grouped. These matters could not be changed unilaterally by Congress without the consent of other parties to the agreement.

The Moslem League had accepted the Cabinet Misson Plan, as this represented the utmost limit to which the British Government would go. In his speech to

From Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New York, 1960), pp. 177, 181–187, 242–244.

the League Council, Mr. Jinnah had clearly stated that he recommended acceptance only because nothing better could be obtained.

Mr. Jinnah was thus not very happy about the outcome of the negotiations, but he had reconciled himself as there was no alternative. Jawaharlal's statement came to him as a bombshell. He immediately issued a statement that this declaration by the Congress President demanded a review of the whole situation. He accordingly asked Liaqat Ali Khan to call a meeting of the League Council and issued a statement that the Moslem League Council had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in Delhi as it was assured that the Congress had also accepted the scheme and that the Plan would be the basis of the future constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the Constituent Assembly, this would mean that the minorities were placed at the mercy of the majority. His view was that Jawaharlal's declaration meant that the Congress had rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and as such the Viceroy should call upon the Moslem League, which had accepted the Plan to form the Government.

The Moslem League Council met at Bombay on 27 July. In his opening speech Mr. Jinnah reiterated the demand for Pakistan as the only course left open to the Moslem League. After three days' discussion, the Council passed a resolution rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to direct action for the achievement of Pakistan.

I was extremely perturbed by this new development. I saw that the scheme for which I had worked so hard was being destroyed through our own action. I felt that a meeting of the Working Committee must be held immediately to review the situation. The Working Committee accordingly met on 8 August. I pointed out that if we wanted to save the situation, we must make it clear that the view of the Congress was expressed by the resolution passed by the A.I.C.C. and that no individual, not even the Congress President, could change it.

The Working Committee felt that it faced a dilemma. On the one side, the prestige of the Congress President was at stake. On the other, the settlement which we had so painfully achieved was in danger. To repudiate the President's statement would weaken the organization but to give up the Cabinet Mission Plan would ruin the country. Finally, we drafted a resolution which made no reference to the press conference but reaffirmed the decision of the A.I.C.C. in the following terms:

The Working Committee regret to note that the Council of the All-India Muslim League, reversing their previous decision, have decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly. In this period of rapid transition from dependence on a foreign power to full independence, when vast and intricate political and economic problems have to be faced and solved, the largest measure of co-operation among the people of India and their representatives is called for, so that the change-over should be smooth and to the advantage of all concerned. The Committee realise that there are differences in the outlook and objectives of the Congress and the Muslim League. Nevertheless, in the larger interests of the country as a whole and of the freedom of the people of India, the Committee appeal for the co-operation of all those who seek the freedom and good of the country, in the hope that co-operation in common tasks may lead to the solution of many of India's problems.

The Committee have noted that criticisms have been advanced on behalf of the Muslim League to the effect that the Congress acceptance of the proposals contained in the Statement of May 16th was conditional. The Committee wish to make it clear that while they did not approve of all the proposals contained in this Statement, they accepted the scheme in its entirety. They interpreted it so as to resolve the inconsistencies contained in it and fill the omissions in accordance with the principles laid down in that Statement. They hold that provincial autonomy is a basic provision and each province has the right to decide whether to join a group or not. Questions of interpretation will be decided by the procedure laid down in the State-

> ment itself, and the Congress will advise its representatives in the Constituent Assembly to function accordingly.
>
> The Committee have emphasised the sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly, that is its right to function and draw up a constitution for India without the interference of any external power or authority. But the Assembly will naturally function within the internal limitations which are inherent in its task, and will therefore seek the largest measure of co-operation in drawing up a constitution of free India allowing the greatest measure of freedom and protection for all just claims and interests. It was with this object and with the desire to function in the Constituent Assembly and make it a success, that the Working Committee passed their resolution on June June 26, 1946 which was subsequently ratified by the All-India Congress Committee on July 7, 1946. By that decision of the A.I.C.C. they must stand, and they propose to proceed accordingly with their work in the Constituent Assembly.
>
> The Committee hope that the Muslim League and all others concerned, in the wider interests of the nation as well as of their own, will join in this great task.

We had hoped that this resolution of the Working Committee would save the situation. Now there was no longer any doubt that the Congress had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in its entirety. If the Moslem League accepted our resolution, it could return to the early position without any loss of prestige. Mr. Jinnah did not, however, accept the position and held that Jawaharlal's statement represented the real mind of Congress. He argued that, if Congress could change so many times while the British were still in the country and power had not come to its hands, what assurance could the minorities have that, once the British left, Congress would not again change and go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal's statement?

The resolution of the Working Committee accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in its entirety. This meant both the long-term plan and the proposals for the interim Government. This unequivocal acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by the Working Committee led to an immediate response from the Viceroy. On 12 August, Jawaharlal was invited by him to form an interim Government at the Center in the following terms:

> His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, has invited the President of the Congress to make proposals for the immediate formation of an interim Government and the President of the Congress has accepted the invitation. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss this proposal with His Excellency the Viceroy.

Mr. Jinnah issued a statement the same day in which he said that "The latest resolution of the Congress Working Committee passed at Wardha on 10 August does not carry us anywhere because it is only a repetition of the Congress stand taken by them from the very beginning only put in a different phraseology." He rejected Jawaharlal's invitation to cooperate in the formation of an interim Government. Later, on 15 August Jawaharlal met Mr. Jinnah at his house. Nothing however, came out of their discussions and the situation rapidly deteriorated.

When the League Council met at the end of July and decided to resort to direct action, it had also authorized Mr. Jinnah to take any action he liked in pursuance of the program. Mr. Jinnah declared 16 August as the "Direct Action Day," but he did not make it clear what the program would be. It was generally thought that there would be another meeting of the Moslem League Council to work out the details, but this did not take place. On the other hand I noticed in Calcutta that a strange situation was developing. In the past, political parties had observed special days by organizing hartals, taking out processions and holding meetings. The League's "Direct Action Day" seemed to be of a different type. In Calcutta, I found a general feeling that, on 16 August, the Moslem League would attack Congressmen and loot Congress property. Further panic was created when the Bengal Government decided to declare 16 August a public holiday. The Congress party in

the Bengal Assembly protested against this decision and, when this proved ineffective, walked out as a protest against the Government's policy in giving effect to a party decision through the use of Government machinery. There was a general sense of anxiety in Calcutta which was heightened by the fact that the Government was under the control of the Moslem League and Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister.

* * *

The 16th of August, 1946 was a black day not only for Calcutta but for the whole of India. The turn that events had taken made it almost impossible to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between the Congress and the Moslem League. This was one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history and I have to say with the deepest regret that it had followed inexorably from the opportunity given to the Moslem League to reopen the whole question of political and communal settlement. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage of this mistake and withdrew from the League's early acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan.

Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to India's national life is second to none. He has worked and suffered for Indian freedom and, since the attainment of independence, he has become the symbol of our national unity and progress. I have nevertheless to say with regret that he is at times apt to be carried away by his feelings. Not only so, but sometimes he is so impressed by theoretical considerations that he is apt to underestimate the realities of a situation.

* * *

The real test of the people's attitude towards the partition of the country came on 14 August, 1947 when independent Pakistan was formed. If the people of India had willingly accepted partition, surely the Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab, the Frontier, Sind and Bengal would have rejoiced in the same way as the Moslems of those regions. Reports which we received from all these provinces showed how hollow was the claim that the Congress acceptance of partition meant its acceptance by the Indian people.

The 14th August was for the Moslems of Pakistan a day of rejoicing. For the Hindus and the Sikhs, it was a day of mourning. This was the feeling not only of most people, but even of important leaders of Congress. Acharya Kripalani was then President of the Congress. He is a man of Sind. On 14 August, 1947, he issued a statement that it was a day of sorrow and destruction for India. This feeling was expressed openly by Hindus and Sikhs throughout Pakistan. It was surely a strange situation. Our national organization had taken a decision in favor of partition, but the entire people grieved over it.

One question naturally arises here. If partition evoked such feelings of anger and sorrow in the hearts of all Indians, why did the Indian people accept it? Why was there not greater opposition to it? Why was there such a hurry to take a decision which almost everybody regarded as wrong? If the right solution of the Indian problem could not be found by 15 August, why take a wrong decision and then grieve over it? I had again and again said that it was better to wait till a correct solution was found. I had done my best, but my friends and colleagues unfortunately did not support me. The only explanation I can find of their strange blindness to facts is that anger or despair had clouded their vision. Perhaps also the fixation of a date —15 August—acted like a charm and hypnotized them into accepting whatever Lord Mountbatten said.

The situation was one in which tragedy and comedy were inextricably mixed. After partition, the most ridiculous position was that of the Moslem League leaders who remained in India. Jinnah left for Karachi with a message to his followers that now that the country was divided they should be loyal citizens of India. This parting message created in them a strange sense of weakness and delusion. Many of these leaders

came to see me after 14 August. Their plight was pathetic. Every one of them said with deep regret and anger that Jinnah had deceived them and left them in the lurch.

I could not at first understand what they meant by saying that Jinnah had deceived them. He had openly demanded partition of the country on the basis of Moslem majority provinces. Partition was now a reality and both in the west and in the east Moslem majority areas formed parts of Pakistan. Why then should these spokesmen of the Moslem League say that they had been deceived?

As I talked to them I realized that these men had formed a picture of partition which had no relevance to the real situation. They had failed to realize the real implications of Pakistan. If the Moslem majority provinces formed a separate state, it was clear that the provinces in which the Moslems were in a minority would form part of India. The Moslems of the U.P. and Bihar were a minority and would remain so even after partition. It is strange, but the fact is that these Moslem Leaguers had been foolishly persuaded that, once Pakistan was formed, Moslems, whether they came from a majority or a minority province, would be regarded as a separate nation and would enjoy the right of determining their own future. Now, when the Moslem majority provinces went out of India and even Bengal and the Punjab were divided and Mr. Jinnah left for Karachi, they at last realized that they had gained nothing but in fact lost everything by the partition of India. Jinnah's parting message came as the last straw on the camel's back. It was now clear to them that the only result of partition was that their position as a minority was much weaker than before. In addition, they had through their foolish action created anger and resentment in the minds of the Hindus.

S. M. Ikram

A PAKISTANI VIEW

S. M. Ikram was a member of the Indian civil service and after partition held a number of important positions in the civil service of Pakistan. He has also published books in both Urdu and English on a variety of topics related to the history and culture of the Muslims of the subcontinent. In the excerpt quoted below, taken from a series of biographical sketches of Indian Muslim leaders, he discusses the re-organization of the Muslim League in the thirties under the leadership of Jinnah.

JINNAH was not invited to the later sessions of the Round Table Conference, but he was now residing in England, and had opportunities of meeting the delegates from India. An important contact, which he effectively renewed during this period was with Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who had come as a delegate to the Round Table Conference. Jinnah was the principal speaker at a reception given in honour of the poet by Iqbal Literary Association and thereafter invited him to lunch at his house. Thus began a series of meetings which were to leave a mark on the course of India's history. Jinnah was not now a delegate to the Round Table Conference, but during the first session, which he attended, he had criticised the conception of the central federation, which other delegates had supported enthusiastically. His objections were partly from the nationalist anglet (*sic*)—the inclusion of the autocratic princes at the centre would "water down democracy"—and partly from the Muslim point of view—a strong centre would nullify the provincial autonomy which the Muslims valued so much. Iqbal, on the other hand, had a few years before, held out his plan for a Muslim bloc in the North-West. This did not receive much consideration at the Round Table Conference, but the separation of Sind, and grant of full reforms to the North-West Frontier Province were bound to pave the way for its fulfilment. This plan, the poet discussed at length with Jinnah, and gradually convinced him that in this lay the only hope for a contented, peaceful India in general and for the bulk of Indian Muslims in particular.

Iqbal had got Jinnah seriously interested in what came to be known as the "Pakistan Scheme" but even then he did not return to India to take it up. He was biding his time, watching events brooding on them, and all the time, most unhappy. During the course of a brief visit to Oxford in 1932, he said to the present writer, with great anguish of soul, "But what is to be done? The Hindus are short-sighted and I think, incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people who, whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do! Where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me?"

Meanwhile he was getting reports from India that Indian Muslims were a flock of sheep without a shepherd. The Aga Khan's leadership was ineffective, as he wanted the palm without the dust, and could not give up the health resorts of France and Switzerland. Maulana Muhammad Ali was dead. So was Sir Muhammad Shafi, and even if he had been alive, he was too closely associated with a pro-British policy to inspire general enthusiasm. The League and the Muslim Conference had become the plaything of petty leaders who would not resign office, even after a vote of

From S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1965), pp. 252–260.

no-confidence! And, of course, they had no organization in the provinces, and no influence with the masses.

It was in these circumstances that certain well-wishers of the Muslims turned towards Jinnah. They requested him to return to India, and once again lead the army, which was fast becoming a rabble. Iqbal joined in these appeals. Jinnah relented, but even now he would only visit India for a few months and return to England again. In 1934, however, he was elected the permanent president of the All-India Muslim League, and finally returned to India in October, 1935.

Back in India, Jinnah began to reorganize the All-India Muslim League. Its annual session was held at Bombay in April, 1936, under the presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, and its constitution was revised to make it a more democratic and living organization. Steps were also taken, for the first time, to set up a machinery for contesting elections on behalf of the Muslim League. A central election board with provincial branches was set up to take in hand arrangements for fighting the provincial elections under the Government of India Act of 1935. Jinnah toured the country to convass (sic) support for the League candidates, but his efforts were only partially successful. In the Punjab, he had the constant support of Iqbal, but could not come to an agreement with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, the Unionist leader and League fared very badly in that 'key' province. Experience in Bengal was similar. In the elections, the League was actively assisted by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, and had generally the goodwill of the Congress, which had been receiving support from Jinnah's Independent Party in the Central Legislative Assembly, but it failed to make much headway against firmly entrenched provincial parties.

THE RALLYING-POST

The provincial elections of 1937 produced many surprises. The League had not come out with flying colours. The Congress, on the other hand, achieved a success, which neither its supporters nor its opponents had anticipated. Most provincial Governors and British officials expected at the provincial elections a repetition of the previous elections to the Central Legislature, when Congress had won about 50 per cent of the Hindu seats. They looked to the provincial parties, which they had encouraged in various areas—the Unionists in the Punjab, the Justice Party in Madras, the Zamindars and the Nationalist party in U.P., the Marathas in Bombay—and were sure that although the Congress may be the largest single party, it would have to depend on others to form ministries. Here they were to be completely disillusioned. The organizing ability of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who had succeeded Dr. Ansari as the chairman of the parliamentary board, the army of the workers, which the Congress had built up during the previous twenty years, the magic name of a Mahatma, and the whirlwind tours of the president, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, completely upset the official calculations. The Congress triumphed in all the Hindu provinces and even in the North-West Frontier!

There is no doubt that this unexpected success went to the head of the Congress leaders. Before and even during the elections, they were friendly to the Muslim League. Now they were cold and distant. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru declared at Calcutta that there were only two parties in the country—the British and the Congress. The League had fared so badly at the elections that it was not necessary to acknowledge its existence. To this attitude of high disdain, two other factors contributed. The Congress president was surrounded by certain left wing—almost de-Muslimised—Muslims, who later left even the Congress fold for the Communists' ranks. They urged on Nehru, that it was "medieval" to recognize political parties based on religions, and the Congress had only to organize a vigorous Muslim Mass Contact Movement to achieve the same success amongst the Muslims, which it had gained among the Hindus. Nehru was carried away by these visions, and an open breach occurred between the Congress and the League. While in the original elections, the Congress had sup-

ported the League candidates in U.P. now it set up a candidate to oppose the Muslim League in Bharaich constituency of U.P. which had returned a Leaguer, who died shortly after the elections.

The personality of the chairman of the Congress parliamentary board was another factor, which drove the Congress away from the League. Sardar Patel was a great organizer but for a man of his ability and importance, he was amazingly ill-informed about the background of Muslim politics, and even otherwise perhaps freedom from communalism was not one of his many gifts. He was at this time at the summit of his power, and as the chairman of the Congress parliamentary board, bossed over all governments in the Congress provinces. He had to decide the question of Muslim representation in provincial governments, and he dealt with the problem in his usual firm and unimaginative way. If he had faced the question in a spirit of statesmanship, he could have seen that Sir Sikandar Hayat and other Muslim premiers had already tackled the corresponding Hindu problem in the Muslim provinces, in a manner which could be a very safe guide to the Congress. Sir Sikandar Hayat's party was in absolute majority in the Punjab Assembly, but he offered the Hindu seat in the Government to the Hindu Mahasabha, and although Raja Narendara Nath, the president of the Hindu Party, was unable to accept it owing to old age, his nominee, Sir Manohar Lal was appointed a minister. There was really no other way to give honest, real, representation to the minorities. If a minister had to be taken not on account of affiliation to the party, or any other personal claim, but to represent the minorities, it was obvious that he should be their genuine representative and not a stooge of the party in power. This the iron-willed Sardar would not—or could not—grasp. Under the constitution, representation had to be given to the minorities. So he was prepared to have Muslim ministers even from the Muslim League—but then, they must resign from the League, sign the Congress pledge, and abide by its discipline. In other words, the minority representatives were not to represent the minorities but the Congress! In imposing his iron discipline, the Sardar had some initial difficulties. The Muslim League had not done well in predominantly Muslim areas, but it had won the vast majority of seats in the Congress provinces. In some of these—like Bombay—not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket. So what was to be done about the representation of the Muslims in the Governments of these provinces? The problem was somewhat complicated but the efficient, resourceful Sardar was not going to be baffled by these difficulties. He offered the ministry to any Tom, Dick or Harry amongst the Muslim members, who was prepared to sign the Congress pledge and so the farce of Muslim representation was complete.

The procedure adopted was, of course, a negation of the constitutional safeguards for the Muslims, but it was also less than fair to the Muslim League. Before the elections the Congress and Jinnah's Independent Party had closely collaborated with each other in the Central Legislative Assembly and many Congress resolutions against the Government succeeded only on account of Jinnah's support. Their relations during the elections were also friendly. Later, when after the elections in 1937, the Congress at first refused to accept office, and the Governors called the League leaders, as representing the next largest party, to form what were called Interim Ministries Jinnah would not allow this. It is known that in some cases, the leaders of the League parties in the provincial legislatures e.g. Sir Ali Mohammad Khan Dehlavi in Bombay were quite willing—even keen—to become premiers but Jinnah overruled them. He would not profit by the Congress refusal to come in, or do anything, which might jeopardise the prospects of an effective League-Congress collaboration on which his heart was set.

The Congress party leaders, however, when it was their turn to be invited by the Governors, completely ignored the Muslim League. This must have hurt Jinnah; what followed was calculated

to rouse his ire still further. The Congress Government had taken one false step in taking, as Muslim Ministers, persons who did not command the confidence of the Muslims in the legislature. This false step was succeeded by many more of the same type. In the absence of a true Muslim representative in the Cabinet, the Congress Governments had nobody to advise them about the views of the Muslims, when they took decisions affecting the general population. The so-called "Muslim Minister" knew very well that he was governed by the Congress pledge, and the iron discipline of that party. He usually represented himself alone, and lacked that moral courage which comes from having "big battalions at one's back." In many cases, he was just a newcomer to the Congress ranks, avowedly for the sake of the office —and did not carry with his colleagues in the Cabinet, anything of the influence which a Syed Mahmud or Yaqub Hassan would carry. Bereft of any following, and any mission, that he was to watch the Muslim interests—and in many cases, even the support of a contented conscience—the Muslim Minister was a pathetic figure, and deprived of his frank advice, the Congress Governments took several steps, which caused deep resentment amongst the Muslims. When the Congress ministries resigned office in 1939, a "Day of Deliverance" was observed by the Muslims—as well as by Hindu untouchables—and a committee has reported on the hardships, to which Muslims were exposed under the Congress rule.

The second half of the year 1937 was one of the darkest periods through which Indian Muslims have had to pass since 1857. Their central political organizations had failed to show any effectiveness at the polls. Over the greater part of the country, where the Congress ministries held sway, they felt that the Hindu Raj had come. They suddenly realized that all the fears, which Sir Syed and Viqar-ul-Mulk had expressed about their future, were coming true. They were most disheartened and sore at heart. They saw no way out of their predicament, and thought that soon the Congress, with its vast organization, and the policy of corrupting a few ambitious, un-principled Muslims, would extend its sway over the Muslim majority provinces and the whole country would become a vast prison-house for them.

The prospects for the Muslims were most gloomy and many faint hearts began to suggest that they should settle with the Congress on its own terms. There was however one light which burned bright and clear. Jinnah has been called a proud and haughty person, and this trait of character may have caused him and his people occasional difficulties. This was, however, the time when just these qualities were needed. In the midst of the storm he stood like a rock. He was the proud representative of a proud people and he hurled defiance at the pretensions and the dreams of the Congress. He was not going to lower his flag to come to terms with the Congress. Far from his accepting conditions while being offered seats in the Congress Governments, it would be he, who would impose conditions!

Indian Muslims are not likely to forget the resolute stand which Jinnah, without any visible following, without much support in the legislatures, and inspired solely by his sense of duty and his faith in his people, took at this juncture. But there was another great Muslim who, although in the background, gave Jinnah powerful and effective moral support. Jinnah had written about Iqbal,

"To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher, and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go, he stood like a rock and never flinched one single moment."

Gradually the darkness began to lift. The Muslims saw the light and rallied round. Those in the Muslim majority provinces saw what was happening to their co-religionists in the Congress provinces and were deeply touched. They now realised that except through a powerful, All-India organization they had no means of saving themselves. So after having decisively defeated the League in the elections, the Muslim premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Sind, came to

terms with Jinnah and agreed to abide by the policy and decisions of All-India Muslim League in all-India matters.

These decisions which were announced at the annual session of the League, held at Lucknow, towards the end of 1937, not only opened a new chapter for the League but marked a turning point in the history of Muslim India. The session was held in the face of heavy odds but, thanks to the help of the young Raja of Mahmudabad the arrangements were perfect. Jinnah, in his presidential address hurled defiance at the Congress, but now it was not the defiance of one who had nothing but faith and courage, to succour him. He had the premiers of the Punjab and Bengal on his right and left and he knew that he had the support of almost every selfrespecting Muslim. The Muslim India had rallied round the rallying-post!

SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The significance of the Lucknow session of the League was not lost on the Congress leaders. They realized that their treatment of the Muslims in the Congress provinces had been taken as a challenge by the entire Muslim India, which was prepared to meet it. The firm, disciplinarian policy of the iron dictator —the Sardar—had given results, quite different from what he expected. Thinking Hindus began to criticise the want of statesmanship shown by the Congress leadership in dealing with the Muslims. Tairsee, president of Hindu Gymkhana of Bombay, criticised, in the columns of the *Bombay Chronicle,* the unstatesmanlike attitude which the Congress leadership had shown in refusing genuine representation to the Muslims in Congress Cabinets. Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar of the Punjab expressed the same view in a long letter to Mahatma Gandhi. Sir Chiman Lal Sitalvad criticised the unhappy development in the presidential address delivered in December 1937 at the Calcutta session of All-India Liberal Federation and contrasted the unwise rigidity shown by the Congress leaders with the statesmanship displayed by the Muslim premiers like Sir Sikandar Hayat.

The Congress leaders realized that they had blundered and appeared willing to take Muslim representatives in the Congress Cabinets on less exacting terms. Now it was Jinnah's turn to be firm and unbending. The numerous unity talks which started between him and the Congress leaders, usually broke down on the question of the representative character of the Muslim League. His plea was that in 1916, when alone there was an agreement between Hindus and Muslims, the League had been taken as the sole and the authoritative representative of the Muslims and the Congress should now acknowledge its position in the same way. This, the Congress considered incompatible with its claim of speaking on behalf of entire India, and the negotiations broke down. Perhaps the truth is that what had happened in 1937, had not only embittered Jinnah but had finally convinced him that there was no safety for the Muslims in the goodwill of the Congress or the Hindus.

Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya

A MARXIST VIEW

Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya of the Institute of Asia, USSR Academy of Sciences, present a Marxist interpretation of the events in Jinnah's career in *A History of Pakistan*. Dr. Gankovsky leads the Pakistan department of the Institute, and is the author of several monographs and articles on the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Dr. Gordon-Polonskaya was a member of the group of Soviet Indologists who wrote *A Modern History of India* and *A Contemporary History of India*.

Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya consider Jinnah the consistent representative of Muslim "big bourgeoisie" and landlord interests. They see the first phase of Jinnah's career as an attempt to protect these interests against mass movements that might have led to social unrest. They see the second phase as an effort to achieve national independence so that these interests might have advantages over both their British and their Hindu competitors.

THE mortal blow to League-Congress co-operation was delivered by the reactionary course of the British authorities and the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1923–1927, which they provoked. India's colonial rulers feared united action by the two parties, but what they feared most was the mass struggle of the working people, which transcended the religious barriers.

The Muslim landlords and compradores held reactionary views. The Muslim educators appealed for religious separatism. The British went out of their way to set Muslim against Hindu. But for all this, the efforts to produce a religous chasm did not succeed for a long time.

The few religious riots in the cities towards the close of the 19th century and before and during the First World War were local and sporadic, and did not cause any serious damage.

It was different in 1923–1927. Incitement of Hindu-Muslim clashes became part of reaction's general offensive. The British authorities fomented religious enmity among the peasants, artisans and workers. Religious unrest broke out in places where the revolutionary actions of the masses had been the strongest and where the British imperialists made the most of the fears roused by these actions among the Indian bourgeois-leaders. The venom of Hindu-Muslim discord spread to the countryside. Riots caused reactionary demonstrations by religious fanatics throughout the country and new reprisals against workers, peasants, artisans and progressive intellectuals.

By steering the class actions into religious channels, the British authorities, helped by the local reactionaries, dealt the Indian patriots a blow in the back. This was so during the anti-imperialist Moplah rising in 1921, when religious differences between the Muslim peasants and the landlords and money-lenders, most of them Hindu, were accentuated by the authorities to suppress the unrest.

The religious strife provoked by the British in North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab was another attempt to steer mass dissatisfaction along Hindu-Muslim lines. Rajendra Prasad and Hakim Ajmal Khan, who obtained official permission to enter the Punjab, encountered obstruction from British officials when they tried to allay the intense religious feeling. Similar facts are cited in

From Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 50–52, 68–70, 85, 87–89.

the Congress report on the causes of religious unrest in Bombay.

* * *

At the close of 1921 and early in 1922 some Muslim leaders declared that nothing but religious motives could produce unity and improve the condition of the people. They averred that to this end people of other religions had to be converted to Islam, giving impetus to the Tabligh movement of the Muslims. At about the same time the Hindu Mahasabha launched a campaign for converting Muslims to Hinduism (the Shudhi movement).

The Tabligh campaign was closely associated with the movement for renewing the Muslim faith and for a strong Muslim organization (Tanzim). A fairly large section of intellectuals, including members of the civil disobedience campaign and the Khilafat movement, took part in the Shudhi and Tabligh campaigns.

Objectively speaking, these two campaigns, whatever the subjective wishes of the various campaigners, were deeply reactionary. They were so in form and also in content. They diverted the urban middle strata and the peasants from the anti-imperialist struggle and underlined the discord between the two religious communities. "That year the seed of distrust was sown, and it took root gradually," wrote Rajendra Prasad. "In the course of time a wide gulf came to separate the two communities. The British saw their chance and stepped in. . . . By skilful manoeuvres they kept the fires of communal distrust burning."

The division among the radical Indian intellectuals hampered the fight against religious separatism and the reactionary manoeuvres of the British imperalists, and this, in turn, brought Mohammed Ali Jinnah to prominence.

In his efforts to build up a strong Muslim party, M. A. Jinnah attached prime importance to the consolidation of the upper Muslim bourgeoisie. He had never been an advocate of mass forms in the national-liberation movement, but had never, until 1935, appealed to the Muslim working people. He spoke of the "mob" with mingled contempt and mistrust, and this lay behind the efforts to cement the alliance of the upper-crust bourgeoisie with the landlords. But great as his fear of mass action by the people may have been it did not relieve the contradictions between the British monopolies and the Muslim big bourgeoisie, whose interests Jinnah represented and who wished a certain amount of political independence for India.

M. A. Jinnah favoured a constitutional movement for dominion status. This stand won popularity for his separatist communal programme among the Muslim bourgeois groups. The frankly pro-British views of the Aligarh leaders and the Aga Khan no longer appealed to the Muslim community, not even to its propertied section.

The political foundations of Jinnah's programme, worked out in 1923–1927, envisaged home rule within the framework of the British Empire, to be achieved *in a constitutional manner*, based on the recognition of *special Muslim privileges*. Jinnah's programme accorded with the interests of the Muslim big bourgeoisie, since it was a tool against the mounting political consciousness of the masses and helped its competitive struggle against other Indian bourgeois groups.

Furthermore, it assisted the big bourgeoisie in angling concessions from the British imperialists. . . .

In its campaign against the Congress, the League capitalised on the inconsistency shown by the Congress ministries in handling the agrarian problem and labour legislation. It posed as the "champion" of the Muslim peasants and accused the Congress of opposing Hindus against Muslims and neglecting the needs of the latter.

"Even an economic measure, which is national elsewhere, assumes a communal complexion in this country," said the report of a Special Inquiry Committee of the Muslim League. ". . . Discrimination had been made in the case of Muslim peasants and workers by the Congress and Socialist organization.

Agents of zamindars and capitalists have given communal colour to disputes that were purely economic. And once communal colour was given, the poor victims of oppression were deprived of all protection from the very organisations which boast of nationalism." Similar charges were repeated time and time again in various Muslim League resolutions and in the speeches of its political leaders.

But this stand did not prevent the Muslim League from steering the class actions of Muslim working people along religious lines. In the Punjab and Bengal, where the League was represented in the government, its agrarian bills accorded largely with landlord interests. Yet they did provide for certain improvements in the situation of the peasant upper strata and created illusions among peasants about the League's agrarian policy. Leftist influence in the liberation movement was weaker among the Muslim working people then among Hindus. This left the field open for League propaganda.

The British colonialists, who feared the consolidation of the country's patriotic forces behind the Congress, went out of their way to obstruct the Congress ministries, and depended for support on the more reactionary groups of landlords and princes. They also exploited the leadership of the various religious communal parties, such as the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the organizations of the untouchables. It was, indeed, on the advice of the British that the Muslim League appointed a special Inquiry Committee in 1938 to "inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress provinces." The Committee, which had undisguised British support, fanned religious feeling and its ultimate report was grossly biassed.

The attempts made by the Congress to reach the understanding with the League yielded no results. Rajendra Prasad's proposal that Muslim complaints be examined by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court was turned down by the League which demanded that the British authorities and the Viceroy intervene.

The Congress campaign to establish contact with the Muslim masses, launched in 1938, was not very effective, because the key social problems, and the agrarian most of all, still hung fire. The League branded the campaign as a propaganda manoeuvre and contributed considerably to its failure. . . .

The internal weakness of the movement for an anti-imperialist united front, the inconsistencies of the Congress leadership in the struggle against colonial rule, and the inability of the Congress ministries to solve the basic social problems enabled the Muslim League to parade as a champion of freedom and social justice, and thus to enhance its prestige among India's Muslims before the outbreak of the Second World War. . . .

India's national liberation movement rose to flood tide in a world exultant over the victory of the anti-fascist coalition, in which the Soviet Union had been most prominent; the British imperialists were compelled to leave India. But the British government was determined to keep the country economically and politically dependent on Britain, and therefore dragged out the transfer of power, fostered the most reactionary schemes of partition and abandoned the country in a condition which made normal relations between the two newly-created states practically impossible, thus setting the stage for imperialist intrigues. . . .

Both the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the British proposals, which overlooked the key demand of immediate independence because, among other things, India's capitalists and landlords were eager to consolidate their front in face of the mounting revolutionary movement. But in a way it was a progressive development, welcomed by the public as a long-awaited solution of Hindu-Muslim contradictions.

On the face of it, the hour had struck for the religious communal problem to be relegated to the background and for the main problem, the termination of India's colonial status, to assume precedence. . . .

In less than a month after the first

agreed decisions were adopted, the situation changed abruptly. It appeared on the surface that an unfortunate Congress statement to the press was to blame. But the true reasons for the differences between Hindus and Muslims went deeper, and were bound up with the fact that unity went against the aims of the British imperialists.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in June, 1946. Of the 389 deputies elected, 192 belonged to the Congress and 70 to the Muslim League. In the main, they represented the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords. For all this the British government was bent on restricting its authority.

In reply to a Congress statement that the Constituent Assembly should be a completely sovereign body, the Pethick Lawrence mission declared that its terms of reference would not extend to the minorities problem and the question of India's relations with Britain. Jawaharlal Nehru attacked this notion at a press conference on July 10, 1946. "We shall have no treaty," Nehru said, "if they seek to impose anything upon us, and we shall tear up any treaty they try to impose. . . . In regard to the Minorities it is our problem and we shall no doubt succeed in solving it. We accept no outside interference in it—certainly not the British Government's interference in it—and therefore these two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly are not accepted by us."

Nehru was asked at the press conference about possible modifications of the proposed constitutional scheme. He replied that the Congress had agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly, but did not consider itself committed to this scheme as a whole. This statement was used as a pretext by the British and the reactionary Indian press to spread the spurious charge that the Congress did not intend to recognize provincial autonomy.

The reactionary papers did not print the interview in full. They quoted passages from it, and furnished them with biassed comments. The League leadership seized upon this pretext to resume its anti-Congress campaign.

On July 29, 1946, the League Council revised its previous decisions, rejected Pethick Lawrence's proposals, and announced "direct actions" to achieve Pakistan, charging Jinnah to draw up a programme. The programme envisaged a boycott of the Constituent Assembly and set August 16 as "Direct Action Day."

The leaders of the Pakistan movement hoped to achieve two ends. To begin with they hoped to force the British government into immediately declaring its agreement to an independent Muslim state. At the same time, by organizing an anti-Hindu campaign and charging the Congress with partiality to Hindu interests, they wanted to press the Congress into consenting to a division of the country into two states. Due to the British policy of playing off religious communities against each other and to the provocative conduct of reactionary elements (both Muslim and Hindu) within India, this campaign caused bloody Hindu-Muslim riots. The British press and reactionary Indian elements whipped up religious frenzy throughout the land. Provincial communal organizations took up the cue. . . .

But it was impossible, despite the provocations, to keep the people of India in colonial bondage any longer. The revolutionary struggle for independence and a flood tide of strikes and anti-feudal peasant actions in 1946 and 1947 forced the hand of the British government. It was compelled to speed the inauguration of Provincial Indian Government, to widen its authority and, at long last, to grant the country independence. But it made the most of its "divide and rule" policy to split the national forces and to transfer power to the Indians on most unpropitious terms.

M. A. H. Ispahani

THE DAY REMEMBERED

Once the Cabinet Mission had failed, the Viceroy then proceeded to form an Interim Government with the Congress as the representative Indian party. One Muslim view, voiced here by M. A. H. Ispahani, was that this move indicated the intention of the British to go ahead towards granting independence, if necessary, without Muslim League cooperation or consent. The following selection from *Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him* gives an account of the circumstances of the League's call for Direct Action. M. A. H. Ispahani has been one of the most active members of the Muslim League in Bengal.

NOW what was the position? The Congress had not accepted the long-term plan in accordance with the explanation and clarification given by the Mission itself. It had definitely rejected the short-term proposal. The Viceroy was thus under no obligation to include the Congress in the proposed Interim Government. On the other hand, it was clearly the Viceroy's duty to proceed with the formation of the Interim Government even if the Congress refused to come in. The qualifying words "as representative as possible" in para 8 showed that the possibility of one of the parties remaining out had been visualized. Later, the Viceroy did, in fact, form the Interim Government with only one major party—the Congress—although it had not accepted the long-term plan as clarified by the Cabinet Mission. Thus a breach of faith was committed which was, to say the least, unworthy of responsible statesmen charged with the task of transferring power to the main elements of the Indian body-politic in a fair and just manner.

As I have pointed out before, the speeches and statements of the Congress President and other Congress leaders created a situation which wrecked all the efforts that had been made to bring about an amicable settlement of the constitutional problems of the subcontinent. Naturally, the Qaid-i-Azam could not remain silent. He took up the Congress challenge. The speeches of the British spokesmen in Parliament were far from convincing. They did not indicate as to what was the remedy if the Congress persisted in its misinterpretations and used its "brute majority" in the Constituent Assembly to undermine the basic terms and conditions of the Cabinet Mission's Plan.

Qaid-i-Azam, therefore, called a meeting of the Working Committee and, at the same time, held an extraordinary meeting of the Muslim League Council at Bombay on July 27, 28, 29, 1946. Congress tactics were denounced, declaration was made that we no longer stood by our acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's Plan and as a mark of protest against the British Government's patent partiality towards the Hindu Congress, it was resolved that Muslims should renounce all British titles and honours. The League Council also declared that the time had come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan and directed the Working Committee to prepare a programme of direct action.

I give below the actual resolution that was put to vote and carried amid enthusiastic scenes. Needless to state that it was what the Qaid had planned and wanted:

Whereas the Council of the All-India Mus-

From M. A. H. Ispahani, *Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him* (Karachi, Pakistan, 1966), pp. 185–195.

lim League has resolved to reject the proposals embodied in the statement of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy dated 16th May, 1946 due to the intransigence of the Congress on the one hand, and the breach of faith with the Muslims by the British Government on the other; and whereas Muslim India has exhausted without success all efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means; and whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu raj in India with the connivance of the British; and whereas recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs; and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the Muslims of India would not rest contented with anything less than the immediate establishment of an independent and fully sovereign State of Pakistan and would resist any attempt to impose any constitution-making machinery or any constitution, long-term or short-term, or the setting up of an Interim Government at the centre without the approval and consent of the Muslin League; the Council of the All-India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination.

This Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand as one man behind their sole representative and authoritative organisation, the All-India Muslim League, and to be ready for every sacrifice.

This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a programme of direct action to carry out the policy enunciated above and to organise the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.

As a protest against and in token of their deep resentment of the attitude of the British, this Council calls upon the Muslims to renounce forthwith the titles conferred upon them by the alien Government.

When the "Direct Action" Day resolution was passed, the Qaid stood up and spoke as follows: "What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods." He went on to say: "Throughout the fateful negotiations with the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy, the other two parties, the British and the Congress, held a pistol in their hand, the one of authority and arms and the other of mass struggle and nonco-operation. Today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it." Thundering applause of those assembled greeted this spirited and bold declaration as they had not heard their leader speak in this strain ever before.

We could well appreciate his anger, disgust and frustration. He had done all that was in his power to arrive at an honourable settlement—a settlement which gave to the Muslims an honourable position under the sun and, at the same time, preserved some kind of union of the sub-continent. But to no effect. Congress was in no mind or mood to share power in the sub-continent. Its arrogance was patent and it was this arrogance which eventually brought about the partition of India.

* * *

The day fixed for Direct Action was August 16, 1946. I remember the scene when each one of the title-holders present at the Council meeting walked up to the dais and announced his renouncement amidst loud cheers and vociferous appreciation. I also remember the humorous scene when Sir Saadullah, the former Chief Minister of Assam, renounced his knighthood with such vehemence that his dentures parted from his gums and found a resting place in the palm of his right hand.

The observations of a powerful pro-Congress weekly paper of Bombay, the *Blitz*, on the decisions of the Bombay session of the Muslim League Council are noteworthy:

The worst enemies of the Muslim League cannot help envying the leadership of Mr. Jinnah. Last week's cataclysmic transformation of the League from the reactionary racket of the Muslim Nawabs, Noons and Knights into a revolutionary mass organisation dedicated, by word if not by deed, to an

anti-imperialist struggle, compels us to express the sneaking national wish that a diplomat and strategist of Jinnah's proven calibre were at the helm of the Indian National Congress. There is no denying the fact that by his latest master-stroke of diplomacy Jinnah outbid, outwitted and out-manoeuvred the British and the Congress alike and confounded the common national indictment that the Muslim League is a parasite of British Imperialism.

* * *

Whilst the Hindus, to serve their own political ends, interpreted "Direct Action" day in its literal bellicose sense and gave this interpretation countrywide publicity, our basic purpose in observing this day, as publicly stated, was to hold meetings all over India with the object of explaining to the Muslims and to the world the reason for the final rejection of the Cabinet Mission's Plan by the League and, at the same time, to expose and condemn the tactics resorted to by the British Government. But as there were misgivings about "Direct Action," the All-India Muslim League Working Committee again met at Bombay on August 2, 1946, to remove them and resolved: ". . . and further calls upon the Muslims of India to suspend all business on August 16, 1946, and to observe complete hartal." Hartal was observed by Muslims and meetings were held throughout India. Nowhere was there any disturbance but in Calcutta, violence started by the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha engulfed the city in an orgy of loot, arson and killings in which the worst sufferers were the Muslims.

We were in the Maidan getting ready for the mammoth meeting at which the "Direct Action" resolution was to be explained. It is a sheer calumny to suggest that the Muslims had made preparations to start a riot and kill the Hindus on that day. They were merely coming to the Maidan unarmed to listen to the speeches of their leaders, leaving their children and womenfolk in the Mohallas and Bustees. They would not have done so if they had any evil intentions. In any case they constituted only 24 percent of the population of Calcutta and they would not choose this city to indulge in rioting which in any event was not in their interest.

It is true that the Muslims declared August 16 as a public holiday to celebrate the day of "Direct Action" but in no circumstances was "Direct Action" meant to be a battle royal or carnage. It was a day to record an emphatic protest against the British Government's policy in by-passing the Muslim League and to explain the "Direct Action" resolution of the League Council. August 16 was declared a public holiday because we, the Muslim Leaguers, wanted to have a record turnout from every corner of Calcutta at the Ochtorloney Monument standing in the famous Maidan of Calcutta. We expected a gathering of between two and three hundred thousand Muslims, coming in processions and jathas from all over the city.

* * *

I rushed to Bhawanipur where I was almost killed by a Sikh who thrust his sword through the ventilator of the driving window of my car. It was sheer instinct of self-preservation which made me throw my body as far back as I could. The sword passed my chest with a clearance of about two inches without inflicting injury. This was not the only attempt on my life during the three frightening days through which the citizens of Calcutta lived. On two other occasions, too, God willed that I should not die.

During the three agonizing days I engaged myself for sixteen and eighteen hours a day in picking up dying and wounded Muslims from Hindu quarters and Hindus dying and wounded from Muslim quarters and rushing them to hospital for urgent treatment. My blood-splattered car had to be washed inside and out, every morning. Thousands of innocent men, women and children were brutally massacred bringing back to memory the days of Chengez and Halagu. Corpses lay in heaps on street corners and on roads, heaped like carcasses in a slaughter house. In Bustees where

the minority was butchered without compunction and compassion, human beings had overnight become irrational beasts—a terrible state of affairs indeed!

I may state that the blame for not calling in the Army by the evening of August 16 must rest squarely on the shoulders of Sir Frederick Burrows, Governor of Bengal. He failed to quickly realise the gravity of the situation and to take action which would have stopped the carnage.

* * *

To sum up, it is not correct to accept the view that the Muslims started the disturbances and were responsible for them. What happened was that the Hindus, knowing the position, had under their clever and able leadership planned to meet the "black day of Direct Action" with such direct action of their own as would not only put fear into the hearts of the Calcutta Muslims but frighten the rest of their brothers and sisters throughout the sub-continent. They wanted the Muslims to be so intimidated that they would forget their leadership and also their demand for independence from the Hindus. Their plan, of course, misfired because Muslim determination grew doubly strong as a result of the happenings in Calcutta. And this is not an expression of view but a fact of history.

Ian Stephens, former Editor of *Statesman*, was present in Calcutta when the riots broke out. The remarks he makes on the observance of the "Direct Action" day and the happenings in Calcutta are significant:

> Except in one city nothing of note except big meetings happened on Direct Action day, August 16; and such evidence as can be got does not show that the League's central leadership planned anything much to happen. . . . The Day, it was explained, was simply to be one when the League Council's resolution would be publicly explained. "It is nothing but a statement," said Mr. Jinnah, "concerning the steps which we propose to take for self-preservation and self-defence." It was "no declaration of war" on anybody. The meetings would not in themselves be "Direct Action" and those who came were asked to behave peacefully . . . it is inconceivable that the members of the (Bengal) Ministry could have wanted an outbreak such as happened, if only because there was no possibility of the Muslims winning. Though they enjoyed a majority in Bengal as a whole they were heavily outnumbered in the province's capital, their proportion of the population there in 1946 probably being less than 25 percent. . . . Even perhaps during the first day's fighting and certainly during the second and third, Muslim losses were the worst. Apparently local Hindu organisations, hearing rumours that some sort of Muslim attack was contemplated, had made formidable counter-preparations.

The Qaid, a peace-loving and constitutional-minded man, abhorred violence. The happenings in Calcutta on August 16 and the following two or three days upset and pained him beyond measure. His feelings indicated that, notwithstanding his external reserve, he was at heart intensely humane, for the sufferings of innocent humanity deeply affected him. For months he could not get over what had happened in Calcutta. He expressed his grief over the massacre of innocent Muslims and equally he was sorry over the death of those Hindus who had been killed though they had nothing to do with the political conflicts. I can recall what he told me about the lesson to be learned from the Calcutta killings. He said: "This proves what treatment the Muslims should expect from the Hindu majority if they exist as a minority in undivided India."

IV. LEGACY TO PAKISTAN

Richard Symonds

THE TROUBLES OF THE FIRST YEAR

Once the partition of the subcontinent had been agreed upon, numerous immediate difficulties had to be faced by the government of the new nation of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah lived for nearly a year after the founding of the nation, and during that time took most of the responsibility into his own hands, as Governor-General, for setting up and administering a viable nation. In the selection given below, Richard Symonds (1918–), an Englishman who worked as Director of Relief for Refugees during the partition troubles, gives his impressions of Jinnah's leadership during the painful first year of the nation.

WHEN the Muslim League accepted the British Government's proposals of 3rd June 1947, and when the votes of the acceding provinces brought a Pakistan Constituent Assembly into being, the provisional Cabinet which was formed faced two obvious immediate problems. Firstly, Pakistan had to come to an agreement with the new Indian Provisional Government on the division of the assets and services of undivided India, and must set up a new Dominion administration to which they should be transferred. Secondly, the future of the Indian princely states must be decided, and the accession to Pakistan must, if possible, be obtained of those whose inclusion was imperative to her economy and security. But at the moment of her birth, Pakistan had to face a third, unexpected problem: the appalling communal disorders in the Punjab, which caused an influx of more than six million refugees.

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At the beginning of August widespread disorders broke out all over the Punjab which intensified as the date of Partition drew near. . . . Whole sections of Lahore, Amritsar, Sheikupara, and indeed most of the principal cities of the Punjab were in flames. In the villages armed bands plundered, burned, massacred and raped. . . .

Spontaneously on both sides of the border, the minorities collected together in improvised camps or, placing their favourite belongings in bullock carts, marched towards the frontier. All along the roads they were ambushed and butchered. Those who travelled by rail fared little better, for the trains were derailed and their occupants cut to pieces.

* * *

The economic dislocation caused was great. The West Punjab obtained a considerable surplus of agriculturalists, weavers, potters, shoemakers and other artisans. It lost, on the other hand, probably 80 per cent of its traders and 90 per cent of the sweepers, who were responsible for sanitation. In the villages the agricultural credit system disappeared with the Hindu moneylender. In the market towns it was impossible for the peasant to sell his crop because the Hindu wholesaler had left. In the cities

From Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1950), pp. 77, 82–84, 92–93, 191–193.

the banks were closed because accountants and clerks had almost all been Hindus.

Jinnah and Liaquat Ali moved to Lahore, the capital of the West Punjab, and a Pakistan Ministry of Refugees was created to assist and supervise the work of the Provincial Government. The refugees on arrival were fed and clothed as far as resources would allow. Middle-class women came out of purdah to nurse the sick and wounded. A branch of the Red Cross was organized, and British and American relief agencies sent personnel and supplies. After feeding the refugees, the most urgent task was to put the cultivators on the farm land vacated by the Hindus and Sikhs, lest the country's richest source of food should be imperilled.

* * *

The heaviest part of the burden in the first year of Pakistan was carried by Jinnah himself. He was far more than Governor-General. He was the Qaid-i-Azam, the "Great Leader" who had brought the state into being, and as such could admonish and persuade the provinces as none of his ministers could do. After supervising the immediate refugee problems in Lahore, he toured the other provinces, speaking bluntly and soberly. The first duty of a government, he told the Constituent Assembly before its members dispersed to their provinces in August, was to maintain law and order; the second to root out corruption. The minorities must be treated with absolute fairness. "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed: that has nothing to do with the business of the State." Provincialism, he warned the Bengalis, was liable to be the biggest curse to Pakistan. "As long as you do not throw off this poison in our body politic, you will never be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanize yourself into a true nation."

His influence was steadying in a time of fierce excitement. At the end of October he addressed a huge open-air meeting in Lahore which was clamouring for intervention in Kashmir. He deliberately refrained from mentioning Kashmir and instead advised his audience to avoid retaliation, exercise restraint, and protect the minority communities. He urged the students to stick to their studies, and the Muslims who were still in India to give unflinching loyalty to their own government. And he repeatedly laid down the challenge: "it is easier to go to jail or fight for freedom than to run a government."

Jinnah was over seventy and in poor health. In addition to being Governor General, he was President of the Constituent Assembly and the ultimate authority in the Muslim League. In the last instance all major decisions of the Government and the party came to him. He died . . . in September 1948. He had worked himself to death, but had contributed more than any other man to Pakistan's survival. . . .

. . . It appears that Pakistan came into existence because, in spite of the safeguards which were from time to time offered them, the majority of Indian Muslims did not eventually feel that their religious, economic, cultural and political rights would be secure in an independent India. From the first introduction of representative institutions, most Muslim leaders insisted firmly on separate electorates, and as steps were granted towards self-government they were equally emphatic that the Provincial Governments must be strong enough to withstand any coercion from the Federal Government. Both conceptions, though from time to time accepted, were fundamentally repugnant to the Congress, which favoured a strong Central Government based on absolute democracy. The Partition of India took place because the Indian Muslims felt themselves to be Muslims before they were Indians.

It has often been maintained by Indian historians and politicians that the British are primarily responsible for India's communal conflict. It is true that earlier British administrators, precariously balanced and with few troops, played off Hindu, Muslim and Sikh against each other. . . . It can be argued that the British could not have con-

quered or held India but for the communal disunity, but hardly that they caused it. The British found India disunited and left it disunited. Paradoxically, it may be said that the recrudescence of communal bitterness in the twentieth century was a result of the nationalist movement; that the creation of the Muslim League was a direct consequence of the creation of the Congress. As long as the British monopolized power, there was little for Hindu and Muslim middle classes to quarrel over. Only when, under pressure from the nationalists, the British began to transfer power, did the competition for seats and jobs between communities become acute. And this in turn had the effect of slowing up progress to independence. As Mohamed Ali, no friend to the British, said at the Round Table Conference: "It is the old maxim of 'divide and rule,' we divide and you rule."

* * *

But if Pakistan was not the creation of the British, it cannot be attributed solely to Jinnah. Jinnah, having an unrivalled reputation among the Muslims for political integrity and parliamentary skill, was the obvious leader who guided rather than caused the movement towards Pakistan between 1937 and 1940. If there had been no Jinnah, it still seems probable that there would have been a Pakistan.

Ian Stephens

WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN GOVERNOR-GENERAL?

Ian Stephens (1903–) is an English writer who in prepartition India was editor of the influential newspaper *The Statesman*. In the following selection from his book *Pakistan,* he discusses some of the implications of Jinnah's decision to become Governor-General of Pakistan. The British, and some Indians, had hoped that one Governor-General could be appointed to serve both India and Pakistan in the early years of the two nations. But this did not happen, and Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of undivided India, became the first Governor-General of the new India.

A big event of this time was Mr. Jinnah's decision to become Pakistan's first Governor-General. It had been supposed that, like Mr. Nehru, he would rather be Prime Minister. Further, the idea had been put about, probably by the Viceroy's staff, that at the start Lord Mountbatten would become Governor-General of both Dominions. Indeed, provision for this was made in the draft Indian Independence Bill, then being hustled through the British Parliament. So when Mr. Jinnah's decision was announced, early in July, it caused surprise.

There has been speculation about its reasons. Campbell-Johnson—who it must be remembered was Lord Mountbatten's Press Attaché—takes the view that Mr. Jinnah simply wanted "power and glory." But his diary is hostile to the League leader almost throughout. If that reflects Lord Mountbatten's own attitude at that stage, it is important. But Ismay's weightier evidence lends no support. Clearly, Lord Mountbatten and Mr. Jinnah differed much in temperament. And any visitor to Government House could learn that, whereas both Viceroy and Vicereine were on affable terms with leading Congressmen, they were not so yet with Mr. Jinnah or the Leaguers. But Mr. Jinnah was not easy to become affable with. It seems doubtful whether Lord Mountbatten had yet really developed the hostility to him which he later showed. And if he had, Mr. Jinnah was unaware of it. For it is a fact that, near the start of this episode, Mr. Jinnah pressed him to become "a sort of super-Governor-General," with both Dominion Governors-General under him; and that when, after reference to London, this was turned down, he readily agreed to Lord Mountbatten's staying on as Governor-General of India only, and indeed got Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to write saying he hoped this would happen. Possibly, as early as June, some Leaguers had come to suspect that Lord Mountbatten, in his proposed dual role, would subconsciously or otherwise load the dice against Pakistan, because of the friendships he and his wife had formed with leading Hindus. But Mr. Jinnah seems to have been above such suspicions.

* * *

According to Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, who though still a Government official was in the League leaders' confidence, Mr. Jinnah's decision was due to two practical points, the first of which —as an expert in legal niceties—he had at the outset pressed on Lord Mountbatten's attention. This was that he wanted it explained because he could not see the answer—what would happen

From Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* 3d ed. (London, 1967), pp. 174–178.

in the almost inevitable event, with relations between Congress and Leaguers so bitter, of the proposed Joint Governor-General being given conflicting advice by his two sets of Ministers, those in Karachi urging him one way, those in Delhi another way. The second derived from a fact already touched on . . .: the shortage of trained Muslims at the higher administrative levels, both military and civilian, because of the community's backwardness in Western-style education. Owing to this, Pakistan at the start would need British officers to command her Forces, and British civil servants as Governors of some provinces. Might not Pakistanis themselves, as well as unfriendly foreigners, ask as a result whether she really was an independent country at all? But with a Muslim as Head of State, such doubts would go.

Whatever the decision's causes, it did not smooth the path towards Partition. Ismay describes it as "a blow. We had all felt," he goes on, "that the best hope of an orderly transfer of power, an equitable division of assets, and the establishment of friendly relations between the two new Dominions would be for them to start off with the same Governor-General." And Lord Mountbatten himself seemed personally riled by it. Those brought in touch with him would doubtless agree that his weakness—perhaps the only one—was a curiously sensitive kind of vanity. Murphy's biography confirms this. That someone of his superb gifts should have had such a characteristic is odd; but evidently it was so. And it seemed noticeable at an editor's conference arranged the afternoon before Mr. Jinnah's decision was announced. Several of us inferred that the matter had not merely caused him political worry, but had hurt him. Perhaps he had set his heart on becoming dual Governor-General; the rebuff knocked against his most vulnerable point, his pride.

Whether Mr. Jinnah's choice proved right for Pakistan is a question uncommitted Westerners may prefer to leave open. With Pakistanis, his prestige stands so high that few would admit the possibility of his making any major error. In his lifetime, he became the acknowledged Father of the Nation; and his memory commands unquestioning reverence, rather like Ataturk's in Turkey or Mr. Gandhi's in India. And in further support of his decision it could be argued—and his advisers did argue—that as Joint Governor-General Lord Mountbatten would have spent less time in Karachi than in Delhi, the bigger Dominion's capital; and that while in the latter city, though functioning in part on Pakistan's behalf, he would have been so near Mr. Nehru, whom he liked, as to be influenced by him. And Mr. Nehru detested the very idea of Pakistan. The point undeniably has weight. . . .

* * *

On balance, most non-Pakistani historians, looking at the facts as now known, may think Mr. Jinnah's choice about the Governor-Generalship was a mistake. But that, of course, would be a judgement based on hindsight. A British official who then held a post near the heart of things, writes: "I would add a point about Jinnah's decision, which I suggest be borne in mind. He had, after all, almost alone created Pakistan—or rather, at that stage, had forced through an acceptance by the British and the Congress of the idea of Pakistan. The odds against it, only a year or two before, had been terrific. What was more natural, and perhaps more necessary, than for him to carry the thing through personally until its success could be seen and crowned by his own headship of the State? On a cold-blooded calculation, I would agree with an estimate, made now, that it would probably have been better for Pakistan had Mountbatten, as proposed, been Joint G.-G. of both Dominions for a while; I think that this might have averted some of the excesses in the Punjab. But in the political and psychological conditions of June and July 1947 it was inevitable, I believe, that Jinnah should insist on being G.-G."

Keith Callard

COULD THE LEAGUE GOVERN THE NATION?

The Muslim League served as an effective instrument in uniting the Muslims in their struggle for Pakistan. Once the country was established, however, many of the qualities that had made the League effective in the freedom struggle worked against its becoming an adequate instrument for governing the country. Keith Callard (1924–1961), a former professor of political science at McGill University, made an excellent analysis of these problems in his book, *Pakistan, A Political Study*.

WHEN Mr. Jinnah returned from England in 1934 the Muslim League was moribund. The Indian National Congress had clearly taken the lead with its demand for Indian self-determination. By comparison with the Congress the League was a defensive organization composed of some wealthy zamindars and a few discontented intellectuals who wanted greater access to government employment. Many of its members were still within the Congress or, like Mr. Jinnah himself, ready to co-operate substantially with it.

There was no air of enthusiasm about the League of that period; it had no sense of mission. Many of its members looked back nostalgically to the glorious days of the Khilafat movement. Those were the days when the cause of Indian freedom and the cause of Islam coincided. It was a campaign in which religion, nationalism and political adventure were combined into a brew that proved powerfully intoxicating to many a young Muslim. It gave a chance to suffer, though not to suffer too much, for the cause. Many of the "old guard" of Pakistan's politics in 1947–56 looked back with pride on their arrest and imprisonment during the Khilafat movement. Intellectually perhaps the cause of the last of the Caliphs was not very convincing. But then Indian Muslims were not likely to have to live under the successors of Abdul Hamid. In emotional terms they were the symbol of the unity of the Muslim world and of the political independence of the adherents of Islam.

Political parties are often founded upon the shared recollection of powerful emotions. It is for this reason that the significance of the period from 1919 to 1922 is essential to an understanding of the Muslim League in Pakistan. During this time a number of elements was added to the ideology of Muslim politics in India that was to be of importance in the ensuing years. Firstly the use of the vocabulary and concepts of classical Islam was accentuated. The movement directed attention to the Islamic heritage of the series of caliphs stretching back ultimately to the rule of the Prophet himself. It invited the defence of ancient Islamic forms as such. It was admitted that the actual caliphate of the twentieth century had its faults, but their remedy was to be found, not by trying to build a new structure but by a return to the ideals of the purer epoch of the rightly guided Caliphs.

Secondly, by a process of reaction, the movement strengthened the tendency towards opposition to anything Occidental. For two centuries the West had succeeded in overturning one Muslim state after another. Soon the Muslims, as a result of a mixture of Western aggression and perfidy, would become a people without a country, hewers of wood and drawers of water for alien and infidel masters. This opposition to the West went beyond a simple dislike of imperialism. It became necessary to at-

From Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London, 1957), pp. 34–40, 48–49, 53, 197–198, 326, 329.

tack the foundations of Western civilization, above all to disparage the public morals of advanced Western states. Western observers complain of purdah. Is this not better than sexual licence and crowded divorce courts? Muslims are said to be backward, illiterate and lacking in business enterprise. But is the West proud of crime comics and drunkenness and stomach ulcers and psychiatric disorders?

The third product of the Khilafat movement in the minds of Muslim politicians lies in the field of political organization and tactics. The first object of the Muslim League, as declared by its founders in 1906, was "To promote, among the Mussalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard to any of its measures." But the movement of 1919 was designed to embarrass that government to the point where it would feel obliged to secure more favourable treatment for Turkey. The movement was destructive in purpose and authoritarian in method, and was far removed from the parliamentary approach through Legislative Assembly and Council.

The Khilafat movement was independent of the League, but no Muslim political organization could fail to be subjected to its influence. In later years many of its participants became "nationalist Muslims" and opposed the Pakistan movement as a betrayal of the universal principles of the earlier struggle. But a substantial legacy of ideas and emotions was also inherited by the campaign for Pakistan, which unleashed a second wave of Muslim political enthusiasm.

The Muslim League did not adopt the demand for Pakistan until its meeting at Lahore in 1940. From that time all other aims were relegated to a position of secondary importance. They served as tactical manoeuvres in the grand strategy. In 1937–38 Mr. Jinnah had consolidated his hold upon the League, and had begun to secure mass support for its activities. At first this was based upon resistance to Hindu "oppression." Wide publicity was given to allegations of anti-Muslim activities on the part of Congress provincial governments. When the latter resigned as a consequence of the outbreak of war, Mr. Jinnah declared a Day of National Deliverance.

The adoption of Pakistan as the objective simplified the task of political agitation. The Muslim masses were able to resent evidence of Hindu domination that fell within their own experience. But it was not so easy to make a peasant in Sind or the Punjab feel angry because a Congress flag had been flown on a public building in Madras or because Muslim children in Bengal had been required to sing Bande Mataram. Arguments about quotas and ratios in legislatures and cabinets and public services might convince the urban intellectual but would be unintelligible to the cultivator. But Pakistan could include all these lesser points and much more besides. It was a positive aim, not a defensive screen. It was a vision capable of sustaining unlimited hope and enthusiasm. The attainment of Pakistan was presented as a panacea that would open the way to the transformation of the lives of the Muslims of India.

The League's tactics and the presentation of its case were simple. It asserted that the Muslims of India were a nation and that they must have their own state. Because they were in a minority they must be united in order to achieve their purpose. The Muslim League was the only organization entitled to speak for the nation; other organizations and other allegiances represented treason to the nation. The League had to accept an almost military discipline to accomplish its purpose. "Faith, Unity and Discipline" was the watchword given to the party by its Quaid-i-Azam. The Great Leader's commands had to be obeyed if the nation was to be led to victory.

The League was indeed fortunate to have Mr. Jinnah as its leader. The lower levels of Muslim League politics might be filled with intrigue and personal rivalry, but at the top he was supreme. He was above intrigue, for there was no one to challenge his power. He had no

colleagues, only lieutenants, and they were content to obey his orders. He was very able and very sure of himself and of his purpose. He knew what must be done and what might never be conceded.

In 1947 the victory was accomplished, though not without bloodshed and sorrow. The Quaid-i-Azam and his people rejoiced. The new era had dawned.

This was the victory of the Muslim League. Political loyalty for the Muslims before 1947 could not be given to the state which was alien and in some respects hostile. Loyalty was due to the *millat,* its political organization the League, and its leader the Quaid-i-Azam. The League was older than Pakistan; the League had given Pakistan to the people. The League had triumphed over its adversaries, the Hindus, the British and the Muslim apostates. It was not to be thought of that the League should become an ordinary political party competing with others on equal terms for the favor of the electorate.

Seven years later, when the League was largely discredited, it still seemed impossible to the old Leaguers that anything could take its place. The Quaid-i-Azam's sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, wrote:

> I say to you support the Muslim League, because the League alone won Pakistan and can serve and consolidate Pakistan. The league may not be perfect but it is the only organized party of Muslims, while other bodies are of recent origin. Don't oppose the League but come into it and remove its defects. If you destroy the League you destroy Pakistan.

It was difficult for political or personal claims, now to adjust their loyalties to the new state and its Constituent League. Surely no Prime Minister of a constitutional state has ever spoken as slightingly of Parliament as did Liaquat Ali.

> This house (Council of the Muslim League) now carries more weight than the Parliament and every word uttered here should be in consonance with its dignity and responsibility.
>
> I have always said, rather it has always been my firm belief, that the existence of the League, not only the existence of the League but its strength, is equal to the existence and the strength of Pakistan.
>
> So far as I am concerned, I had decided in the very beginning and I reaffirm it today, that I have always considered myself as the Prime Minister of the League. I never regard myself as the Prime Minister chosen by the members of the Constituent Assembly.
>
> The day I will come to know that the League has no faith and confidence in me, that very day you will not find Liaquat Ali the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

The quotation above is from an address to the party organization. But League adherents were equally unmindful of parliamentary sovereignty even within the Assembly chamber. Thus Begum Shah Nawaz, herself a member of the League Working Committee and of the Parliamentary Board, tried to reassure those who feared arbitrary action by the government:

> Sir, I think that my honourable friends on the right are not aware that the Muslim League Government, whether in the Centre or in the Provinces, is under the direct control of the Central and Provincial Parliamentary Board . . . it is the Central Parliamentary Board which can at any time censure any government anywhere in Pakistan, if it does not practice the civil liberties of its citizens.

It was June 3, 1947, before the League could be certain that it had won Pakistan. The task then before the leaders was to establish a working state. The role of the party—that of producing a programme and mobilizing support behind it—fell into the background. Most of its prominent men were absorbed into positions of importance at the center, in the provinces or representing their country abroad. Parties other than the League were defeated, fearful, disorganized and bewildered. Those early months of struggle for survival were no time for the party politics. But there were some members of the League who were not called by government to accept important posts. And as the first intensity of crisis eased, they felt that the

party had an important part to play in legislation and in framing the new constitution.

The pre-partition Muslim League was, of course, an All-India organization with branches in every province. The Council of the All-India Muslim League held its last meeting in Karachi in December, 1947 with Mr. Jinnah presiding. It was decided to establish a successor for each of the new Dominions. The Council of the Pakistan Muslim League was initially to be composed of former members of the All-India Council resident in Pakistan and all League members of the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was elected convener of the Pakistan League. . . .

* * *

. . . Yet in spite of all the powers provided to maintain party discipline there has been no period since 1947 when some cabinet, central or provincial, has not been in danger from the likelihood of a mutiny among its own supporters. The League convention was postponed and the Constituent Assembly was dismissed because the party could not be relied upon to support the leadership it had accepted. The situation in the provinces was equally unstable, and the central party took the extreme step of dissolving no less than four constituent Leagues.

Why was it that in the formative years the Muslim League was a source of weakness and dissension rather than of strength? Any answer to this question must be complex and must refer in large measure to the larger political forces that were moulding Pakistan's destiny; forces of geography and economics. Often in the history of nations, out of ordeal comes unity. The Muslim League was unified when Pakistan was created and Pakistan was united throughout its first few fateful months. This was a period of striving for one objective: to be born and to survive. When the first crisis was over there were many problems and many conceivable solutions. Socialism, industrialization, war with India, central control, decentralization, land reform—each of these (and many more) had its advocates. Perhaps Mr. Jinnah could have made the task seem simple, urgent and inevitable. But he was ageing, sick and tired, and soon he was dead. And the party that he had built began to disintegrate. . . .

* * *

After the death of Jinnah and more markedly after the assassination of Liaquat Ali, the Muslim League was unable to present to the public either a convincing programme or an inspiring leader. It had therefore to turn for support to the local politician and local issues. . . .

But to return to the Muslim League. Not merely did it start in Pakistan with these many inherent sources of weakness, but it had to take responsibility for everything that had, or seemed to have, got worse since partition and to answer for all the hopes left unfulfilled. There were floods, corruption, inefficiency and poverty, and there was no kingdom of heaven on earth. And Government, as always, was to blame. . . .

Leading spokesmen for Pakistan have always been anxious to prove that a state based upon Islam does not need to be, and in fact cannot be, a theocracy in the sense of rule by a priestly class. If theocracy is taken to mean a state governed in accordance with Divine law, then the term is acceptable, but the idea of rule by priests is in direct conflict with Islam. Pakistan's first Prime Minister was determined to emphasize this point: "Islam does not recognize either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority; and, therefore, the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam."

The demand for Pakistan, and its realization, are not to be understood unless it is clearly perceived that, to the Muslims of India, Islam was more than a religion in the Western meaning. It was, and is, an outlook upon life that embraced social, political and cultural aspects of human behaviour. Islam has guidance to offer in the production and distribution of wealth in the maintenance of social services, in international relations, and in the structure of family life, in public finance and the proper

position of the hands during prayer. All of these, and much more, are integral parts of Islam, not mere deductions from general moral precepts. Islam therefore speaks as plainly to the statesmen or the business-man in his professional capacity as it does to the individual conscience or the man of religious learning.

Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this Sub-Continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.

In a more narrow sphere it was quite certain that Islam in India served to differentiate the Muslim from the Hindu. It is quite untrue to suppose that all Muslims have an identical outlook upon life. There is radical disagreement within Pakistan on the social and political implications of Islam. Two propostions would, however, secure general acceptance. They are, first, that Muslims are not Hindus, and second that, in some sense all Muslims are (are or at least ought to be) brothers. This twin-based consciousness of separate identity is the real basis of Pakistan. The events of the last ten years have strengthened rather than weakened that sense of separateness from the Hindu, whatever symptoms of disunity within Pakistan they may have witnessed. . . .

Pakistan has faced the problem of the place of an ancient religion in a modern society. The Islamic state has been proclaimed but the fanatics are not in control of the country. There has been no victory for Islamic puritanism.

Major friction has developed between the east and west wings of the country, but the unifying ideal of Pakistan is still cherished among all sections of the people. There has been no irrevocable cleavage and the chances of closer harmony have not vanished.

Pakistan has avoided some of the worse calamities that might have befallen her. But these achievements are negative. It would be idle to pretend that the political prospect gives much cause of satisfaction. The traditions of cabinet government have not been accepted either at the center or in the provinces. That is the system adopted by the constitution, but most politicians seem totally unwilling to pay more than lip service to its requirements. The political parties have presented a picture of almost unredeemed failure. At no time since the death of Liaquat Ali has a cabinet been in office that seems to have the clear support of the party, the legislature and the electorate.

Public life in Pakistan has suffered from a marked tendency to try to act on two contradictory principles at the same time. The people want the country to be founded on the full measure of the immutable principles of Islam; yet they are willing to abandon none of the advantages of a modern secular state. They want democracy but they also admire an act of strength and rally to support the man who has acted. They want provincial autonomy but are not ready to deny power to the central government. They want a foreign policy that will give automatic support to all Muslim causes; yet they also desire all the benefits of a policy of selective self-interest. . . .

It is a mistake to judge the success or failure of government in a country like Pakistan solely or even mainly by its fulfilment of the ideal standards of the Western democracies. There are more fundamental tasks than the operation of representative institutions. Law and order must be preserved; government should be just and incorruptible and it should be capable of putting national policies into effect. Personal liberty and parliamentary government are not necessarily inseparable though they are closely related. Above all, it is necessary to remember that popular government does not spring full-grown from the ground. Pakistan, by its constitution, is publicly committed to the operation of democratic institutions. It is too early to say whether those institutions are likely to mature. Democracy has been accepted as an ideal; there is nothing to indicate that it cannot become a reality.

Javid Iqbal

JINNAH IN RETROSPECT

The following excerpts are taken from *The Legacy of Qaid-i-Azam* by Javid Iqbal, the son of the poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, who was a friend and close associate of Jinnah. Javid Iqbal has published two other books in English, *The Ideology of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1959) and *Stray Reflections* (Lahore, 1961). The latter is an edition of some of his father's notebooks.

Javid Iqbal was a member of the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations from 1960–1962, and at present he practices law in Lahore and teaches at the Law College. An inscription on the flyleaf of *The Legacy of Qaid-i-Azam* says that the book is an attempt to restate "the principles and ideals which Qaid-i-Azam left behind for Pakistanis. The need for reverting to the purity of the foundational principles usually arises when a people pass through a period of ideological decay and such principles are misinterpreted, twisted or distorted." As this comment indicates, the interpretation of Jinnah's attitudes is still a matter of lively interest in contemporary Pakistan.

THE desire of the Muslims to order their lives in accordance with Islam had gradually led to the growth of Muslim nationalism, which, under the inspiring leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, bifurcated the Indian nationalist movement and eventually resulted in the secession of Islam from India.

Quaid-i-Azam was the architect of Pakistan and consequently on its establishment became its first Governor-General. As the Governor-General of a newly born State, he had to tackle numerous problems, the most urgent being the settlement of the refugees and the restoration of a sense of security and confidence among the non-Muslim minorities. He worked very hard and toured the country extensively calling upon the people to have faith, unity and discipline for they were going through fire and the sunshine had yet to come. He assured them that Pakistan had come to stay and that there was no power on earth which could undo it. But unfortunately he could not continue to retain the position of directing head of the young State for long. Thirteen months after the establishment of Pakistan, he passed away, leaving behind a legacy to the Pakistanis in the form of principles and ideals.

In what sense did Quaid-i-Azam desire Pakistan to be an Islamic democracy? How much importance did he attach to the fundamental rights of the citizens? Did he want the Judiciary to be subservient to the Executive or independent of it? Did he expect Pakistan to have one man's rule or one party government? Was he in favour of the system of indirect election or direct election?

Quaid-i-Azam was a lawyer by profession and had been brought up under the discipline of Rule of Law. He believed in Rule of Law rather than the rule of individuals. Consequently democracy was a matter of conviction with him. Although he had shown no preference for either the parliamentary or the presidential form of democracy, his mind was absolutely clear on such basic issues as: the government should be constituted by the directly elected representatives of the people, the fundamental rights of the citizens should be

From Javid Iqbal, *The Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam* (Lahore, 1967), pp. 17–83, 97.

guaranteed, and the judiciary should be independent of the executive.

With this frame of mind, Quaid-i-Azam had approached Islam and discovered to his satisfaction that Islamic democracy was founded on the very same principles which he had upheld throughout his life. He was indeed not an academic expert in Islam and therefore did not care to find out as to how and why the "ideal" in Islam had been destroyed by the historically "real." His main concern was a re-statement of the principles of Islamic democracy and not of Islam-in-history.

Quaid-i-Azam was aware that through Islam the Prophet had accomplished a religio-political revolution in Arabia. The tribes were unified and the Arabs emerged as a single community. (*Umma*). The Prophet was the leader (*Imam*) of this revolution, and in his person were combined a legislator, an administrator, a judge, and a military commander. He was the Prophet, he led the congregational prayers and was the supreme authority in matters connected with religion and law. Nevertheless in the affairs of the State he consulted the Companions (who formed an informal Senate) according to the Quranic injunctions: "And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel among themselves"; and: "Therefore, forgive and ask for pardon for them, and consult them in the affairs." (42; verse 38 and 3; verse 159.) The Prophet is reported to have said: "Difference of opinion in my community is (the manifestation of Divine) Mercy"; and that "My community would never agree on an error."

Paying tribute to the Prophet, in his address to the Bar Association, Karachi on 25th January, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam said:

> Thirteen hundred years ago he laid the foundations of democracy. . . . The Prophet was a great teacher. He was a great law-giver. He was a great statesman and he was a great sovereign who ruled. No doubt, there are many people who do not quite appreciate when we talk of Islam. Islam is not only a set of rituals, traditions and spiritual doctrines. Islam is also a code for every Muslim which regulates his life and his conduct in even politics and economics and the like. It is based on the highest principles of honour, integrity, fair-play and justice for all. One God and the equality of man is one of the fundamental principles of Islam. In Islam there is no difference between man and man. The qualities of equality, liberty and fraternity are the fundamental principles of Islam.

Explaining the principles of Islamic democracy in his speech at Sibi Durbar on 14th February, 1948, he said:

> It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great law-giver, the Prophet of Islam. Let us lay the foundations of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles. Our Almighty has taught us that "our decisions in the affairs of the State shall be guided by discussions and consultations."

It is unanimously held by the Muslim jurists that the election, nomination, designation or appointment of the *Khalifah* by a single eminent member or a restricted number of eminent members of the community was legally validated or confirmed only when the entire community had sworn allegiance to him, and it was only then that he was considered to have held his office by the approval of God. In the early practice of Islam, undoubtedly such validation or confirmation was secured in the form of acquiescence; but in those days the eminent members who elected, nominated or designated the *Khalifah* were the Companions of the Prophet in whom the community reposed confidence and trust. However, after the abolition of the Caliphate, the principle of Islamic democracy derived from this Consensus by the contemporary Muslim thinkers was that the government should be constituted by the directly elected representatives of the people. Accordingly it was maintained by Iqbal that the formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim countries was a return to the original purity of Islam and Quaid-i-Azam was not only familiar with this view-point

but upheld the same in his recorded broadcast on Pakistan to the people of the United States of America (February, 1948). He said:

> The Constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this Constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fair-play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future Constitution of Pakistan.

Earlier on 25th January, 1948, while addressing the Karachi Bar Association, he had said:

> What reason is there for anyone to fear democracy, equality, freedom on the highest standard of integrity and on the basis of fair-play and justice for everybody. . . . Let us make it (the future Constitution of Pakistan). We shall make it and we will show it to the world.

Quaid-i-Azam genuinely believed that democracy was the blood of Mussalmans because they believed in fraternity, equality and liberty. (Address: Muslim League Branch in Great Britain, London, 14th December, 1946.) In his broadcast talk to the people of Australia, recorded on 19th February, 1948, he proclaimed:

> The great majority of us are Muslims. We follow the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be on him). We are members of the brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal in rights, dignity and self-respect. Consequently, we have a special and a very deep sense of unity. But make no mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those who, of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.

In a Press Conference held in New Delhi on 4th July, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam answered certain questions which were put to him regarding the nature of the State of Pakistan:

> Q: Will Pakistan be a secular or theocratic state?
>
> Mr. M. A. J.: You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a theocratic state means.
>
> (A correspondent suggested that a theocratic state meant a state where only people of a particular religion, for example, Muslims could be full citizens and non-Muslims would not be full citizens.)
>
> Mr. M. A. J.: Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing water on duck's back (laughter). When you talk of democracy, I am afraid, you have not studied Islam. We learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago.

It is generally accepted that the Fundamental Rights of the citizens were guaranteed in written form, for the first time, under the Constitution of the United States of America. But like the contemporary Muslim thinkers, Quaid-i-Azam believed that the fundamental, inalienable and residual rights of Man were guaranteed in written form, under the Quran, long before the United States' Constitution was conceived, long before the American continent was discovered; nay, even long before the modern Western civilization was born.

The Quranic Rights guaranteed to Man were the basic principles of Islamic democracy. They could not be obscured or eradicated by any mortal power because they constituted the Spoken Word of God.

The following basic rights of Man can be directly traced from the Quran and the Sunna (Practice of the Prophet):

EQUALITY OF ALL CITIZENS BEFORE LAW AS WELL AS EQUALITY OF STATUS AND OPPORTUNITY

> O Mankind; Be careful of your duty to your Lord who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and spread from these two many men and women. (4; verse 1.) Lo! Pharaoh exalted himself in the earth and divided its people into castes. A group among them he oppressed, killing their sons and sparing their women. Lo! He was of those who work corruption. (28; verse 4.)

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

There is no compulsion in the matter of religion. (2; verse 256.)

And if thy Lord had pleased, all those who are in the earth would have believed, all of them. Wilt thou then force men till they are believers? (10; verse 99.)

Had Allah willed, idolaters had not been idolatrous. We have not set thee as a keeper over them, nor art thou responsible for them. (6; verse 108.)

And argue not with the People of the Book unless it be in a way that is fair, save with such of them as do wrong; and say: We believe in that which hath been revealed unto us and revealed unto you; our God and your God is One, and unto Him we surrender. (29; verse 46.)

If God had not raised a group (Muslims) to ward off the others from aggression, churches, synagogues, oratories and mosques where God is worshipped most, would have been destroyed. (22; verse 40.)

THE RIGHT TO LIFE

And slay not the life which Allah hath forbidden save for justice. (17; verse 33.)

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY

And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to gain the hearing of the judges that ye may knowingly devour a portion of the property of others wrongfully. (2; verse 188.)

NO ONE IS TO SUFFER FOR THE WRONGS OF ANOTHER

Each soul earneth on its own account, nor doth any laden bear another's load. (6; verse 165.)

Whosoever goeth right, it is only for the good of his own soul that he goeth right, and whosoever erreth, erreth only to its hurt. No laden soul can bear another's load. (17; verse 15.)

That no laden one shall bear the burden of another. (53; verse 38.)

FREEDOM OF PERSON

Inferred from the Sunna by Imam Khattabi and Imam Abu Yusuf. A Tradition is reported by Abu Daud to the effect that some persons were arrested on suspicion in Madina in the times of the Prophet. Subsequently, while the Prophet was delivering the Friday sermon (Khutba), a Companion enquired of him as to why and on what grounds had these persons been arrested. The Prophet maintained silence while the question was repeated twice, thus giving an opportunity to the prosecutor, who was present there, to explain the position. When the question was put for the third time and it again failed to elicit a reply from the prosecutor, the Prophet ordered that those persons should be released. On the basis of this Tradition, Imam Khattabi argues in his M'alim-al-Sunnan that Islam recognizes only two kinds of detention: (a) Under the orders of the Court, and (b) For the purposes of investigation.

There is no other ground on which a person could be deprived of his freedom. Imam Abu Yusuf maintains in his Kitab-al-Kharaj, on the authority of the same Tradition, that no one can be imprisoned on false or unproved charges. Caliph Umar is reported to have said: "In Islam no one can be imprisoned without due course of Justice." (Imam Malik's Muwatta.)

FREEDOM OF OPINION

Allah loveth not the utterance of harsh speech save by one who hath been wronged. (4; verse 148.)

Those of the children of Israel who went astray were cursed by the tongue of David, and of Jesus, son of Mary. That was because they rebelled and used to transgress.

They restrained not one another from the wickedness they did. Verily evil was that they used to do. (5; verse 78–79.)

And when they forgot that whereof they had been reminded. We rescued those who forbade wrong, and visited those who did wrong with dreadful punishment because they were evil-livers. (7; verse 165.)

Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right and forbid wrong. (3; verse 110.)

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

It is He who has made the earth manageable for you, so travel ye through its tracts and enjoy of the sustenance which He furnishes; but unto Him is the Resurrection. (67; verse 15.)

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

And let there be formed of you a community inviting to good, urging what is reputable and restraining from what is disreputable. (3; verse 104.)

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

O ye who believe! Enter not houses other than your own without first announcing your presence and invoking peace upon the

folk thereof. That is better for you, that ye may be heedful.

And if ye find no one therein, still enter not until permission hath been given. And if it be said unto you: Go away again, then go away, for it is purer for you. Allah knoweth what ye do. (24; verse 27–28.)

And spy not, neither backbite one another. Would one of you love to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Ye abhor that so abhor the other! (49; verse 12.)

THE RIGHT TO SECURE BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE

And let not those who hoard up that which God has bestowed upon them of His bounty think that it is better for them. Nay, it is worst for them. That which they hoard will be their halter on the Day of Resurrection. (3; verse 180.)

And in the wealth of the haves there is due share of the have-nots. (51; verse 19.)

THE RIGHT TO REPUTATION

Neither defame one another, nor insult one another by nicknames. Bad is the name of lewdness after faith.

O ye who believe! Shun much suspicion; for lo! some suspicion is a crime. (49; verse 11–12.)

And those who malign believing men and believing women undeservedly, they bear the guilt of slander and manifest sin. (33; verse 58.)

THE RIGHT TO A HEARING

Inferred from the Sunna. The Prophet sent Ali to Yeman and gave him the following direction: "You are not to take decision unless you have heard the second party in the same way as you have heard the first."

THE RIGHT TO DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPER JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

O ye who believe! If an evil-liver bring you news, verify it, lest you smite some folk in ignorance and afterward repent of what ye did. (49; verse 6.)

O man, follow not that whereof thou hast no knowledge. (17; verse 36.)

Lo! Allah commandeth you that ye restore deposits to their owners, and, if ye judge between mankind, that ye judge justly. (4; verse 58.)

Quaid-i-Azam was aware of these Quranic Rights, although he attached more importance to the rights of equality and liberty, and the freedom of religion. In respect of the right of equality, he was obviously aware of the Quaranic verse: "O Mankind; Be careful of your duty to your Lord who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and spread from these two many men and women." (4; verse 1.) Regarding the freedom of religion, he was acquainted with such Quranic verses as: "There is no compulsion in the matter of religion"; and: "And if thy Lord had pleased, all those who are in the earth would have believed, all of them. Wilt thou then force men till they are believers?" (2; verse 156. 10; verse 99.) About tolerance and protection of the non-Muslim religious communities, he was familiar with the Quranic injunction: "If God had not raised a group (Muslims) to ward off the others from aggression, churches, synagogues, oratories and mosques where God is worshipped most, would have been destroyed." (22; verse 40.) Therefore, he knew that the God of Islam enjoined not only tolerance of all the religions other than Islam but the Muslims were obliged to defend the places of worship of the non-Muslims under their protection.

According to Quaid-i-Azam, the demand and struggle for Pakistan had ensued mainly because there was a danger of denial of these fundamental human rights in the Indian sub-continent. In his speech at Chittagong on 26th March, 1948, he stated clearly:

> You are only voicing my sentiments and the sentiments of millions of Mussalmans when you say that Pakistan should be based on sure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasize equality and brotherhood of man. Similarly you are voicing my thoughts in asking and in aspiring for equal opportunities for all. These targets of progress are not controversial in Pakistan, for we demanded Pakistan, we struggled for it, we achieved it so that physically as well as spiritually we are free to conduct our affairs according to our traditions and genius. Brotherhood, equality and fraternity of man—these are all the basic points of our religion, culture and civilisation. And we fought for Pakistan be-

cause there was a danger of denial of these human rights in this sub-continent.

In a speech at the University Stadium, Lahore on 30th October, 1947, he said:

> The tenets of Islam enjoin on every Mussalman to give protection to his neighbours and to the minorities regardless of caste and creed. . . . All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and peace without.

Earlier on 11th August, 1947, in his Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he had proclaimed:

> You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. . . . Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

Although in his Presidential Address, Quaid-i-Azam had illustrated two fundamental principles of Islamic democracy, namely, equality and freedom of personal faith, a campaign was started against him by his enemies to the effect that he was a nationalist and that he would make Pakistan a secular state. He was very distressed as it appears from the following interview reported in the Press on 25th January, 1948:

> M. A. Jinnah said that "he could not understand a section of the people who deliberately wanted to create mischief and made propaganda that the Constitution of Pakistan would not be made on the basis of Shariat. . . ." The Governor-General of Pakistan said that he would like to tell those who are misled—"some are misled by propaganda"—that not only the Muslims but also the non-Muslims have nothing to fear.

Quaid-i-Azam obviously stood for a strong, independent and irreproachable judiciary because human rights could not be protected and enforced without such a judiciary. In this respect also he followed one of the basic principles of Islamic democracy, namely, the traditional independence of the *Qaza* (judiciary). The *Qaza* had existed as an independent institution in Islamic polity since the times of the Prophet. In the later centuries, the *Qazis* (judges) came to be regarded as the "Successors of the Prophet" because they interpreted and enforced the Law of God. Once a *Qazi* was appointed, he became entirely independent from the executive, so much so that even the Head of the State could be summoned and tried in his Court. Everyone came under the Rule of God's Law, including the Head of the State, and in case the Executive Head issued an ordinance which came into conflict with the Injunctions of the Quran, that ordinance was declared null and void by the *Qazi*. Undoubtedly many *Qazis* suffered for their integrity and independence at the hands of autocratic and tyrannical rulers, but the principle of supremacy of God's Law was upheld at all costs.

Throughout his life, Quaid-i-Azam believed that the law courts alone should decide the question of a citizen's rights. He always fought against any move the object of which was to make the judiciary subservient to the executive, or to grant arbitrary powers regarding the liberty of a citizen to the executive.

On 19th September, 1918, attacking the Press Act, 1910, he said:

> Sir, this Act has the defect of all measures which do not come under the purview of judicial supervision, because it is a measure which has got to be administered by the Executive. . . . The Act has been administered in a most arbitrary manner, and you

cannot prevent it, you cannot avoid it, because you must remember that we are all human beings and when such arbitrary powers are given to Heads of Departments and to Executive Officers, it must be remembered that they are human, they have got likes and dislikes and they have their prejudices.

Opposing the Rowlatt Bill in the Legislative Council on 6th February, 1919, he demanded:

> I am a firm believer—I do not care how many Rowlatt Committees will decide and recommend—I am a firm believer that no man's liberty should be taken away for a single minute without a proper judicial inquiry.

In the same speech he further observed:

> It is obvious that this measure is of a most serious character. It is dangerous. It imperils the liberty of a citizen and, my Lord, standing here as I do, I say that no man who loves fair-play, who loves justice and who believes in the freedom and liberty of the people can possibly give his consent to a measure of this character.

On 23rd March, 1925, opposing the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Supplementary Bill, he declared:

> What is your ground? Your ground is a petty ground that a few lives are in danger of being shot at . . . a few lives of officials are endangered; they may be shot at or shot down. Now I ask a simple question, Sir, of myself and my answer is that if I were an official and if I felt that my life was in danger and I was going to be shot down, even like a dog, I should never be a party to a measure which will endanger the life and liberty of the innocent population as this measure undoubtedly does. . . . But rather I would stand to be shot down by that wicked gang, than give power to the Executive and the Police which can be abused and has been abused in the past.

Again on 28th January, 1925, speaking in the Central Legislature, he said:

> My liberty should not be taken away without a judicial trial in a proper court where I have all the rights to defend myself. Under this Ordinance, if I were a citizen of Calcutta, I should have to transfer my allegiance to Mr. Tegart, the Commissioner, because he is the only man who can give me protection and not His Majesty's High Court or His Majesty's Courts.

It was with this mental background that in the course of clarifying various aspects of Pakistan, he explained in an interview to the representative of Associated Press of America on 8th November, 1945:

> The theory of Pakistan guarantees that federated units of the National Government would have all the autonomy that you will find in the Constitutions of the United States of America, Canada and Australia. But certain vital powers will remain vested in the Central Government such as the monetary system, national defence and other federal responsibilities. Each federal state or province would have its own legislative, executive and judicial systems, each of the three branches of Government being constitutionally separate.

Quaid-i-Azam was indeed a firm believer in a strong Centre. But he was, at the same time, aware of the lesson of Islamic history that the Centre which gained its strength through the force of a strong man was doomed to collapse and perish on the removal of the strong man. Therefore, he firmly believed that the source of the strength of the Centre should be the will of the people. Accordingly he was opposed to one man's rule or one party government in Pakistan, as it is clear from the report of his interview to the representative of Associated Press of America dated 8th November, 1945: "Mr. Jinnah said that he did not expect that Pakistan would have one party government and that he would oppose one party rule. 'An opposition party or parties are good correctives for any party which is in power,' he said."

According to Quaid-i-Azam, the will of the people could be ascertained only through the system of direct election. In other words, it was only through direct election that right and proper men could be taken as the representatives of the people.

In 1931, Lord Peel had maintained that the "natives" of India were illiterate

and that they were incapable of electing proper representatives for the Central Legislature. He regarded the system of direct election as unsuitable and dangerous for India, and instead, recommended the adoption of the system of indirect election for the election of the representatives of the Lower House. Lord Lothian, approving the scheme, argued that the election of the representatives of the Lower House by indirect election did not mean that they would not be the representatives of the people. Lord Reading, however, suggested that the matter should be referred to a Commission. But Quaid-i-Azam vehemently opposed the adoption of indirect system of election. The following discussion ensued on 2nd January, 1931, in the sub-Committee which was considering this question:

Mr. Jinnah: I have all along understood the point which Lord Lothian has just put before us. I quite appreciate that the election of the representatives to the Lower House by indirect election does not mean that they will not be the representatives of the people or the nation. We have had that system in India. As a matter of fact, we had that system for our provincial bodies in the old days, and so we have tried it and had experience of it; and it is not my opinion only, but the general opinion that it has been found wanting.

Lord Lothian: What was the size of the electorate, may I ask?

Mr. Jinnah: We had electoral colleges.

Lord Lothian: Yes, but what was the number of the electorate?

Mr. Jinnah: I could not give you that.

Lord Lothian: But that is the point, surely?

Mr. Jinnah: It did not give us satisfaction; we did not get the right men as our representatives. It was found wanting, and therefore, we had to change that system, even with regard to our local legislatures. . . . The representatives must be elected, in our judgement, by direct election. As it is, the franchise is very high and the number of electors very limited, and therefore, Sir, I am not satisfied that any useful purpose would be served by adopting the suggestion of Lord Reading to refer the matter to a Commission, and I agree entirely with Lord Peel that this is a question of principle, or at any rate a question which must be determined by this sub-Committee and by the Plenary Conference; I agree with him there. But while I agree with Lord Peel on that point, I totally disagree with him as to his other conclusions. After listening very carefully to his forcible arguments, I am not satisfied at all that he has made out a case that there will be any such danger as he apprehends in a system of direct election. I think that is more the fear of a conservative mind, which naturally dreads democracy.

Yes, indeed, Quaid-i-Azam definitely differed from such conservative minds which dreaded democracy. It was precisely for this reason that he upheld the principles of Islamic democracy.

It has already been pointed out that according to Quaid-i-Azam, the basic principles of Islamic democracy are equality of man, freedom of private faith, and justice and fair-play to everyone without distinction and discrimination. God has commanded the Muslims to be just and equitable. He says in the Quran: "O you who believe: be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for God's sake, though it may be against your own selves, or (your) parents or near relatives; if he be rich or poor, God is most competent (to deal) with them both; therefore do not follow (your) low desires, lest you deviate; and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely God is aware of what you do." (4; verse 135.)

Islamic state can obviously not be a theocracy because there is no priesthood in Islam. Muslims are forbidden to renounce the world and Islam lays down principles as to how they should conduct themselves in their worldly life. Therefore, in the words of Quaid-i-Azam, Islam is not only a set of spiritual doctrines but a code which regulates the life and conduct of a Muslim even in politics and economics and the like.

There exists a unanimity among the Muslim jurists of the past regarding the distinction between a secular state and an Islamic state. According to this Consensus, the secular state is founded on principles derived through human reasoning, and therefore, it promotes the material advancement and welfare of

its citizens only in this world. On the other hand, the Islamic state is based on principles derived through Revealed Law, and therefore, it promotes the material advancement and welfare of its citizens not only in this world, but also prepares its Muslim citizens for the Hereafter through promoting their spiritual advancement and welfare. In other words, the Islamic state embraces the qualities of an ideal secular state, but in addition to it, endeavours to promote the spiritual advancement and welfare of its Muslim citizens. It was precisely in this sense that Quaid-i-Azam desired Pakistan to be an Islamic democracy —a democracy embracing the qualities of an ideal secular democratic state and at the same time endeavouring to promote the spiritual advancement and welfare of its Muslim citizens.

What were Quaid-i-Azam's views regarding the development of commerce and industry? Was he a supporter of the Western economic theory and practice or did he advocate the adoption of socialization based on the Islamic concepts of equality and social justice?

Quaid-i-Azam was the first to proclaim that Pakistan would be based on the foundations of social justice and *Islamic socialism* which emphasized equality and brotherhood of man. (Chittagong speech, 26th March, 1948.) Therefore, he had aspired to do away with the obvious manifestations of gross social inequality through making Pakistan a Welfare state. He was indeed aware that Islam regarded private ownership as a sacred trust. However, he was also conscious that according to Islam the social rank of an individual was not determined by the amount of wealth he owned, but by the kind of life he lived. Islam recognized the worth of the individual, but at the same time, it disciplined him to give away his all to the service of God and man. It was precisely for this reason that he had rejected the Western economic theory and practice. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan on 1st July, 1948, he declared:

> The economic system of the West has created almost insoluble problems for humanity and to many of us it appears that only a miracle can save it from disaster that is now facing the world. It has failed to do justice between man and man, and to eradicate friction from the international field. On the contrary, it was largely responsible for the two world wars in the last half century. The Western world, in spite of its advantage of mechanization and industrial efficiency is today in a worse mess than ever before in history. The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concepts of equality of man and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind.

According to him, Pakistan must develop industrial potential side by side with its agriculture and give its economy an industrial bias. In respect of commerce and trade, he preached that the traders of Pakistan must maintain the Islamic standards of honesty and integrity while dealing with others. In his address to the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, on 27th April, 1948, he said:

> Commerce and trade are the very life-blood of the nation. I can no more visualize a Pakistan without traders than I can one without cultivators or civil servants. . . . Commerce . . . is more international than culture and it behoves you to behave in such a way that the power and prestige of Pakistan gain added strength from every act of yours.

In the same speech, he declared:

> I would like to call your particular attention to the keen desire of the Government of Pakistan to associate individual initiative and private enterprise at every stage of industrialization. The number of Industries Government have reserved for management by themselves consists of Arms and Munitions of War, generation of Hydro Power and manufacture of Railway Wagons, Telephones, Telegraph and Wireless apparatus. All other industrial activity is left open to private enterprise which would be given every facility a Government can give for the

establishment and development of industry. Government will seek to create conditions in which industry and trade may develop and prosper by undertaking surveys of Pakistan's considerable sources of minerals, schemes for the development of country's water and power sources, plans for the improvement of transport services and the establishment of the ports and an Industrial Finance Corporation. Just as Pakistan is agriculturally the most advanced country in the continent of Asia . . . I am confident that if it makes the fullest and the best use of its considerable agricultural wealth in the building up of her industries, it will, with the traditions of craftsmanship for which her people are so well known and with their ability to adjust themselves to new techniques, soon make its mark in the industrial field.

He always insisted on the industrialists to provide for residential accomodation and other amenities for the workers when planning their factories. On the occasion of laying the foundation-stone of the buildings of a textile mill on 26th September, 1947, he said:

By industrializing our State, we shall decrease our dependence on the outside world for necessities of life, we will give more employment to our people and will also increase the resources of the State. . . . I hope in planning your factory, you have provided for proper residential accommodation and other amenities for the workers, for no industry can thrive without contented labour.

But in spite of the above statements, Quaid-i-Azam was for the socialization of certain industries and public utilities. Clarifying various aspects of Pakistan in an interview to the representative of Associated Press of America on 8th November, 1945, he had said:

You are asking me to interpret what the Government will do. But personally I believe that in these modern days essential key industries ought to be controlled and managed by the State. That applies also to certain public utilities. But what is a key industry and what is a utility service are matters for the law-makers to say, not for me.

In short, the principle laid down by Quaid-i-Azam was that Pakistan must achieve a balance between private enterprise and State control of industries and public utilities, but he left it to the National Assembly to decide as to which industries and public utilities ought to be controlled and managed by the State and which by private enterprise.

According to him, what were the requisites of national consolidation? Was he for or against the emancipation of Muslim women?

Islam had acted as a nation-building force in the Indian sub-continent, and it was on the basis of "Two nation" theory that Quaid-i-Azam had demanded, struggled for and achieved Pakistan as the homeland of the Muslims. The basis of nationalism in Pakistan, therefore, could only be Islam—particularly when the Muslims of Pakistan descended from different racial stock, spoke different languages and were geographically non-contiguous. Hence, in order to secure national consolidation, Quaid-i-Azam felt that the barriers of regionalism, provincialism, sectarianism and tribalism must be demolished. At a public meeting in Dacca, held on 21st March, 1948, he warned:

As long as you do not throw off this poison (provincialism) in our body politic, you will never be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanise yourself into a real true nation. What we want is not to talk about Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Pathan and so on. They are of course units. But I ask you: have you forgotten the lesson that was taught to us thirteen hundred years ago? If I may point out, you are all outsiders here. Who were the original inhabitants of Bengal—not those who are now living. So what is the use of saying "we are Bengalis, or Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punjabis." No, we are Muslims. Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a Nation now; you have now carved out a territory, vast territory, it is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi, or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is yours. You have got your Central Government where several units are represented. Therefore, if you want to build up yourself into a Nation, for God's sake give up this provincialism. Provincialism has been one of the curses and so is sectionalism Shia, Sunni etc.

Quaid-i-Azam obviously desired that the Pakistanis should demolish the barriers which hindered their development as a single nation. It was with this object in view that he wanted Pakistan to have Urdu as its State language. At the same public meeting in Dacca he declared:

> Ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it clear to you that the State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.

He was aware that there were countries in the world which had two State languages; but all such countries were geographically contiguous. Therefore, in spite of two State languages, they remained tied up solidly and functioned. Pakistan, however, was geographically non-contiguous, and in addition to it, was an ideological State. It had to have, according to him, only one State language. On 24th March, 1948, at the Dacca University Convocation, he again proclaimed: "There can be only one State language, if the component parts of this State are to march forward in unison, and that language, in my opinion, can only be Urdu."

It was also necessary for national consolidation that the Muslim women should work side by side with men. In a speech at the Jinnah Islamia College for Girls, Lahore, on 22nd November, 1942, he said: "If Muslim women support their men, as they did in the days of the Prophet of Islam, we should soon realize our goal."

He preached to the Muslims to emancipate their women. Addressing the Muslim University Muslim League meeting at Aligarh on 10th March, 1944, he said:

> Another very important matter which I wish to impress on you is that no nation can rise to the heights of glory unless your women are side by side with you. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the houses as prisoners. I do not mean that we should imitate the evils of Western life. But let us try to raise the status of our women according to our own Islamic ideas and standards. There is no sanction anywhere for the deplorable conditions in which our women have to live. You should take your women along with you as comrades in every sphere of life avoiding the corrupt practices of Western society. You cannot expect a woman who is herself ignorant to bring up your children properly. The woman has the power to bring up children on right lines. Let us not throw away this asset.

What changes did he want to see in the system of education?

Quaid-i-Azam was aware that under the political subjugation and servitude of the British, the character of the Muslims as a nation had been completely destroyed. They had lost respect for piety, for character, for knowledge or even for wealth, and were taught to respect nothing but power. A people with slavish mentality naturally respect power because they dread it. But a free nation can only achieve greatness if it possesses the strength of character.

Hence Quaid-i-Azam desired that the educational policy of Pakistan should be brought on the lines suited to the genius of the nation, consonant with its history and culture, and having regard to the modern needs and requirements, and vast developments that had taken place all over the world. He told the students at the Dacca University Convocation on 24th March, 1948 that there was no shame in doing manual work and labour for the building up of Pakistan.

In a message to All-Pakistan Educational Conference held at Karachi on 27th November, 1947, he worte [sic]:

> Education does not merely mean academic education, and even that appears to be of a very poor type. What we have to do is to mobilize our people and build up the character of our future generations. There is immediate and urgent need for training our people in the scientific and technical education in order to build up our future economic life, and we should see that our people undertake scientific commerce, trade and particularly, well-planned industries. But we do not forget that we have to compete with the world which is moving very fast in this direction. Also I must emphasize

that greater attention should be paid to technical and vocational education. In short, we have to build up the character of our furture [*sic*] generations which means highest sense of honour, integrity, selfless service to the nation, and sense of responsibility, and we have to see that they are fully qualified and equipped to play their part in the various branches of economic life in a manner which will do honour to Pakistan.

What ideals did he set before the services?

CIVIL

The British had organised the administrative and Police services in accordance with the colonial services' principle, i.e., the officers should regard themseleves [sic] as belonging to the ruling class and therefore they should remain detached and aloof from the common people, with the result that they developed a sense of social superiority bordering on arrogance. They constituted a bureaucracy that ruled and was feared and respected.

Quaid-i-Azam wanted to change this mentality. Accordingly he set three ideals before the officers: First, that they should regard themselves as servants of the people and believe in "service" as their ideal; second, that they should be just and impartial in dealing with the people; and third, that they should not accept political pressure under any circumstances because it eventually led to corruption, bribery, favouritism and nepotism.

Addressing the Gazetted Officers at Chittagong on 25th March, 1948, he declared:

> Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the bureaucracy. It is the people's Government, responsible to the people. . . . Now that freezing atmosphere must go; that impression of arrogance must go; that impression that you are rulers must go and you must do your best with all courtesy and kindness to try to understand the people.

In the same speech he said:

> Wipe off that past reputation; you are not rulers. You do not belong to the ruling class; you belong to the servants. Make the people feel that you are their servants and friends, maintain the highest standard of honour, integrity, justice and fair-play.

He again emphasized in the same speech:

> You must do your duty as servants; you are not concerned with this political or that political party; that is not your business. . . . You are civil servants. Whichever gets the majority will form the Government and your duty is to serve that Government for the time being as servants not as politicians. How will you do that? The Government in power for the time being must also realize and understand their responsibilities that you are not to be used for this party or that. I know we are saddled with old legacy, old mentality, old psychology and it haunts our foot-steps, but it is up to you now to act as true servants of the people.

He told the Civil Officers at Government House, Peshawar on 14th April, 1948:

> You may even be put to trouble not because you are doing anything wrong but because you are doing right. Sacrifices have to be made and I appeal to you, if need be, to come forward and make the sacrifice and face the position of being put on the black-list or being otherwise worried or troubled. . . . It is you who can give us the opportunity to create a powerful machinery which will give you a complete sense of security.

MILITARY

Quaid-i-Azam also addressed the Military Officers frequently and set before them the ideals of faith, discipline and selfless devotion to duty. Addressing the Officers and Men of the 5th Heavy Ack Ack and 6th Light Ack Ack Regiments in Malir on 21st February, 1948, he said:

> Nature's inexorable law is "the servival [*sic*] of the fittest" and we have to prove ourselves fit for our newly won freedom. You have fought many a battle on the far flung battlefields of the globe to rid the world of the Fascist menace and make it safe for democracy. Now you have to stand guard over the development and maintenance of Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of mankind in your

own native soil. You will have to be alert, very alert, for the time for relaxation is not yet there. With faith, discipline and selfless devotion to duty, there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot achieve.

According to him, the Defence Forces' responsibilities included the study of the Constitution and obedience to the commands and orders which had the sanction of the Executive Head. In his address to the Officers of the Staff College, Quetta on 14th June, 1948, he pointed out:

One thing more. I am persuaded to say this because during my talks with one or two very high-ranking officers I discovered that they did not know the implications of the Oath taken by the troops of Pakistan. Of course, an oath is only a matter of form; what is more important is the true spirit and the heart. But it is an important form and I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed Oath to you: "I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the Constitution and the Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all commands of my officer set over me. . . ."

As I have said just now the spirit is what really matters. I should like you to study the Constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the Constitution of the Dominion. I want you to remember and if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adopted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, that the executive authority flows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General and therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position.

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The legacy of Quaid-i-Azam is undoubtedly precious. But it depends upon the legatees to make the best use of this treasure of principles and ideals.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING

The two main biographical studies of Jinnah are Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), and Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study)*, (Lahore, 1953). Jinnah's own writings are compiled in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (2 vols., Lahore, 1960–64). Jinnah's speeches are published in *Speeches by Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah Governor-General of Pakistan*, 3rd June 1947 to 14th August 1948 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, n.d.). Material relevant to understanding the attitudes of Jinnah's circle of friends and co-workers may be found in "Shamloo," ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore, 1948). Background information on the history and problems of the Muslims of India may be found in W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musulmans* (Lahore, 1964, reprinted from the first edition, 1871); Afzal Iqbal, ed., *My Life a Fragment, An Autobiographical Sketch of Maulana Mohammad Ali* (Lahore, 1946); Bashir Ahmad Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan* (Lahore, 1957); S. M. Ikram, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern India* (Lahore, 1950); and Rais Ahmad Jafri Nadvi, ed., *Selections from Mohammad Ali's Comrade* (Lahore, 1965).

For the history of the main political movements in India before partition, two major studies are Penderal Moon's, *Divide and Quit* (Los Angeles, 1962), and Khalid Bin Sayeed's, *Pakistan, The Formative Phase* (Karachi, 1960). The Congress view can be found in B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress* (2 vols., Madras, 1935–47), and R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (3 vols., Calcutta, 1962–63); a Muslim view is presented in A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and To-Day* (Lahore, 1948).

Perhaps the clearest picture of the events of Direct Action Day can be gained from *While Memory Serves* (London, 1950), written by the British officer, Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker, who was in charge of the army in Bengal at the time. For an introduction to the attitudes of the Indian socialists in the years preceding partition, W. C. Smith's *Modern Islam in India* (Lahore, 1947), reflects vividly the mood of many of the intellectuals of the period, especially with reference to communalism.

Information about the Muslim League can be found in *The Constitution and Rules of the All India Muslim League* (Constitutions for the years 1928, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, and 1946), (Delhi: All India Muslim League). The events of partition and of Jinnah's year as Governor-General can be studied in Lord Birdwood, *India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides* (New York, 1954); Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London, 1957); M. R. Kayani, *Not the Whole Truth* (Lahore, 1963); and Percival Spear "The Political Evolution of Pakistan: A Study in Analysis," in Saul Rose, ed., *Politics in Southern Asia* (London, 1963).

A colourful and informative appraisal of Jinnah and Pakistan is given in Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London, 1963). Richard Symond's *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1950), written out of the context of personal involvement with the disasters suffered by the refugees during the transfers of population, remains one of the most accurate accounts of the attitudes that were prevalent at the time. Further useful studies on the history and development of the conflicts that led to the independence of India and Pakistan are W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge, 1953); Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan: a Political Analysis** (New York, 1962); R. V. Weekes, *Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation* (Princeton, 1964); Wayne Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation** (New York, 1963); and L. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London, 1962).

* available in paperback.